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I. INTRODUCTION 
Physical and institutional constraints on the West's water supplies 
threaten to create future shortages in rapidly growing areas. The 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (HWD), for example, 
projects a 140,000 acre foot (AF) shortage by the year 2000, under 
average weather and growth conditions. Under conditions similar to the 
1976-77 drought, the shortage would balloon to near 1.2 million acre 
feet.^  This is not a trivial amount of water and combined with a high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the reliability of present supplies, 
poses a large obstacle to Southern California's future growth. 
Alternatives for solving this problem have focused on water supply 
augmentation through reclamation and in-state transfers (Wahl and Davis, 
1985). These alternatives are technically feasible, but the amount of 
water yielded from them is projected to be small in relation to its cost. 
In an average year, it may cost well over $200 per acre foot to cover the 
projected deficit from these in-state sources. A dry year could drive 
acquisition costs in excess of $400 per acre foot. 
In light of this and other spot shortages projected in the western 
United States, there is a renewed interest in interstate transfers of 
water rights. That is, letting water move between willing buyers and 
sellers as long as third-party interests are protected. This concept of 
an interstate water market and probable reallocation of present water 
uses cuts against the grain of tightly controlled interstate compacts and 
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rigid institutions. Western states currently forbid this sort of 
interstate transfer by private citizens. States possessing significant 
volumes of water in lower valued uses, such as irrigation, would no doubt 
oppose such a plan. However, reallocation may be less costly, both 
privately and socially, than developing and transporting new sources of 
water. 
This investigation will examine the legal, institutional, and 
economic aspects of interstate water transfers. Since economic forces 
can be a long run catalyst in bringing about legal and institutional 
changes, they will be the emphasis of this study. Possible benefits of 
such research have been put forward by (Howe, 1985, p. 1,226), who 
states: 
"...timely research on the economic, legal, and hydrologie 
issues involved in interstate water transfers may preclude 
unnecessary hardening of state policies, obviate litigation, and 
avoid unnecessary expense and environmental damages of future 
(water) development." 
A. The Study Area 
Similar to the Howe study, the Upper Colorado River Basin 
(Figure 1.1) areas has been selected for investigation. This decision 
was made for several reasons. A good deal of research has already been 
done on the hydrology and water diversion systems in the Colorado River 
Basin. Irrigation diverts and consumes the vast majority of Colorado 
River water. Recent salinity and energy studies (Gardner, 1983, Gisser, 
Loke.zi Araond 
Meadyii ffiVe 
rCoiorodo Rivf n 
Boiiiw ' #=: 
Figure 1.1. The Colorado River and Its ttlbutarles 
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et al., 1979) have examine the profitability of Upper and Lower Colorado 
agriculture with reduced water supplies. Nearly one-half of all water 
developed in the Colorado basin is attributable to the Bureau of 
Reclamation—which is in the process of changing its policies regarding 
water transfers. Finally, the Colorado River Basin offers a marked 
contrast in water uses and users. The Upper Basin is characterized by 
lower valued uses while the Lower Basin connects to California and the 
MWD. Between the two extremes are hydropower interests, elevation 
differences, recreational uses, environmental concerns, and secondary 
impacts to consider. Whether interstate water right transfers are 
economic may well depend on how one treats these interests and the 
underlying institutional issues. 
An often quoted description of the physical setting of the River is 
contained in the Arizona vs. California Supreme Court decision (373 U.S. 
546, 552 (1962)). The Court's eloquent description is as follows: 
"The Colorado River itself rises in the mountains of Colorado 
and flows generally in a southwesterly direction for about 
1,300 miles through Colorado, Utah, and Arizona and along the 
Arizona-Nevada and Arizona-California boundaries, after which 
it passes into Mexico and empties into the Mexican waters of 
the Gulf California. On its way to the sea it receives 
tributary waters from Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Arizona. The river and its tributaries flow in a 
natural basin almost surrounded by large mountain ranges and 
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drain 242,000 square miles, an area about 900 miles north to 
south and 300 to 500 vide from east to west—practically 
one-twelfth the area of the continental U.S., excluding Alaska. 
Much of this large basin is so and that it is, as it always has 
been largely dependent upon managed use of the Colorado River 
System to make it productive and inhabitable." 
Obviously, the Colorado River basin is a unique area. Alternatives 
for balancing water supply and demand in this area will likely be 
conditioned by this unique physical setting, as well as its institutional 
and economic characteristics. All of these attributes will be discussed 
in greater detail in the text. 
B. Objectives of the Study 
This investigation deals with the transfer of water rights. The 
focus will be the irrigation in the Colorado Upper basin and how 
transfers from agricultural uses may impact regional crop production and 
and the quality and volume of river return flows. As such, it is a 
supply analysis of agricultural production and water delivery under fixed 
commodity prices but variable water prices. Of less emphasis to the 
study, but of equal importance in the water transfer setting, are the 
demand characteristics of Colorado River water users. Future needs and 
alternatives of this nonhoraogenous group will dictate the time frame and 
packaging of any transfer proposal. Southern California users, for 
example, are concerned with the diversion schedule of the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP) as well as political pressures involved with an enlargement 
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of California's State Water Project (SWP). These uncertainties could 
influence the rigor with which these users press for institutional 
changes. Thus uncertainty may also impact the terms of trade offered by 
these Lower Basin users. Option leasing as well as outright leases or 
sales of water rights may add reliability to future variable water 
supplies. 
Specifically, this research has two objectives. They are to: 
(1) Determine the economic value of irrigation water in the Upper 
Colorado basin. 
(2) Develop a link between economic, institutional, and hydrologie 
variables in the Upper Basin. Observe the impacts increasing 
opportunity cost of water has on irrigation water usage and 
supplied water for transfer. Determine changes in the River's 
return flow and their off-site impacts. 
The objectives will be carried out in the context of two transfer 
strategies. Although hypothetical, the first strategy closely resembles 
an actual proposal to transfer 300,000 to 500,000 acre feet from the 
Upper Basin to San Diego. The other strategy has not been proposed but, 
in the opinion of water resource experts, is the more feasible transfer 
alternative. They are; 
(1) Transfer up to 400,000 acre feet of Upper Basin irrigation water 
to the Lower Basin on an annual basis for delivery to the MWD 
system. 
(2) Transfer up to a maximum annual delivery of 400,000 acre feet of 
irrigation rights to the MWD system, at the discretion of the 
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recipient of the water, on an option lease basis. That is, the 
recipient takes the water only when it is needed. 
The transfer strategies are both for delivery to the MWD system. 
This does not imply that MWD would be their instigator. Indeed, in the 
case of the proposed San Diego transfer, MWD vocally opposes the plan. 
However, it is very reasonable that one of their member agencies may 
independently try to obtain increased supplies. The transfers will be 
long term leases in nature over a given period of time, here assumed to 
be 30 years. 
The motivation behind using MWD's system as the delivery point is, 
obviously, their possible forthcoming shortages and, as importantly, the 
completion of CAP. As will be discussed later, CAP will legally take 
about one-half of the historical deliveries to the MWD system. At this 
point the Colorado River Aqueduct, which conveys water from the Colorado 
into the MWD service area, will be used at only a fraction of its 
capacity. It is highly likely MWD, or other nearby water users, will 
make a strong attempt to acquire enough water to keep the Aqueduct nearby 
fully utilized. 
C. Method of Analysis 
A major share of the effort in this research was dedicated to 
developing economic models of Upper Basin agriculture and adapting a 
model of river basin transfers. The ideal economic model(s) to estimate 
the value of irrigation water to Upper Basin agriculture might be 
multi-input, multi-output empirical models based on principles of 
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duality. This framework would be flexible enough to analyze the value of 
water as an input of production incorporating uncertainty in input and 
output prices and risk attitudes of area producers. Examples of models 
which only begin to fulfill these ambitions are contained in studies by 
McKay et al. (1983), in regards to the Australian sheep industry, and 
Lopez (1981), for modeling Canadian agriculture. Both studies used 
generalized forms of profit functions to derive input demand and output 
supply responses to changing input prices. 
Lack of data for the study area dictated a more pragmatic 
methodology of determining water's value. Initially, linear programming 
models of Upper Basin agriculture were adapted from the CARD/RCA 
programming framework to accomplish this task. Subsequent difficulty in 
replicating base year acreage levels and setting flexibility constraints 
motivated the adoption of a related nonlinear procedure. 
Incorporating the numerous institutional and hydrologie 
characteristics of the system is accomplished with a model of the 
Colorado basin developed by the Bureau of Reclamation. It was obtained 
from the Bureau for this particular study, but the use of the model 
should not be considered an endorsement of interstate water transfers by 
the Bureau. They were careful to include many disclaimers about 
nonofficial usage of the model. However, the Bureau was very cooperative 
in assisting in its installation and adjustments for this research. 
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D. Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is divided into six chapters in addition to the 
introductory one. 
Chapter II describes the institutional setting for possible 
interstate water transfers in the Colorado basin. There are many levels 
of government involved in water's allocation, each of which needs brief 
elaboration. Additionally, several recent developments in the water 
transfer arena relevant to this study are identified and discussed. 
A survey of the uses and users along the Colorado River comprises 
Chapter III. Although not all directly related to the transfers at hand, 
the background provided in this chapter serves to illustrate the wide 
variety of water users in the system and factors effecting their future 
water demands. Where possible, the value of water for each use is 
summarized from the available literature. 
Chapters IV and V document the evolution of the programming models 
and describe the river basin hydrology model, respectively. 
The procedures used to assess the transfer strategies and their 
results are contained in Chapter VI. Three tasks are assigned in this 
chapter. One is using the programming models to estimate water's value 
under each type of strategy. The other two involve using this 
information in conjunction with off-site impacts generated by the river 
basin model. For each task there is a procedures section specifically 
outlining how the analyses will be conducted and the assumptions needed 
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to make it manageable. Following the procedures are the results of the 
experiments. 
The final chapter, as usual, contains conclusions and then policy 
implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research. 
In the first reading, it may be useful to skip directly to 
Chapters VI and VII after getting the necessary institutional background 
in the next chapter. This is for continuity. As is common with 
dissertations, a good deal of background material and model development 
information is contained in the middle chapters. It is necessary 
information, but its detail can be distracting from the purpose of the 
study. 
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Endnotes 
A^n acre foot is the amount of water needed to cover one acre with 
12 inches of water. This is equivalent to 325,000 gallons of 
water—enough to supply a family of 5 for one year. 
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II. THE "LAW OF THE RIVER" AND ITS RELATION TO 
THE PROPOSED TRANSFER STRATEGIES 
The "law of the river" is the collective term for a group of 
compacts, statutes, and court decisions regarding the allocation and 
operation of the Colorado River. They have evolved from years of 
litigation and negotiation in attempt to guarantee the river is equitably 
apportioned. Whether the rulings have been successful is a social value 
judgment, but it is certainly true they pose a large barrier to 
interstate water transfers in the Colorado basin. The legal environment 
surrounding this topic is at least as important as its economic aspects. 
A large supply of low valued Upper Basin water may be attractive to Lower 
basin urban users, but add to this the litigation costs, river operation 
constraints, and other acquisition expenses, and the per acre foot cost 
of the transfer option can rapidly increase. 
This chapter will discuss the institutional constraints presently 
steering the river's operation. It will be done in the context of the 
specific strategies analyzed in this investigation. After stating the 
strategy, its legal barriers will be briefly reviewed with reference to 
Table 2.1, which summarizes the relevant "laws of the river." Following 
this is a section discussing recent developments in the water transfer 
arena and sure to have an impact on the continued viability of this 
institutional framework. 
Table 2.1. Institutional aspects influencing vater transfers in the Colorado River 
Constraint L#v#l of Administration States Involved Killing 
Colorado Kivar 
Compact (1922) 
Federal, Congressional 
apportion 
l^iper Basin: CO.UT. 
WY,NM. 
Mexican Hater 
Treaty (1945). 
Minute 242 of the 
International 
Boundary and 
Water Commission 
(1973) 
Criteria for Coor- Federal 
dinated Long Range 
Operation of 
Colorado River 
Reservoirs (1970) 
Federal, international O.S. and Mucican 
governments 
All basin states 
Determined river's annual 
average flow of 17.5 million 
acre feet (HAF) would 
be divided evenly between 
Upper and Lover Basin, and 
Mexico. Each basin receives 
annual average of 7.5 MAF. 
Mexico receiving 1.5. Upper 
Basin must release a 10-year 
moving average of at least 
8230 MAF to Lower Basin and 
Mexico. Excess deliveries 
will be split 50/50 between 
AZ and CA. 
Reaffirmed Mexico's 1.5 MAF 
and st^ulated that salinity 
in the Colorado River's de­
livery to Mexico should not 
exceed 115 ppm ± 30 above 
salinity level at Imperial 
Dam. 
Sets flood control levels and 
other criteria for reservoir 
operation. Section 602a 
states that Lakes Powell and 
Mead have equal annual 
storage. 
w 
Table 2.1 (continued) 
Constraint Level of Administration States Involved Ruling 
Arizona vs. 
California 
(1964) 
Upper Colorado 
River Compact 
(1948) 
(Upper Basin 
AcrMMnt) 
Sevan Party 
Afraamr 
(1931) 
Stq>r«Be Court 
affirmation 
Regional CO. UT. mr. NH 
State CA 
Stat# Water Lavs State All basin states 
i^iportioned the Lover Basin's 
share of 7.5 HAF: California. 
4.4; AZ, 2.8; HV, .3. Decreed 
excess deliveries over 7.5 MAF 
be split evenly betveen CA and 
AZ. 
Set specific nrimimiw target 
levels of distribution of 
Upper Basin's 7.5 HAF 
betveen states. 
Divided Câ's 4.4 HAF. First 
3.85 goes to agricultural 
agencies. Utax. .55 goes to 
HiD. Of vater in excess of 
4.4, HMD gets first .55. (HMD 
can drav waarimm of 1.1 HAF). 
All basin states enploy a form 
of the prior apprt^riation 
doctine. i.e. first time, 
first in right. It grants 
private parties usufruetory 
rights to public's vater. 
Seniority of right is de­
termined by filing date. 
Only AZ and Hï make rights 
appurtenent to land. General­
ly, only consumptive use por­
tion can be transferred. 
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Â. Water Transfer Strategies Analyzed 
1. Outright transfer of Upper Basin agricultural water to a Lover Basin 
user on MWD's system 
This strategy would resemble the Galloway Proposal discussed in the 
next section. It involves a Lower Basin urban user taking advantage of 
probably future excess capacity of MWD's Colorado River Aqueduct to gain 
long term annual access to water coming from Upper Basin uses. While 
Galloway plan is to take their water from (apparently) previously 
undeveloped rights, this strategy will look at taking it from currently 
existing agricultural uses. The location and cost of the potentially 
transferred water will be determined by programming models of the Upper 
Basin, described in Chapter IV. 
The most cited institutional constraint barring this sort of 
transfer is the Colorado River Compact of 1922 (70 Cong. Rec. 324, 
1 2 1928). As summarized in Table 2.1, it splits the assumed 15 million 
acre feet average annual flow of the river evenly between the Upper and 
Lower Basins. Each basin must be charged for one-half of Mexico's 1.5 
million acre feet entitlement; the Upper Basin must deliver a long term 
average of 8.23 million acre feet to the Lower Basin, measured at Lee's 
Ferry. The issue which must be resolved as a result of the Compact is 
whether the transferred water should be charged against the Upper Basin's 
entitlement. In the case of a 400,000 acre foot transfer, would the 
Upper Basin be required to release 8.63 million acre feet or would the 
8.23 acre feet remain in effect? Obviously, MWD and CAP officials would 
16 
oppose the latter because it would put them in direct competition for the 
transferred water. The transferee may not go for the latter possibility 
either because in coming years, when excess deliveries (over 8.23 million 
acre feet) are not made as frequently, their priority of supply is likely 
be under that of MWD and CAP. Therefore, for any interstate transfer to 
be feasible, the amount being transferred must be charged against the 
Upper Basin's entitlement in accordance with the Compact, and the 
appropriate state's entitlement as well, pursuant to the Upper Colorado 
River Compact of 1948 (Colo. Rev. Stat § 37-62-101)(McDonald, 1986). 
This assumption also prevents conflict with the decision rendered in 
Arizona and California (373 U.S. 546, 552 (1962)), dividing the Lower 
Basin's share. There remains, however, a source of conflict with 
California's Seven Party Agreement. In the event of excess deliveries 
above 8.63 million acre feet, the transferee may find themselves without 
a conveyance system when MWD takes its first priority to California's 
excess. This possibly will become more remote with each passing year, 
but may exist in the near term. The recipient would likely be a member 
agency of MWD, at any rate—reducing the possibility of conflicts. 
Significant obstacles to the transfer proposition would be contained 
in state water laws. Without some sort of reciprocating agreements, none 
of the states in the Colorado basin allow private parties to enter into 
water transfer pacts that cross state boundaries.^  A recent court case 
could have an impact on this characteristic of state water laws, and will 
be discussed in the next section. 
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States would also have to recognize a transfer as a beneficial use 
of water, especially in the case of a long-term lease. The prior 
appropriation doctrine is often characterized by the phrase "use it or 
lose it." There is a possibility a long-term transfer may be considered 
nonuse or abandonment. However, Upper Basin states, especially Colorado, 
are increasingly recognizing the need for increased conservation and 
efficiency, and will likely exempt some transfer strategies from this 
regulation (Driver, 1986b, and Getches, 1987). 
Another characteristic of state water law—this one more easily 
overcome—is a "rule-of-thumb" indicating that the consumptive use 
portion of the right is only eligible for transfer, not the entire right 
(Trelease, 1979, p. 209). This is to protect neutral third parties. If 
more than the consumptive use is transferred, there is almost certain to 
be alteration in the tributaries, return flows, and hydrolygic 
characteristics. All states guarantee that third parties, whether senior 
or junior rightholders, must not be adversely affected before a transfer 
can take place. 
Other relevant information regarding this transfer strategy involves 
the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau manages the flow of the river by 
coordinating reservoir levels and releases. They do so in a manner which 
fulfills compact and treaty obligations but also in accordance with their 
criteria for coordinated long run operation of Colorado River reservoirs. 
Changes in the current pattern of planned releases would have to be 
compatible with flood control and reservoir balance strategies already in 
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effect. Among the most important of these is Section 602a of the long 
run criteria. It targets equal storage for Lakes Powell and Mead and 
generally states that, for flood control purposes, reservoirs along the 
system should be filled at an approximately equal percentage of capacity. 
During the course of discussing this research, in general and especially 
for the particular transfer strategies considered, the Bureau emphasized 
that it would take skillful river management all along the system to 
carry out the institutional alterations implied by the transfer 
4 proposal. 
Another issue involving the Bureau of Reclamation concerns their 
policy towards transfers of Bureau-developed water. About 40 percent of 
the developed water in the Colorado basin was organized under Bureau 
cost-sharing agreements (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1978). Until 
these cost shares are repaid, rightholders of these waters are 
restricted to transferring their rights to designated local areas only. 
The rightholders are also barred form selling Bureau developed water for 
a profit. However, the Bureau is in the process of changing policies 
regarding transfers out of these designated service areas and profits 
stemming from the transfers. 
2. A lease-option strategy by the Lower Basin user to assure supply 
at a given level 
This is probably a more realistic strategy than the first and has 
been proposed in other areas as well as the Colorado basin (Whittlesey 
et al., 1986). A recipient, such as MWD or someone on their system. 
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would acquire an option to take water from agricultural uses during years 
of reduced deliveries. In the case considered here, MWD would try to 
assure themselves an annual delivery of approximately 897,000 acre 
feet - 400,000 acre feet higher than their base entitlement, but nearly 
equal to their historical use of the Colorado River. In years when 
normal deliveries fall below this amount, MWD would put a "call" on the 
river for the difference. The deficit would be taken from predetermined 
Upper Basin agricultural agencies who would presumably enter into 
contract with MWD for such an arrangement if adequately compensated. 
Like the first strategy, the programming models will identify the areas 
where this water could be acquired at least cost. 
There would necessarily have to be a "trigger date" during the 
previous winter or early spring when MWD would announce whether they will 
exercise their option or not; and if so, how much would need to be 
"called." Of course, the trigger date would need to be sufficiently 
early for irrigators to adjust their operation accordingly. This is 
plausible since the reservoirs and winter snowpack are continually 
monitored. 
The institutional constraints surrounding this strategy are 
essentially the same as those examined for the first strategy. The 
volume transferred for this supplemental purpose would be subtracted from 
the Upper Basin's and appropriate states' entitlements. Only consultative 
use portions of a water right are eligible for transfer. And, as before, 
the same river management criteria apply as well as the treaty 
obligations and state water rights. 
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B, Recent Developments Influencing the "Law of the River" 
The last five years have witnessed a growing momentum for relaxing 
the rigid institution structure surrounding interstate water transfers 
and increasingly using economic criteria to allocate water. Some of the 
impetus originates from private sector investors trying to capitalize on 
Southern California's anticipated water shortages. But most of it stems 
from the public sector itself, finally realizing it may be cheaper both 
socially and environmentally to reallocate existing supplies rather than 
developing new ones. For nearly each one of the last five years there 
has also been an event, or events, which marked a challenge to the 
present water allocating institutions. These will be discussed in 
chronological order; 
1. The Sporhase Decision. 1982 
In Sporhase v. Nebraska (102 S. Ct. 613, 1982), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed Altus v. Carr (87 S. Ct. 240, 1966), ruling that groundwater 
is an article of commerce as defined by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution (Art. 1, 58, cl. 3). As such, the Supreme Court can 
invalidate state and federal regulation if they pose an "impermissible 
burden" on interstate commerce. The opinions rendered by the Justices in 
Sporhase indicate a delicate distinction between the Commerce Clause and 
the states' right to conserve their resources. This case is repeatedly 
cited in current legal opinions regarding the Galloway Proposal and will 
certainly be relied upon if the Colorado River Compact or state water 
regulation are challenged. 
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2. The-Gallowav-Proposal.-1984-to-present 
The Galloway Project is the plan of a group of private sector 
investors to impound up to 1.3 million acre feet of water from Colorado's 
White and Yampa rivers and lease water rights to out-of-state, 
dut-of-basin users. The City and County of San Diego, a member agency 
of MWD, which is threatened with immediate water shortages due to CAP, 
has bought an option for 300,000-500,000 acre feet per year for 40 years. 
Although San San Diego paid only $10,000 for this option. Galloway has 
reportedly spent $28 million for construction of a 20,000 acre foot 
reservoir and intends to raise over $230 million of private funds to 
develop more impoundments (Gross, 1985). Legal obstacles or not, the 
amount of capital already invested by Galloway and the willingness of San 
Diego to buy options on the risky venture illustrate the seriousness of 
the issue of interstate water transfers. As Gross observed, it is the 
water issue of the 1990s. 
Present water institutions are against the Galloway Project. 
Natural resource legal specialists can list many reasons that it is 
doomed. The amount of water Galloway actually has rights to is 
questionable. Many of their current claims were formerly unappropriated 
and have no history of consumptive use.^  The size of their proposed 
impoundments will probably deny Utah their entitlement to the Yampa and 
White rivers - conflicting with the Upper Basin Compact, Provisions on 
location of use and basin apportionment under the Colorado River Compact 
are in direct conflict with the Galloway Project. Finally, Colorado's 
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state export statutes prohibit such transfers for several reasons, but 
mainly because Colorado's citizens would not receive sufficient benefits 
under such a transfer. Two private parties would receive the benefits of 
the public's water. 
Except for the high degree of emotion surrounding the Galloway 
proposal in Western states, its legal impediments make the proposal 
almost laughable. The Upper Basin states are clearly worried that they 
may lose control of future water supplies despite the assurance of the 
Colorado River Compact (Driver, 1986a). 
3. Changing state attitudes toward water reallocation. 1986 
A recent study sponsored by the Western Governor's Association 
(Driver, 1986b), embodies much of the current thinking regarding states' 
evaluating their water allocation institutions. This much publicized 
report actually reiterates what many natural resource economists have 
been proposing for years.* However, coming from the WGA, the message 
seems more urgent because it implies that economists' preaching may have 
finally "sunk in." 
The report lists many findings and recommendations, but the 
overriding messages are that states should: (1) encourage water use 
efficiency as a goal of water policy, (2) facilitate transfers within the 
current institutional structure, (3) reformulate the pricing structure so 
that marginal costs of water supply are reflected in the price, and (4) 
encourage conservation and salvage of water through markets. 
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Two of the more powerful Western governors, Lamm of Colorado, and 
Babbitt of Arizona gave the report high praise and are ardent proponents 
of its message.^  Although far from shaking the foundations of Western 
water law, the report is starting to chip away at traditional attitudes 
characterizing intra- and interstate water allocation. 
4. Changing attitudes at the Bureau of Reclamation. 1986-87 
In a February 20, 1986 meeting in Denver, Interior Undersecretary 
Ann McLaughlin and Bureau of Reclamation Chief Dale Duvall stated that 
the Department of Interior will change its water supply contracts and 
"facilitate exchanges between willing buyers and sellers" of Bureau 
developed water (Twin Falls Times News, 1986). Further statements 
regarding this dramatic policy reversal have been delayed pending 
consultation with Western legislators. 
The 1986 statement is consistent with the Reagan Administration's 
goal of reducing government regulation and increasing market incentives. 
However, it was silent on the important issue of how the almost certain 
windfall profits generated from Bureau water transfers would be divided. 
Many feel that the government should be reimbursed for their substantial 
cost sharing, while others feel that few irrigators would sell or lease 
their rights unless they could retain a majority of the profits. 
Few public statements regarding this change of policy have been made 
since then. Evidently, the reaction to this relaxation of water policies 
was much stronger than anticipated - both positive and negative - and the 
Bureau has since been curiously quiet about it. The feeling among the 
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Bureau's field personnel is that the statement was sincere and future 
transfer proposals of waters developed by them will be considered on a 
case-by-case basis (Hamilton, 1987). 
5. Legal developments in California. 1987 
In January, 1987, California Assembly Bill 2746 (AB2746), also known 
as the Katz Amendment, was enacted. It prohibits "state, regional, or 
local public water agencies from denying a bona fide transferor of 
water...the use of a water conveyance facility which has unused capacity, 
as defined, for the period of time for which that capacity is available, 
if fair market value, as specified, is paid for that use...." 
The Katz Amendment opens the door for someone wanting to take 
advantage of the probable future excess capacity in MWD's Colorado River 
Aqueduct. Although the State Department of Water Resources officials 
downplay this possibility (Hill, 1987), San Diego County Water Authority 
is seriously considering taking advantage of it to gain conveyance for 
Galloway Proposal water (Rios, 1987). 
Other developments in California water policy are less dramatic but 
revealing as evidence of liberalization of transfer regulation. Another 
bill, AB3351, which would establish an Office of Water Marketing within 
the Department of Water Resources was defeated, but the Department was 
directed to facilitate transfers as much as possible. A result of this 
is a State published catalog itemizing proposed water transfers, the 
legal issues surrounding them, the volume of water involved, and likely 
third party impacts of their enactment (California DWR, 1986). 
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C. Summary 
Specific transfer strategies and their legal impediments were 
discussed in this chapter. Two strategies which would take water from 
Upper Basin agricultural uses and send it to a Lower Basin user through 
MWD's conveyance facilities—an outright transfer and an option 
lease—were described in terms of the institutional constraints 
surrounding them. Finally, recent legal developments partially clearing 
the way for such strategies were reviewed and discussed. 
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Endnotes 
R^atified by Congress as the Boulder Canyon Project Act. 
2 
Table 2.1 will not be continually mentioned, but should be used as a 
reference for cited regulation. 
3 
Ironically, although barring this sort of interstate transfers, the 
state of Colorado imposed a $50 per AF tax on water transferred between 
states in excess of compact agreements. The tax is likely to be 
rescinded on constitutional grounds (Holme, 1986). 
Personal communication with Ronald Shuster, River Management section. 
Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, July 1987. 
I^f the right has no history of consumptive use, the percentage of the 
right eligible for transfer cannot be determined. 
T^he report even made it as far east as the Washington Post: "Western 
States Would Turn Off Federal Fawcett," by Susan Kelleher, July 11, 
1986. 
H^owever, neither governor sought reelection in 1986. 
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III. A SURVEY OF THE USE AND USERS OF THE COLORADO RIVER 
AND THEIR ECONOMIC VALUES 
A recent water marketing conference featured a workshop entitled 
"Interstate Marketing of the Colorado River: Money, Politics, and the 
Search for Solutions."^  Among the panelists were John D. Musick, an 
attorney representing the Galloway Group—private investors proposing to 
transfer up to 500,000 acre feet of Upper Basin water to San Diego—and 
Timothy H. Quinn, chief economist with Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California (MWD)—a water user's consortium steadfastly opposed 
to the controversial Galloway plan. Rather than the expected spirited 
exchange, however, the audience was more than mildly surprised to hear 
the two panelists agree on far more issues than they disagreed on. Both 
recognized that agriculture diverts over 90 percent of the Colorado's 
water, and its relative economic value has been steadily decreasing over 
time. They agreed that if agriculture's share of the river dropped to 
80 percent, there would likely be abundant water for competing uses well 
into the next century. Both feel the federal government will play a 
diminishing role in future water development; water supplies for future 
growth will come from private sector initiatives. Most importantly, they 
concurred that long standing institutional restrictions to water 
transfers, such as the Colorado River Compact and California's Seven 
Party Agreement, will be modified to accommodate these transfers. 
Their main point of disagreement was the form and timing of the 
institutional modification. Citing the Sporhase case (102 S. Ct. 613, 
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1982), which alludes that water is an article of interstate commerce and 
cannot be restricted by state-imposed regulation, Musick contends the 
time is at hand for the private sector to play an active role in the 
water allocation process. Quinn, at the other extreme, pleads the use of 
extreme caution when proposing to dismantle long standing agreements. In 
uncharacteristic fashion for a representative of water starved MWD, he 
advocates the use of imaginative options in balancing the demand and 
supply for water. Demand management through pricing and increased 
conservation of existing supplies should be explored before attempting 
interstate (or controversial intrastate) transfers. Quinn, then, sees 
these interstate transfers» as coming in the distant future when other 
plausible strategies are exhausted. 
Whether either one of the panelists is correct is uncertain. The 
Galloway proposal has stalled due to a lack of investors (Getches, 1987) 
and MWD has recently broken off negotiations with Imperial Irrigation 
District to subsidize irrigation conservation, and in turn, acquire the 
conserved water (Water Market Update, 1987). The timing of interstate 
transfer of rights along the Colorado River will depend on many 
variables, among which include future prices of irrigated crops, weather 
patterns, the political climate surrounding California water development, 
federal reclamation policies, and patterns of economic growth in the 
southwestern United States. Although unable to provide reliable 
predictions for the above variables, this chapter can provide relevant 
discussion of the present and future uses of the Colorado, their relative 
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values, and alternatives facing major users of the river when acquiring 
additional water. Hopefully, this information will be useful in 
assessing the probability of interstate transfers as future developments 
unfold. 
The next section broadly surveys the uses of the Colorado. 
Following the survey is a breakdown by Upper and Lower Basin of the 
demands upon the river. The Upper Basin discussion will focus on the 
individual uses of the river. The discussion of the Lower Basin 
concentrates on individual users tapping into the system. 
A. Present and Future Demands in the Colorado Basin 
The exact figures vary according to source, but there is little 
argument that the Colorado River is now over-appropriated. Recent wet 
years and slower than expected completion of the Central Arizona Project 
(CAP) have pushed the almost inevitable water shortage further into the 
future. Two sources serve to illustrate the coming shortage. 
In 1978, the Second National Water Assessment (SNWA) was conducted 
by the now defunct Water Resources Council (WRC, 1978). Among other 
things, they estimated withdrawals and consumptive use by use group for 
the subbasins of the Colorado River. The base year was 1975 with 
estimates provided for 1985 and 2000. Table 3.1 summarizes the SNWA 
estimates for the basin as a whole. Several items are worth noting. 
First, agriculture takes about 92 percent of total diversions and is 
responsible for about 85 to 90 percent of total consumption. Second, 
agriculture's share of water, although remaining high, is estimated to 
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decrease towards the year 2000. Domestic and mineral uses are two other 
major uses of the river which take up agriculture's slack. Finally, the 
total diversions of the Colorado for 1975 and 1985 exceed the river's 
estimated annual flow of 17.5 million acre feet. 
Diverting more than the river flow may not be too alarming 
considering return flows from agriculture and other low efficiency uses. 
2 
Note from Table 3.1 their consumption levels are only a fraction of 
their diversions. The unused portion gradually finds its way to the 
river or tributary. However, in this case there may be cause for some 
alarm. Not included in these figures is the 1.5 million acre feet per 
year required delivery to Mexico. Since the United States would get no 
return flow from this, the 1.5 million acre feet can be added to each of 
the diversion and consumption totals. There is also some question as to 
whether the river's annual flow is even as high as 17.5 million acre 
feet. This figure was derived in the early 1920s during the battle over 
the Colorado River Compact. It was the average of the previous 18 years 
of streamflow data; years which, in retrospect, were fairly wet. Between 
the dryer years 1930 and 1952, the river averaged only 11.7 million acre 
feet. Longer term averages based on tree ring analysis indicate an 
annual flow of near 13.5 million acre feet (Weatherford and Jacoby, 
1975). 
The SNWA estimates of future use of the Colorado River are quite 
conservative when compared to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's estimates 
for future consumption. Table 2 includes these with a slightly different 
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Table 3.1. Present and estimated future diversions and consumptive use 
of the Colorado River by user group, Second National Water 
Assessment (1,000 acre feet)* 
Diversions Consumption 
Use 1975 . 1985 2000 1975 1985 2000 
Agriculture 16,198 16,357 14,682 7,050 7,507 7,342 
Thermal Electric 191 344 397 115 269 310 
Manufacturing 104 105 156 64 62 118 
Domestic 551 667 830 251 304 379 
Commercial 95 114 140 42 52 64 
Minerals 354 500 746 222 324 475 
Public lands 137 189 205 136 187 203 
Fish hatcheries 47 55 64 0 0 0 
Total 17,677 18,333 17,220 7,880 8,705 8,891 
S^ource: Water Resources Council, 1978. 
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user aggregation than the SNWA. Recall that consumptive use contains no 
returns flow, and is lost to the system forever. The estimates are not 
official in the sense that they regularly published, but they are 
publicly reviewed. They are, in fact, somewhat political because some 
feel they are inflated in the more distant years by the Bureau to justify 
future water projects. The source for these estimates is the Colorado 
River Simulation System (CRSS), a river basin computer model which 
calculates future deliveries, power production, reservoir levels, flows, 
and other variables given a user supplied depletion schedule and 
historical streamflow records. The depletion schedule incorporates 
Table 3.2 data and is the working schedule used in the Bureau's river 
management studies. 
Table 3.2 indicates a large jump in municipal and industrial use 
between 1982 and 1990. This is almost entirely due to CAP. Coal 
gasification and oil shale uses are scheduled to begin the latter years 
of the 20th Century. In contrast to the SNWA, agricultural uses are 
estimated to increase significantly. The latter estimate implies the 
Bureau expects several controversial projects in the Upper Basin will be 
completed. 
Two conclusions for the Colorado basin as a whole can be drawn from 
the two demand information sources. One is that irrigated agriculture is 
the main user of the river, current and future. Other uses, particularly 
municipal and energy related are growing rapidly but compose a small 
portion of total water diversions and consumptive use. Irrigated 
agriculture consumes less than one-half the water it diverts. However, 
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Table 3.2. Summary of Colorado River depletion schedule, as used by the 
Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River Simulation System* 
(1,000 acre feet) 
Annual consumption for year; 
Use 1982 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 
Agriculture^  8,828 9,110 9,445 9,486 9,496 9,599 
Thermal power 144 255 313 281 298 314 
Fish, wildlife. 
and recreation 454 482 482 482 482 482 
Minerals 61 73 93 94 94 94 
Water quality im­
provement 
project 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Municipal and 
industrial 981 2,386 2,520 2,559 2,603 2,648 
Exports 838 1,039 1,124 1,176 1,206 1,246 
Coal gasification 0 0 10 30 45 83 
Oil shale 0 9 49 124 172 236 
Total 11,320 13,368 14,050 14,246 14,410 14,716 
S^ource: Colorado River Simulation System (USSR, 1985). 
T^his figure includes 1.5 MAF delivery to Mexico. 
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attempts to increase on-farra irrigation efficiency may be futile given 
the nature of the prior appropriation doctrine. The other conclusion 
concerns total volume of use rather than specific users. From Table 3.1, 
it is apparent that diversions along the river well exceed the long term 
average flow. Table 3.2 shows that consumption of river water should 
increase 18 percent between 1982 and 1990, and 24 percent between 1982 
and 2000. Even discounting the latter figures for possible Bureau 
inflation yields a conclusion of future shortages in the Colorado 
basin. 
B. Current and Future Demands on the Colorado Upper Basin 
Similar to the previous section. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 document present 
and future use of the Colorado Upper Basin as estimated by the SNWA and 
the Bureau of Reclamation, respectively. Again, agriculture uses the 
bulk of the river. The Bureau of Reclamation figures also tend to show 
more dramatic increases in use after the year 1990. Both sources 
estimate consumptive use to be near 3.5 million acre feet in the 
mid-1980s. 
The various categories of use identified in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 are be 
aggregated into five categories of a more general nature and discussed as 
to their present and future uses, and relative economic values. The five 
categories are: (1) agriculture, (2) energy and mining, (3) municipal, 
commercial and industrial, (4) exports, and (5) fish, wildlife, and 
recreation. 
35 
1. Agricultural uses 
Varying with the information source, irrigated agriculture accounts 
for 90 percent of the total Upper Basin diversions and between 60 and 
90 percent of the basin's consumptive water use. A variety of crops 
receive this water, ranging from fruits in Colorado's Grand Mesa to the 
more traditional hay crops in the river valleys. Table 3.5 itemizes the 
crops grown in the Upper Basin and the 1982 acreage figures for each. 
Irrigated crops account for just over 70 percent of the total 
acreage. Irrigated hay alone accounts for over 50 percent of the total 
acres. The crop mix reflects several geographical and economic 
characteristics of the area. Geographically, the Upper Basin is over 
5,000 feet above sea level, with many dryland areas over 8,000 feet. 
These latter areas are limited by high altitude and rainfall to wheat and 
dry bean production. The areas where altitude is not a factor and the 
growing days are in sufficient number to allow row crops are further 
constrained by soil quality. The basin's soils are varied but many are 
derived from salt bearing shale formations. They are also low in organic 
matter, as is common with desert soils, which make them prone to nutrient 
leaching (Gardner, 1983). As a result, crops such as irrigated corn and 
wheat are grown in 3 to 5 year rotations with legumes and other hays to 
retain soil integrity. 
Return flows from Upper Basin irrigation are a major contributor to 
salinity loading of the Colorado River. Irrigators here tend to apply 
excessive amounts of water, up to 6.2 acre feet per acre in some areas, 
to leach salts out of the plant root zone (Gardner). The EPA estimates 
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Table 3.3. Present and future diversions and consumptive use of the 
Colorado Upper Basin by user group, Second National Water 
Assessment (1,000 acre feet)* 
Diversions Consumption 
Use 1975 1985 2000 1975 1985 2000 
Agriculture 7,198 8,124 7,511 2,488 3,011 3,108 
Thermal Electric 115 176 225 44 119 169 
Manufacturing 4 2 2 2 1 2 
Domestic 78 85 93 28 30 32 
Commercial 11 11 12 3 4 4 
Minerals 148 218 398 53 81 161 
Public lands 115 134 142 115 134 142 
Fish hatcheries 22 30 38 0 0 0 
Total 7,691 8,780 8,421 2,733 3,380 3,618 
S^ource; Water Resources Council, 1978. 
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Table 3.4. Colorado River Upper Basin depletion schedule, as used by 
the Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River Simulation 
system (1,000 acre feet)* 
Annual consumption for year: 
Use 1982 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 
Agriculture 2,337 2,532 2,829 2,861 2,871 2,985 
Thermal power 134 237 291 281 298 314 
Fish, wildlife, 
and recreation 21 38 38 38 38 38 
Minerals 61 73 93 94 94 94 
Water quality 
improvement 
project 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Municipal and 
industrial 48 107 192 218 237 236 
Exports 838 1,039 1,124 1,176 1,206 1,246 
Coal gasification 0 0 10 30 45 83 
Oil shale 0 9 49 124 172 236 
Total 3,443 4,039 4,630 4,826 4,965 5,236 
S^ource: Colorado River Simulation System (USER, 1985). 
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Table 3.5. Acreage data for the Colorado Upper Basin, 1982 (1,000 
acres) 
Crop Dryland Irrigated Total 
Fruits 0 11.4 11.4 
Vegetables 0 7.1 7.1 
Corn, grain & silage 1.5 72.8 74.3 
Wheat 212.9 9.9 222.8 
Oats .5 8.7 9.2 
Barley 9.1 117.6 126.7 
Summer fallow 76.8 0 76.8 
Legume hays 16.2 184.3 200.5 
Nonlegume hays 47.7 734.2 781.9 
Other horticulture 
crops 0 .7 .7 
Other row crops, 
including dry 
beans 68.8 1.3 70.1 
Total 433.5 1,148.0 1,581.5 
S^ource: 1982 National Resources Inventory. 
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that nearly 37 percent of the salinity concentration in the Colorado is 
due to irrigation return flows (EPA, 1971). A result of this quality 
degradation was the Colorado River Salinity Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 
93-320) which set maximum salt concentration levels on flows sent to 
Mexico. It also involved a controversial 75 percent federal cost share 
of irrigation efficiency improvements in targeted areas of the Upper 
Colorado Basin. 
Precipitation on the arable areas of the basin varies considerably 
from year to year but averages an irregular 15 to 16 inches. The years 
1979 through 1985 have been relatively wet years, averaging higher than 
historical averages (Colorado Department of Agriculture, 1986). 
The crop mix shown in Table 3.5 reveals an important aspect of the 
area's agricultural economy. The predominance of hay crops in such a 
remote area indicates a major cow/calf industry. The hay is utilized by 
wintering cattle to supplement grazing lands leased from the Forest 
Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Feeder cattle generally 
are sold and transported out of the area to be finished. In net, the 
Upper Basin is an importer of hay, corn, and forages, but an exporter of 
wheat, dry beans, and feeder cattle (Sharp, 1987). 
Under present development rates, the Bureau of Reclamation sees 
nominal increases in surface water supplies in the northern areas of the 
Upper Basin. A significant increase, however, is estimated for the 
southern reaches. Three to four hundred additional acre feet developed 
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for agricultural purposes are scheduled to be "on line" between 1990 and 
2000. The bulk of this is from several historically controversial 
projects—the Dallas Divide, Dolores, and Animas-La Plata projects—which 
are nearing completion. Whether the water from these projects will 
irrigate a crop is questionable and a lesson in political science. The 
projects themselves are products of logrolling from the long lived 
Arizona/California conflict over the Central Arizona Project. Either 
through incorrect expectations of future agricultural prices, or a belief 
the federal government would eventually increase its cost share, the 
targeted recipients of this hard fought water cannot now afford to pay 
for the conveyances to transport it to their farms. 
Since the demand for irrigation water in the Upper Basin is the 
focus of this study and is analyzed in depth in other chapters, little 
discussion of it is offered here. It is important to note that demand is 
a function of the profitability of irrigated agriculture and the 
institutional constraints governing surface water use. Interstate 
compacts divide the Colorado's waters between adjacent states with few 
provisions for transferring water between states. Lesser developed 
areas, such as southwestern Wyoming and western Colorado, currently have 
an abundance of cheap irrigation water, while Lower Basin users, such as 
MWD, are facing imminent shortages at very high prices. An additional 
constraint which insures a large, economical supply of Upper Basin 
irrigation water is a Bureau of Reclamation stipulation which ties 
Bureau-developed water to a specific service area and a specific use. 
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About 40 percent of all Upper Basin water is under Bureau contract 
provisions (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1978), with the bulk targeted 
for irrigation. As a result of the institutional constraints, economic 
incentives play a small role in the demand and supply of irrigation 
water. 
Howe (1985) summarized the annual returns to irrigation water in the 
Upper Basin on a per acre foot level, as shown in Table 3.6. He noted 
that none of the crops generated an overall average net return of $34. 
Gisser et al. (1979), using linear programming models of the Southern 
Upper Basin, found annual returns to irrigation water ranged from $9.83 
to $32.59 per acre foot for up to 226,000 acre feet drawn from 
agricultural uses. 
Although it is clear that irrigated agriculture is a marginal 
proposition in this area, it remains the dominant user of water. 
Competing uses attempting to purchase water rights will base their offer 
price on the present value of the annual returns to irrigation 
water. 
2. Energy and mining uses 
Both sources used to construct Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the Second 
National Water Assessment and the Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River 
Simulation System, estimate water consumption for thermal energy to 
increase by about 100,000 acre feet between 1985 and 2000. About 
one-half of this amount will be drawn from the lower San Juan River for 
additions to 3 power plants in the Four Corners area, operated by Arizona 
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Table 3.6. Consumptive use (1,000 acre feet) and net returns per acre 
foot of consumptive use ($/acre feet) for the Upper Basin. 
Compiled from Hove (1985) 
Crop Consumptive Use 
(1,000 AF) 
Net returns/acre foot consumed* 
Alfalfa 505.5 $42.14, 
Barley 38.2 -27.09® 
Wheat 22.1 23.00 
Corn grain 53.0 38.37 
Corn silage 44.7 51.97 
Pasture 882.8 31.39 
Total 1546.30 Wt. Avg. 34.16 
*These are weighted average figures across eight sub-basins of the 
Colorado River. 
B^arley is often used as a nurse crop for hay. 
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Public Service, Public Service of New Mexico, and Utah International 
Corp. Twenty-five thousand acre feet will be demanded near the Green 
River headwaters in Wyoming to cover expansion of the Jim Bridger Power 
Plant. The remainder of the increase in thermal energy water use is 
located in western Colorado, on the Yampa River, and eastern Utah, near 
the San Rafael. 
To date, little water has had to be drawn from competing uses to 
supply thermal energy needs. In the past, sufficient water was obtained 
through appropriation of excess flows and extra supplies developed by 
water projects. A market value of water for this use in the Upper Basin 
would be hard to establish as a result. However, in the adjacent Great 
Basin, irrigators along Utah's Sevier River have sold water rights to the 
Intermountain Power Project for $1,750 per acre foot. Using a 10 percent 
capitalization rate, a $175 annual charge results. When dealing among 
themselves, the irrigators' water sells for $250 to $350 for a permanent 
right ($25-$35 annually) and $10 to $41 for an annual lease (Wahl and 
Osterhoudt, 1986). Obviously, an economic rent is paid by the power 
companies. 
Other energy related uses of the river are coal gasification and oil 
shale development. The current slide of the energy industry, in general, 
has pushed most concerns about its water use past the year 2000. Future 
development of these two industries are likely to be in northern reaches 
of the Upper Basin, along the Yampa and upper Green rivers. Little 
documentation on water transactions between these uses and competing uses 
44 
is available. Until the 1970s unappropriated water was available in the 
northern reaches, eliminating the need for drawing it out of other uses. 
Mining, along with agriculture, was one of the main users of the 
Colorado before the vast development projects started. Although still 
using a significant quantity of water, its fraction of total uses has 
declined to less than 5 percent. Being a long lived user has resulted in 
a very early priority date for many mining water rights and yielded a 
very reliable water supply. The Bureau of Reclamation estimates nearly a 
50 percent increase in water consumption by the mining industry 
concentrated in the Wyoming portion of the Upper Basin. Little 
information is available regarding the economics of the increase, but the 
water will apparently come from the Bureau's Seedskadie Project. 
3. Municipal, commercial, and industrial uses 
This category contains urban uses such as municipal and domestic 
supplies, and nonurban uses such as commercial, manufacturing, and 
industrial. There are no major metropolitan areas in the Upper Basin 
and, with the exception of growth associated with the recreation and 
energy industries, few prospects of seeing one develop in the near 
future. Being as remote as it is, and lacking major transportation 
thoroughfares, it is little surprise that few outside service and 
manufacturing industries decide to locate here, other than natural 
resource using ones. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicate these categories are 
but 1 to 2 percent of total use. The Bureau of Reclamation estimates a 
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dramatic 4-fold increase in municipal and industrial use between 1982 and 
2000. About one-half of this increase can be attributed to the 103,000 
acre foot Ruedi Reservoir in western Colorado. This reservoir was 
originally built by the Bureau, in part, to provide water for an 
anticipated boom in the oil shale industry. Since this did not 
materialize, the water has been earmarked for future, 
unspecifiedmunicipal and industrial uses. The remainder of the increase 
is distributed among the Gunnison, Blue Mesa Reservoir and Upper San Juan 
areas. 
Little information is available on transactions regarding this 
category of water. With Ruedi Reservoir water available in some parts of 
the basin at subsidized Bureau rates, it seems unlikely an estimate of 
the economic value of water to this category can be derived. 
4. Exports 
Behind agriculture, exports account for the greatest amount of 
depletion in the Upper Basin. Table 3.7 illustrates the many exports on 
the system, their 1982 levels and projected levels for years 1990 and 
2000, as estimated by the Bureau of Reclamation.^  
The recipients of the exported water have not paid a per acre foot 
charge for the water, per se, but have had to provide area-of-origin 
compensation to the Upper Basin. Historically, the compensation has 
usually consisted of the recipient sponsoring water development in the 
originating area. For example, the Northeast Colorado Water Conservancy 
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Table 3.7. Exports from the Colorado River Upper Basin, 1982-2000* 
Volume 
Originating (1.000 acre feet) 
area Destinations 1982 1990 2000 
Main stem, 1) Denver, 
Colorado River Colorado/Big Thompson 378 378 378 
2) Windy Gap Project 0 54 54 
3) Denver Expansion 48 70 100 
4) Colorado Springs, Englewood 10 10 10 
5) Homestake 28 48 48 
Roaring Fork 1) Fryingpan, Arkansas Rivers 117 117 117 
2) Independence Pass 7 7 7 
3) Pueblo, Colorado 3 3 3 
Dolores River 1) (Intra-basin export) 100 162 162 
Yampa, Little 
Snake rivers 1) Cheyenne, Wyoming 8 8 8 
Duchesne River 1) Bonneville, Central Utah 121 160 255 
Project 
Green, Price 
Rivers 1) Central Utah Project 12 12 12 
Upper San Juan 1) San Juan/Chama, Rivers 110 110 110 
Total 942 1, 139 1,264 
S^ource: Colorado River Simulation System (USSR, 1985a) 
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District (NCWCD) was the main beneficiary of the famous Colorado-Big 
Thompson diversion. As compensation to the area west of the Continental 
Divide, near the headwaters of the Colorado, the Green Mountain Reservoir 
was constructed to provide electricity generation and supplement the flow 
of the Colorado. The aforementioned Ruedi Reservoir was partially paid 
for by a similar compensatory strategy from the Fryingpan/Arkansas 
exports. 
5. Fish, wildlife, and recreational uses 
While population growth in the urban areas of the Lower Basin and 
areas adjacent to the Upper Basin have increased consumptive use of the 
river, it has also increased demand for recreation, aesthetics, and 
species preservation (Leigh-Livingston and Miller, 1986). These demands 
depend on water remaining instream and have forced the associated 
institutions to legitimatize their existence. Traditionally, a potential 
user had to divert and beneficially consume water to gain right to it, 
Colorado is the first Upper Basin state to recognize instream use (Col. 
Rev. Stat. 148-121-3(7)) and actively acquired unappropriated water, 
where available, or purchased low priority existing rights to maintain 
minimum flows. Not appearing in Table 3.4, since it is a diversion 
rather than a consumptive use, is an additional 370,000 acre feet 
reserved for fish and wildlife preservation in the Colorado state 
portions of the basin (USBR, 1985b). 
Fish and wildlife often compete with other consuming uses, as is the 
case when irrigators in an overappropriated watershed attempt to draw 
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their full apportionment. Inasmuch that recreational uses are tied to 
native fisheries, wildlife, and other instream uses, they compete with 
consumptive uses also. Recreational uses such as hiking, river rafting 
or canoeing, and fly-fishing are examples of these. However, the large 
dam projects along the upper Colorado, which have resulted in immense 
reservoirs like Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, and Glen Canyon, have generated 
millions of dollars in recreational benefits as well. Power boating and 
easily accessible lake-side activities are the activities of these 
developed waters. 
It is difficult, maybe impossible, to assess whether large scale 
river developments increase or decrease recreational opportunities. For 
certain, these developments have irreversibly changed the basin's 
ecosystem. A wild and scenic river generally attracts a different type 
of person than those who frequent the large reservoirs. Their personal 
values are different and, accordingly, their willingness to pay for the 
experience may be different, also. 
Estimating the value of water used for recreation is difficult. 
Recreational use is often a public good, available for free or at a 
minimal charge, and must be evaluated using indirect techniques. The 
value of fish and wildlife themselves are highly subjective but are often 
aggregated as terms of the recreational demand estimations. Water is 
often a component of many amenities that make up the recreational 
experience "package" whose value is estimated using nonmarket valuation 
techniques such as travel cost methods or contingent valuation. The 
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values derived from such methods are usually site specific and those for 
a particular component, like water, may not be able to be separated from 
the others. 
There are notable exceptions to this, however, Ward (1986) and 
Daubert and Young (1981) analyzed the value of in stream flows for 
recreational boating and fishing in New Mexico, and fishing in Northeast 
Colorado, respectively. Neither study is based in the Colorado basin, 
but in areas adjacent to it. Ward used the travel cost method with 
elicited data from participants to assess the value of increased flows on 
the Rio Chama. He found that by compensating the city of Albuquerque to 
change their reservoir storage strategies, an efficient solution could be 
identified which would increase flow in the river during the summer 
months—greatly increasing recreational benefits accruing to the water. 
The net marginal value to whitewater rafters and fishermen was found to 
be between $868 and $1028 per acre foot consumed for retaining the 
river's normal natural flow. This compares to an opportunity cost of $40 
per acre foot to the city of Albuquerque due to increased evaporation 
from the new storage strategy. Daubert and Young used a contingent 
valuation model to estimate the value of instream flows to fishing on the 
Foudre River. Unlike boating, marginal benefits for fishing decrease as 
the river flow increases over a certain point. Using flow, activity 
days, experience, age, education, and several site specific dummy 
variables, they found the annual marginal benefits of instream flow were 
$11.71 per acre foot (in 1978 dollars) for flow at 100 cubic feet per 
50 
second (cfs).^  As the flow level was increased to 200, 300, and 500 cfs, 
the marginal value of the water dropped to $8.54, $5.37, $2.19, and 
-$.98, respectively. At volumes greater than 500 cfs, the marginal value 
of instream uses for fishing remains below zero, implying the river is 
too turbid for quality fishing. 
The large disparities between the values of instream uses for 
fishing and boating on the Rio Chama and fishing on the Foudre reinforce 
that valuation of such uses is site specific and sensitive to the 
specific use considered. The high values derived from Ward's study show 
that in some areas instream uses can compete very favorably with any 
other use. 
C. Current and Future Demands on the Colorado Lower Basin 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 summarize the demands upon the Lower Basin. 
Again, the Bureau's consumption estimates exceed the SNWAs. However, for 
the years 1982 through 1990 the Bureau figures would probably have to be 
considered the more accurate. The big jump in total consumption over 
this period is the current filling of the Central Arizona Project 
facilities. This is creating a burden upon the Lower Basin which is hard 
to overstate. Note that between 1982 and 1990, the systems annual 
consumptive use began exceeding its annual average of 7.5 million acre 
feet delivery. 
The following sections will concentrate on the individual users of 
this large volume of water, as opposed to the prior examination of the 
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Table 3.8. Present and estimated future diversions and consumptive use 
of the Colorado Lover Basin by user group, Second National 
Water Assessment (1,000 acre feet)® 
Diversions Consumption 
Use 1975 1985 2000 1975 1985 2000 
Agriculture 9000 8233 7171 4562 4496 4234 
Thermal electric 76 168 172 71 150 141 
Manufacturing 100 103 155 62 61 116 
Domestic 473 582 737 223 274 347 
Commercial 84 103 128 39 48 60 
Minerals 206 282 348 169 243 314 
Public lands 22 55 63 21 53 61 
Fish hatcheries 25 25 26 0 0 0 
Total 9986 9551 8800 5147 5325 5273 
S^ource; Water Resources Council, 1978. 
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Table 3.9. Colorado River Lower Basin depletion schedule, as used by 
the Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River simulation 
system (1,000 acre feet)* 
Annual consumption for year: 
Use 1982 1990 2000 2010 2020 2040 
Agriculture 4976 5063 5101 5110 5110 5099 
Thermal power 10 18 22 0 0 0 
Fish, wildlife, 
and recreation 433 444 444 444 444 444 
Water quality 
improvement 
projects 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Municipal and 
industrial 933 2279 2328 2341 2366 2412 
Total 6362 7814 7905 7905 7930 7965 
S^ource: Colorado River Simulation System (USER, 1985b). 
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use categories. The Lower Basin is characterized by a very few, large 
volume of users, each having their own characteristics. Understanding 
these, especially the alternatives facing growing urban users, is 
critical in assessing future water transfers. Following, are 
descriptions of three of the largest users of the water and a brief 
discussion of the largest nonconsumptive user of the river, hydropower 
production. 
1. Agricultural users 
Like the Upper Basin, agriculture is the dominant user of the river. 
However, in the Lower Basin most of the surface water irrigated land is 
not even in the basin itself, but in California's Imperial Valley. The 
irrigation return flows here drain into the Salton Sea. Of the 5 million 
acre feet of agricultural water effectively consumed in the area, about 
4.1 million is accounted for by three agricultural agencies in Southern 
California and an Indian Reservation. The Imperial Irrigation District, 
the largest agency, takes a little over 2.9 million acre feet from the 
river through the All American Canal. There is no return flow from this. 
Likewise, the adjacent Coachella Valley Water District takes about 
350,000 acre feet per year. Along the Colorado River itself, the Palo 
Verde Irrigation district consumes about 420,000 acre feet and the 
Colorado River Indian Reservation uses about 350,000 acre feet. The Gila 
River Project in Arizona makes up the largest non-California agricultural 
users. It uses about 450,000 acre feet annually. 
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Lower Basin agriculture pays better than its Upper Basin 
counterpart. A more favorable climate allows double-croping on much of 
the land and long growing seasons at the least. Because of this, even 
the most marginal crops grown in the Upper Basin such as hay, will return 
2 to 3 times the profit in the Lower Basin. Gardner estimated net 
returns per acre to average $280 in the Imperial Valley, as opposed to 
$50 in one of the more prosperous areas of the Upper Basin, the Grand 
Valley. 
Table 3.10 summarizes the major crops of the Imperial Valley and 
other California lands irrigated with Colorado River water. Fruits, 
legume hay, and cotton are predominant irrigated crops, with significant 
acres in vegetables, wheat, and barley. 
The value of the water used to irrigate these crops is relatively 
high. A detailed breakdown, similar to the one offered by Howe is not 
available for the Lower Basin. However, conservative estimates are 
available for nearby areas in Arizona. Bush and Martin (1986) estimate a 
per acre foot marginal value of water in excess of $400 for vegetables, 
$350 for melons, and $150 to $250 for citrus crops. More traditional 
crops common to both the Upper and Lower Basin, such as legume hay, 
wheat, and barley, have marginal water values of near $100, $75, and $50, 
respectively. Cotton has an estimated value in excess of $100. Finding 
the weighted value of water across Lower Basin crops would be a tedious 
job, but even casual observation puts them well in excess of $100 per 
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Table 3.10. Acreage data for Southern California users of the Colorado 
River, including the Imperial Valley and users adjacent to 
the river (1,000 acres)® 
Crop Dryland Irrigated Total 
Fruit 1.0 223.1 224.1 
Vineyard 1.2 12.0 13.2 
Cotton 0 82.4 82.4 
Sugarbeets 0 18.9 18.9 
Vegetables 0 70.3 70.3 
Other row crops 4.4 35.2 39.6 
Wheat 4.1 34.4 38.5 
Oats 16.0 11.7 27.7 
Barley 67.0 5.3 72.3 
Legume hay 0 140.9 140.9 
Nonlegume hay 0 16.3 16.3 
Total 93.7 650.5 744.2 
S^ource: 1982 National Resource Inventory. 
56 
acre foot and probably closer to $150. This is significantly higher than 
any of the figures from Table 3.6, derived by Howe (1985). 
In the absence of institutional constraints, any nonagricultural 
Lower Basin user trying to draw water out of agriculture would certainly 
consider the Upper Basin's water a candidate for reallocation. 
2. Metropolitan water district of Southern California 
Not the largest single user of the Lower Basin's share of the river, 
MWD may be the singularly most important in terms of initiating changes 
in water allocation. They are facing imminent shortages of water, and, 
by their own estimates demand will exceed available supply by the year 
2000. This assumes historical demand growth, average pricing of water, 
and normal weather patterns between now and then. With a prolonged dry 
period, or a drought similar to the one in 1977, this date could be moved 
up to the immediate future. MWD is very serious about increasing its 
reliable water supply and is already negotiating several option lease and 
water reclamation strategies with surrounding water agencies. 
MWD is a consortium of water user groups whose service areas include 
the counties of Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego. It serves over 
12 million people currently and projects that 15 million will live within 
its boundaries by 2000 (MWD, 1982). MWD's purpose is to provide wheeling 
services for its members by coordinating reservoir storage and releases, 
and acquiring new sources of water to meet increasing demand. It is a 
politically powerful agency but is restrained by an equally powerful 
California environmental movement. 
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Also, MWD is hindered by the memory of the Los Angeles-Owens Valley 
struggle of the early 1900s, which remains clear in the minds of Northern 
5 Californians. A survey of Northern Californians may show they are 
emotionally opposed to any additional water above historical levels going 
to Southern California. Considering the balance of political power in 
California is split fairly evenly between north and south, these may not 
be idle threats. 
Most of the increase in demand in the MWD area results from 
increasing population. As previously mentioned a 3 million increase in 
population is planned by the year 2000. Through conservation awareness 
and possible pricing strategies, per capita water use is expected to 
decrease from about .22 to .20 acre feet per year by the year 2000. 
Figure 3.1 is an MWD prepared graph of their estimates of total water 
demand. The shaded area represents their most probable estimate range 
considering weather variation and population forecast error. 
In contrast to the increase in demand is a nearly static or slightly 
decreasing reliable future supply. Supply for MWD must be looked at from 
a state-wide basis since they get water from four different sources. 
About 1.1 million acre feet per year are available from natural sources 
within the service area. The Los Angeles Aqueduct and the State Water 
Project (SWP) supply about .47 and 1.5 million acre feet annually. The 
balance of their 3.55 million acre feet total is drawn from the Colorado 
River—about .46 million acre feet (MWD, 1983). This latter figure is 
about half of their historical delivery from the Colorado. As discussed 
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Figure 3.1. MWD*a eetlmetee of future water demand over their 
entire eyatem 
(Source: Metropolitan Water Dlatrlct* 1982). 
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in previous chapters, the Central Arizona Project is taking the formerly 
surplus Lower Basin deliveries. MWD can only count on their .55 million 
acre feet entitlement from the Seven Party Agreement less deductions for 
Indian rights and power development in eastern California. Table 3.11 
documents estimates of total supplies available to MWD under average, 
dry, and drought conditions for the years 1985 and 2000, estimates of 
"normal" demand for the same periods, and projected deficits under each 
scenario. MWD, then, is facing a deficit of anywhere from .14 to 1.2 
million acre feet depending on future weather conditions. 
Many possibilities are being actively pursued to alleviate this 
projected shortage. These fall under the categories of demand 
management and supply enhancement. 
From the demand side, MWD has been experimenting with interruptible 
service, where a member agency can get a $44 per acre foot discount for 
purchasing an interruptible supply (Quinn, 1986). They are also 
evaluating peak period pricing strategies, which would increase rates 
during peak periods relative to off-peak ones. A Regional Urban Water 
Management Plan, implemented in 1985, incorporates a number of 
conservation programs. These include promoting drought resistant 
landscaping, an irrigation management program to improve timing and 
applications, and developing information networks for coordinating 
supplies and releases. MWD also will contribute up to $93 per acre foot 
for members of more fully develop their own local supplies. 
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Table 3.11. Metropolitan Water District estimate's of Service Area 
Supply and Demand (million acre-feet per year)* 
Average-year 
supply 
Repeat of 
1928-1934 
dry period 
Repeat of 
1976-1977 
drought 
1985 2000 1985 2000 1985 2000 
Supply 
Local 
Los Angeles Aqueduct 
Colorado River 
State Water Project 
1.11 
0.47 
0.46 
1.15 
1.12 
0.47 
0.40 
1.48 
1.11 
0.47 
0.46 
1.13 
1.12 
0.47 
0.40 
0.99 
1.11 
0.30 
0.46 
0.71 
1.12 
0.30 
0.40 
0.59 
Total 3.55 3.47 3.17 2.98 2.58 2.41 
Demand 
"Normal demand" 3.19 3.61 3.19 3.61 3.19 3.61 
MWD's estimate 
of deficit 0.14 0.02 0.63 0.61 1.20 
S^ource: Metropolitan Water District, 1983. 
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The volume of water saved by demand management programs Is 
uncertain. Quinn estimates the latter strategy, subsidizing development 
of agencies' local supplies, will reduce annual demand by near 80,000 
acre feet. Wahl and Davis (1986), using elasticities derived from 
previous Southern California water demand studies, estimate a 300,000 to 
730,000 acre foot demand reduction through the use of a marginal cost 
pricing strategy by MWD. Currently, they use an average price structure. 
However, Wahl and Davis note that MWD officials do not put much faith in 
the elasticity estimates. Reisner also noted that these officials are 
very opposed to raising rates to members, believing that their 
constituents pay enough for water already. It would appear that there 
are opportunities for MWD to balance their demand and supply with demand 
management programs, but there obviously would be a great deal of member 
resistance to further rate increases. 
Supply enhancement programs involve water reclamation programs with 
nearby agricultural agencies and large scale investment in upgrading 
existing water projects. Although MWD's negotiations with Imperial 
Irrigation have recently turned sour, they are working with the adjacent 
Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD) on a groundwater storage program. 
During recent wet years MWD has recharged CVWD's groundwater basin with 
excess Colorado River water. In later dry years MWD can draw up to 
61,000 acre feet from CVWD's share of the SWP. Negotiations are 
currently under way with the Palo Verde Irrigation District for an option 
lease program similar to the one considered in this study. MWD believes 
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there is potential to increase their Colorado River yield by up to 
100,000 acre feet in dry years by compensating Palo Verde irrigators for 
the use of their water and investing in efficiency raising capital 
improvements in the area. Other capital improvements related to the 
Colorado River source include lining of the All American and Coachella 
canals. This is estimated to save about 125,000 acre feet, but at a cost 
of between $200 and $300 per acre foot. 
An exchange agreement with the Arvin Edison Water Storage District 
(AE) shows potential to increase supplies by 100,000 acre feet in dry 
years. Excess SWF water, which has historically been wasted for lack of 
reservoirs, would be put into groundwater storage for AE irrigators. 
When MWD is faced with a shortage, they could draw upon AE's portion of 
the federal Central Valley Project (CVP). AE would then use the 
groundwater stored by MWD. Other potential water banking strategies are 
considered with Kern County and in the Chino Basin. 
Potential large scale additions to the SWP and the CVP, their yield, 
and per acre foot costs are presented in Table 3.12. Its source is Wahl 
and Davis (1986). Without discussing every possibility, it is safe to 
say the least expensive alternative is a controversial peripheral canal 
around the delta of San Francisco Bay. It is estimated to yield around 
700,000 acre feet at a cost of $210 per acre foot. 
The preceding discussion could leave the impression that MWD has 
their future water supplies under control. Under normal demand and 
weather conditions this may be the case. However, none of the strategies 
63 
Table 3.12. Potential Future Yields from State Water Project and 
Central Valley Project* 
Project 
Firm Yield 
(MAF) 
Cost 
(1981 $ per acre--foot) 
With 
Delta 
transfer 
Without 
Delta 
transfer 
Costs 
at 
Delta 
Transport 
to 
southern 
California Total 
State 
(Peripheral Canal) 0.70 100 110 210 
Cottonwood Creek 0.20 0.15 200 110 310 
Thomes-Newville 0.22 0.16 245 110 355 
Los Vaqueros 0.26 0.20 325 110 435 
Los Banos Grandes 0.25 0.10 330 110 440 
Federal 
Enlarged Shasta 1.40 n.a.b 175 110 285 
Surplus water 1.00+ 1.00 n.a. 110 n.a. 
S^ource: Wahl and Davis (1986). 
n^.a.: not available. 
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for balancing supply and demand currently being implemented have enough 
firm yield to cover their own estimates of projected deficits. 
Implementation of nearly all the strategies simultaneously, with the 
exception of a peripheral canal, would be needed to assure a reliable 
future water supply. Since many of them are still in the negotiation 
stage, there is a strong possibility only a few would ever be realized. 
Additionally, MWD's strategies are expensive. The least expensive are a 
peripheral canal and demand management through pricing. The canal would 
cost over $200 per acre foot and likely be rigorously opposed by northern 
Californiens. Increasing prices in the MWD service area would draw 
equalopposition by their constituents. Its little surprise, then, that 
MWD member San Diego County Water District bought an option on Colorado 
Upper Basin water from the Galloway initiative. Given the chance to 
potentially get up to 500,000 acre feet, they have little to lose when 
compared to their high cost alternatives. 
3. The Central Arizona Project 
Brought before Congress in 1948, authorized in 1968, the Central 
Arizona Project will transport Arizona's share of the Colorado River into 
the heart of the state. CAP consists of a series of aqueducts and 
pumping stations which lifts water of 2000 feet in elevation and 
transports it 300 miles from Lake Havasu into the arable areas 
surrounding Phoenix and Tucson (Martin, Ingram, and Laney, 1982). The 
portion to Phoenix is complete and began operation in 1986. The Tucson 
aqueduct is planned to begin operation in 1991 (Volante, 1986). 
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CAP is currently coming "on line." The Bureau of Reclamation began 
diverting Colorado River water towards Phoenix in 1985. Between then and 
1991, annual deliveries are expected to jump from 43,000 acre feet to 
1.5 million acre feet (USBR, 1985b). After the year 2000 scheduled 
deliveries are expected to decrease about 100,000 to 1.4 million acre 
feet. The rate of water development in the Upper Basin will play a large 
role in determining the reliability of future supplies to CAP. 
CAP was originally planned as a rescue operation for irrigators 
overlying the Tucson Aquifer. Long term mining of it was dropping the 
water table and adding significantly to pumping costs. Irrigators were 
the most vocal proponents of CAP until recent years when it was apparent 
that, despite federal subsidies, they couldn't afford to pay for the 
distribution system. Controversial studies by Young and Martin (1967) 
and Kelso, Martin, and Mack (1973), suggesting that, from an economic 
standpoint, CAP would yield fewer benefits and larger costs to farmers 
than continued pumping of groundwater, have turned prophetic. 
Most recently the forms of CAP has shifted to urban and native 
American uses. According to Reisner, urban developers are being forced 
into buying nonsubsidized CAP water by a stipulation in recent 
groundwater legislation requiring a 100 year assured water supply for any 
new dwelling. Reisner also notes the Department of Interior settled a 
water dispute with the Ak Chin and Pagago Indian tribes by promising 
300,000 acre feet annually out of the Tucson Aqueduct. It is very 
apparent that after investing in literally billions of dollars over the 
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years on the project, the Department of Interior and State of Arizona are 
determined to see it operate at full capacity. 
Ironically, despite their efforts, CAP water is not currently in 
great demand. The Central Arizona Water Conservancy District, created to 
distribute project water, is having a hard time finding buyers for it. 
Although this may not be the case 10 years from now, it is currently 
offering water to subcontractors for less than $50 per acre foot for 
assured supplies and $35 per acre foot for Interruptable service (CAWCD, 
1986). These prices are intended to eliminate an embarrassing near term 
1 million acre foot surplus. Only about 500,000 of 1.5 million acre 
feetscheduled for present delivery is contracted. Arizona is also 
developing a program to recharge the Tucson Aqueduct with CAP water to 
prevent its waste. 
While MWD is aggressively searching for high priced additions to 
their water supply. It seems odd that the recipient of MWD's former 
surplus waters, CAP, Is trying to find someone to take it. Whether 
desirable or not, it is an example of how politics can override economics 
when it comes to water allocation. Given the hard feelings between 
Arizona and California over division of the Colorado River, it seems 
unlikely they will find a mutually agreeable plan to reallocate the near 
term surplus to achieve an economically efficient solution. 
4. Hydropower production 
Hydropower production does not consumptively use water but takes 
advantage of large elevation drop in the basin to generate a massive 
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amount of electricity. The Bureau of Reclamation, who manages water flow 
through the reservoir system, does not specifically manage with respect 
to maximizing power production. They are first obligated to satisfy 
treaty and flood control requirements, and then power production can be 
maximized. However, some have accused the Bureau of confusing the order 
of the priorities, especially after the 1983 Lower Basin floods 
(Weatherford and Brown, 1986)(pp. 225-226). 
Table 3.13 illustrates the amount of energy produced by the Colorado 
River system. A range of annual energy production is given for each of 
the major hydropower dams. A simple average of the range is 13,645 
gigawatt hours (gwh). Using a retail price of $.06 per kilowatt hour 
(kwh), 818.7 million dollars worth of electricity is generated here. Of 
course a retail rate is rarely obtained for it, but illustrates why 
hydroelectric production is counted on to repay a good share of water 
project costs. 
D. Summary 
This chapter identified the demands upon the Colorado River by use 
type, and in some cases, individual users. To the extent possible, it 
attempted to record estimates of the economic value of water for each use 
and user. It should be apparent from the discussion that irrigated 
agriculture is the major consumer of the river, accounting for anywhere 
from 60 to 90 percent, depending on the source, of total consumptive use. 
However, water in agriculture has a very low marginal value, especially 
in the Upper Basin. Previous studies indicated it ranged from near zero 
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Table 3.13. Major hydropower producing dams in the Colorado basin and 
their production* 
Range of annual energy production 
Dara(s) (GWH) 
Blue Mesa 165 484 
Crystal 122 274 
Fontenelle 36 85 
Flaming Gorge 294 761 
Glen Canyon 3633 7527 
Hoover 3633 6359 
Davis 936 1818 
Parker & Imperial 351 811 
Total 9170 18,119 
X = 13,645 
S^ource: Colorado River Simulation System (USER, 1985a). 
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to around $42 per acre foot. On the other hand, a better climate in the 
Lower Basin allows water to return in excess of $100. In comparison, 
urban uses within the MWD service area may be forced to pay in excess of 
$300 per acre foot for limited future supplies. There is high variation 
in the marginal value of product for water in the Colorado basin, which 
may eventually cause pressure to be put upon the institutional systems 
regulating its allocation. 
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Endnotes 
"^Water Marketing: Opportunities and Challenges of a New Era," sponsored 
by the University of Denver College of Law and Watershed West, 
September 26, 1986. 
2 Consumption is that amount of water which is not returned to the 
watershed as return flow. 
3 
Although obtained from different sections of the same source, the total 
from Table 3.6 do not match the export figures in Table 3.3. 
One cfs equals 1.98 acre feet per day. A 100 cfs flow, then, equals 198 
acre feet per day. 
M^any do not distinguish between MWD and Los Angeles Water and 
Power—who, near the turn of the century, anonymously bought up half the 
water rights in the north's Owens Valley in a checkerboard fashion. By 
using such a pattern they could undermine the region's distribution 
system by not maintaining their ditches. This rendered the remaining 
farmland and water rights nearly useless to anyone but themselves 
(Reisner, 1986; Wahl and Davis, 1986). 
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IV. PROGRAMMING MODELS OF UPPER BASIN AGRICULTURE 
Mathematical programming models of Upper Basin crop production were 
developed to assess the agricultural impacts of increased water 
marketing. This chapter will chronologically document their development 
and propose a recently developed method for calibrating them to a base 
year without the use of flexibility constraints. The calibrated models 
are then used to estimate agricultural production, income, and resource 
use in light of increasing opportunity cost for water in downstream uses. 
This information can be applied to derive the value of water for crop 
irrigation—establishing a lower bound from which higher valued users 
might bid water away from agriculture. 
The programming model is for the Upper Basin of the Colorado River 
and its many tributaries. Activities in them account for production, 
resource use, and net returns for 6 major crops—corn grain, corn silage, 
wheat, barley, legume hay, and nonlegume hays. All crops can be grown 
under irrigated conditions and three—wheat, legume hay, and nonlegume 
hay—can be grown under dryland conditions. Three models were developed, 
each originating from the 1985 CARD/RCA linear programming framework 
(English, Smith, and Oamek, 1987), corresponding to CARD/RCA producing 
areas (PAs) 82, 83, and 84 (Figure 4.1). These, in turn, correspond to 
the Water Resource Council's aggregate subareas (ASAs) 1401, 1402, and 
1403. The first model, PA 82, incorporates the area in the Yampa, White, 
Green, Duchesne, Price, and San Rafael river basins. The second, PA 83, 
is for the main stem of San Rafael river basins. The second, PA 83, is 
Figure 4.1. CARD/RCA producing areas (PAs) 82, 83, and 84 in relation 
to the other PAs 
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for the main stem of the Upper Colorado River, the Gunnison, and Dolores 
River valleys. PA 84 includes the Upper and Lower San Juan River 
valley. 
The CARD/RCA framework was originally chosen for this study to 
provide a linkage between the three Upper Basin models and a national 
model of crop production and resource allocation. By using a similar 
methodology with common data sources and resource constraints, the 
impacts of liberalized water transfer policies can be evaluated with the 
stylized regional models and nationally by linking them with the CARD/RCA 
model. Background information on the development of this framework is 
provided in Appendix A. 
A. Mathematical Representation 
As originally formulated, the Upper Basin models were linear 
programs employing a maximization of expected profit criterion function 
rather than the traditional CARD/RCA cost minimization framework. This 
eliminates the need for estimating regional demands and developing 
supporting sectors, such as transportation, to ensure the demands are 
met. Crop marketing activities were created to generate revenue and 
it was assumed that output demands are perfectly elastic with respect to 
quantities supplied. 
The model's specification and data sources for the model can be 
discussed in the context of its mathematical description. Similar to any 
profit maximization linear program, the objective function can be 
represented by the following: 
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3 6 
IT = % Z P.'Qj gross revenue (4,1) 
1=1 j=l J J 
3 K 8 
• Z Z Z (CD. , , * XD. . ,) cost of dryland (4.2) 
1=1 k=l 1=1 ' ' ' ' production 
3 K 8 
- Z Z Z (CI. u 1 * XI. . ,) cost of irrigated (4.3) 
1=1 k=l 1=1 ' ' ' ' production 
3 
- Z (CWA. * XWA. * WEI./WEO.) cost of irrigation (4.4) 
i=l 1  ^  ^  ^ water 
where 
ÏÏ is regional net revenue. 
Pj is the per unit price of crop output j. 
Qj is the number of units of crop output j produced. 
CD. . , is the cost per acre of dryland crop rotation k in PA. n 
X | K I 1  X  
land group 1. 
CI^   ^ is the cost of surface water irrigation rotation in PA^ , 
on land group 1. 
XD i,k,l is the level of dryland acres in rotation K in PA , on 
land group 1. 
XI^  ^  2 is the level of irrigated acres in rotation k in PA^ , on 
land group 1. 
CWA^  is the per acre foot cost of water in PA^ . 
XWA^  is the level of water use, in acre feet, in PA^ . 
WEOj is the on-farm efficiency of water use in PA^ . 
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WEI^  is the incidental efficiency of water use in PA^ . 
The objective function is maximized subject to several constraints 
and accounting rows. The constraints are for land and water: 
3 8 
Z Ï (XD. }) a RLDY. 
i=l 1=1 i,l 
3 8 
I I (XI^  }) i RLIR 
i=l 1=1 1,1 
dryland acreage (4.5) 
constraint 
irrigated acreage (4.6) 
constraint 
and 
XWA^  ^  RWS^  surface water (4.7) 
constraint 
where 
RLDY^  ^  is the dryland acres available in PA^  in land group i. 
RLIR^  ^  is the irrigated acres available in PA^  in land group 1. 
is the amount of surface water available for irrigating RWS^  
endogenous crops in PA^ . 
The accounting rows include soil erosion from wind and water, and labor, 
machinery, and fertilizer expenditures. These items will not have a 
direct impact on the analysis but the information is carried over from 
the CARD/RCA analysis to lend some insight on the magnitudes of secondary 
impacts of water transfers. Soil erosion from water is defined as sheet 
and rill erosion and the associated accounting row takes the form: 
K 8 
Z I (SWTD,. 
k=l 1=1 
i.k.l * ™i.k.l + SWTIi.k.l and rill 
* X'i.k.l'  
(4.8) 
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where 
SWTD^  ^  2 is water erosion from dryland rotation k in on 
land group 1; 
SWTI^  is water erosion from irrigated rotation k in on 
land group 1. 
Wind erosion accounting rows are in the similar form: 
K 8 
Z Z (SWDD. . , * XD. , , + SWDI. . , wind erosion (4.9) 
X»K|1 X|KfX 
* X'i.k.l) " "-o 
where 
SWDD^  2 is wind erosion from dryland rotation k in PAj^  in land 
group 1; 
SDI. . , is wind erosion from irrigated rotation k in land 1 |K| 1 
group 1. 
Rows accounting for expenditures on input items are grouped together: 
3 K 8 
Z Z Z (FERTD. . , * XD. . , + fertilizer expenditures (4.10) 
i=l k=l 1=1 I'K'i I'K'i 
* XI. . , + FERTI. . ,) a 0.0 
X  » K  I X X  f J t X  
3 K 8 
Z Z Z (MACHD. . , * XD. . , machinery expenditures (4.11) 
i=l k=l 1=1 I'K'i I'K'i 
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3 k 8 
Z Z Z (LABD. . , * XD. . , + LABI. . , labor expenditures (4.12) 
i=l k=l 1=1 I'K'i i|K,i 
where 
FERTD^  ^  and FERTI^  ^  ^ are per acre fertilizer expenditures for 
dryland and irrigated crop rotation k, respectively, in PA^  on 
land group 1; 
MACHD^  ^  and MACHI^  ^  are variable machinery expenditures for 
. dryland and irrigated crop rotation k, respectively, in PA^  on 
land group 1; 
LABD^  ^  ^  and LABI^  ^  ^ as labor expenditures for dryland and 
irrigated crop rotation k, respectively, in PA^  on land 
group 1. 
The following sections review parts of the mathematical 
representation such as the revenue, cost, and constraint portions, and 
discuss their formulation. 
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B. Gross Revenue and Output Prices 
Gross revenue is the product of the output price and production 
level for a crop. Here, it is summed across crops and FAs as well. 
Profit maximizing production levels are determined within the model, but 
crop prices must be exogenously supplied. Ultimately, representative 
prices were derived by simply using area averages for the 6 crops, but 
this should not detract from the importance of producer price expectation 
in the production decisions, nor the strong influence of the local 
geography and culture in the price making process. 
Geography and culture can have a large impact on the price of hay, 
the predominant crop in the Upper Basin. The remote locations of some of 
the hay growing and consuming areas, as well as imperfect market 
information, add to interregional price variability. For example, near 
federal reservations, producers may sell hay to Indians in 40 to 50 bale 
increments (about the capacity of a pick-up truck) at what many believe 
to be inflated prices. These factors, along with a belief that many hay 
sales are unreported, make deriving a single average price a subjective 
process. 
Feed and food grains are marketed through somewhat more conventional 
channels. Local extension estimates participation in commodity programs 
to be near 100 percent (Sharp, 1986) for wheat and corn. A 
representative price for barley may be difficult to derive because it has 
two uses—the traditional feed crop and as malting barley for the Adolph 
Coors Corporation. Barley sold to Coors is monitored closely, and if it 
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meets their specifications, receives a substantial price premium. 
The amount of barley sold for this purpose, however, can vary from year 
to year, depending on regional growing conditions. 
Significant amounts of corn are chopped into silage in the Upper 
Basin, although due to infrequent transactions, it is very difficult to 
determine an accurate figure for production or a price received. 
Colorado is the only state which supplies these figures and they may vary 
so significantly from year to year that it is hard to put a great deal of 
faith in them. 
The preceding discussion underscores the fact that agricultural 
marketing institutions in the basin can be very different from those in 
other parts of the country. The majority of production is sold rather 
informally. Developing a systematic procedure to determine 
representative prices was a potentially frustrating exercise. To 
simplify the process, state averages were used. Specifically, the State 
of Colorado's average prices are used since Colorado accounts for the 
majority of Upper Basin production and include prices for all six 
endogenous crops in their annual statistics. Since the model's land use 
will be calibrated to a 1984 base year, 1984 prices were taken from the 
Colorado Crop and Livestock Reporting Service (Colorado Department of 
Agriculture, 1986). Besides assuming Colorado average prices represent 
the entire Upper Basin, prices between PAs are assumed not to 
vary—meaning, for instance, that a ton of hay in PA 82 can be sold for 
the same price as a ton in FA 84. This is not an unreasonable assumption 
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since these areas are adjacent to one another. Nineteen eighty-four 
prices for the six endogenous crops are given in Table 4.1. From an 
economic standpoint, then, it is implicitly assumed that Upper Basin 
producers are price takers and the demand curves for the crops are 
perfectly elastic. 
C. Dryland Crop Production 
Winter wheat is the predominant dryland crop in the study area, 
although there are instances of hay and barley production under these 
conditions. Dryland wheat is always grown in rotation with summer fallow 
and generally tends to yield rather poorly compared to other regions. 
Correspondingly, the returns to dryland production are low. 
Nonirrigated crop activities and their costs were drawn directly 
from the 1990 CARD/RCA linear programming models. There are few 
differences in production costs between the 1982 and 1990 CARD/RCA models 
for these regions, but yields from the 1990 version tend to be slightly 
higher. Through consultation on enterprise budgets with western Colorado 
and area extension personnel, it was decided that the 1990 costs and 
yields more accurately reflected recent experience in the Upper Basin 
(Sharp, 1986; Dalsted et al., 1986). 
The dryland crop activities include the objective function cost, 
yield, and resource use for dryland crops over 8 land groups and the 3 
PAs. Land group delineations were built into the CARD/RCA framework to 
reflect cost and yield differentials by quality of land.^  Although not a 
Table 4.1. Crop prices used in the Upper Basin programming model* 
Crop Price 
(dollars) 
Corn grain 2.66/bu. 
Corn silage 21.70/T 
All wheat 2.91/bu. 
Barley 2.61/bu. 
Legume hay 73.58/T 
Nonlegume hay 65.67/T 
S^ource: Colorado Department of Agriculture (1986). 
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focus of the study, this extra detail is relatively inexpensive to retain 
and is potentially valuable for identifying areas with low values of 
marginal products for water. 
Crop production in the models is rarely represented by single crop 
activities, but instead by rotations. This is felt to more accurately 
portray the physical realities of the production technology in the area. 
Table 4.2 lists the rotations and percentages of each crop in the 
rotation for the Upper Basin FAs. Rotations are listed by a two letter 
code borrowed from the CARD/RCA analysis. Crop weights represent the 
proportion of each crop in the rotation. 
The per acre variable costs for a rotation in a given FA, are the 
2 
sums of the machinery, labor, pesticide, fertilizer and "other" costs, 
times the appropriate crop weights. Machinery, labor pesticide, and 
"other" costs are expressed on a per acre basis. Fertilizer costs are 
yield dependent. Input levels are not allowed to vary in this framework. 
In a very real sense, a fixed technology is assumed to exist and input 
substitution possibilities are very limited. 
Each activity requires an acre of land, the only constraining 
resource in the dryland sector. Other variables including erosion and 
components of the objective function are carried as accounting rows. 
Yields for crops grown by the various activities are based at FA 
levels, using historical data, and adjusted for the land groups with 
indices developed by the EFIC erosion simulation model (English, 1985; 
Futman and Dyke, 1987). Impacts due to soil and wind erosion, rotation 
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Table 4.2. Dryland crop rotations used in the Colorado Upper Basin 
Rotation code Crop weight Crop 
SC .50 wheat 
.50 summer fallow 
NC 1.00 nonlegume hay 
BM .20 barley 
.60 legume hay 
.20 summer fallow 
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sequence, and nitrogen carryover from previous crops are also 
Incorporated In the yield levels. 
The profitability of dryland production, as might be measured in a 
partial budgeting framework, is possible to compute but would be quite 
lengthy in light of the cost and yield variations by land group and PA. 
Wheat, for example, has a dryland yield of near 30 bushels per acre in 
the more productive land groups of FA 82 but averages less than 14 
bushels per acre on land group 8 of FA 84. Costs vary less, ranging from 
$40 to $45 per acre. Irrespective of the price used, the net returns to 
dryland wheat will vary greatly. It also should be noted that 
profitability of a crop is its return to fixed costs, such as land and 
operator management. 
D. Irrigated Crop Production 
Irrigated crop activities are formulated almost identically to the 
dryland activities. Costs, resource use, and yields are, of course, 
different but derived by the same process and from the data sources. The 
principal differences are additional components accounting for crop 
consumptive water use costs (per acre). Total water available for 
irrigation is limited by PA. 
Assuming a nearly fixed technology with few input substitution 
possibilities simplified the process of determining crop consumptive 
irrigation requirements. All crops are assumed to get a "full" 
irrigation, with no possibility within the model to cut back crop 
consumptive use (and reduce yields). Therefore, only a single Irrigation 
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level and crop yield were derived. Irrigation levels by crop and PA were 
taken directly from Soil Conservation Service estimates (USDA.SCS, 1976). 
There are no variations in irrigation levels by land group. It is 
important to note that these are consumptive use requirements only, not 
diversions. 
Like dryland crops, irrigated crops are nearly all grown in 
rotations. Table 4.3 documents the rotations considered by FA. Corn, 
grain or silage, is never grown continuously. Due to the low organic 
matter content and poor nutrient retaining properties inherent in desert 
soils, its continuous cropping is not plausible. Continuous irrigated 
wheat is possible only in FA 83. Oats is a feasible crop in parts of the 
Upper Basin, especially as a nurse crop for hay, but historically has had 
a low acreage. 
E. Costs of Irrigation Water and Water Use Efficiencies 
Like other costs, there are variable and fixed components for water 
use. Variable cost are on a per acre foot basis. Fixed costs for 
irrigation, as previously mentioned, are included on a per acre basis 
with the other crop activity costs. Irrigation labor also included at a 
per acre level. 
Variable costs of irrigation water are sums of the application and 
water acquisition costs on a per acre foot basis. This figure is in turn 
adjusted upward to account for on-farra, and other, irrigation 
inefficiencies. Application cost is a weighted average of application 
costs between different distribution systems, fuel sources, and land 
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Table 4.3. Irrigated crop rotations In the Upper Basin, by PA 
Rotation 
cod# 
Crop 
weight Crop 
PA'S incorporating 
rotation 
AA 1.00 barley 82, 83 
BF .17 
.66 
.17 
barley 
legume hay 
corn grain 
83 
BH .17 
.83 
barley 
legume hay 
83 
CH .20 
.20 
.60 
barley 
oata 
legume hay 
82 
OH .20 
.60 
.20 
barley 
legume hay 
com grain 
82 
DJ .20 
.80 
barley 
legume hay 
84 
OK .17 
.66 
.17 
barley 
legume hay 
com grain 
84 
DL .17 
.66 
.17 
li i!l 82 
CP .20 
.20 
.60 
com grain 
oats 
legume hay 
83. 84 
GQ .17 
.17 
.66 
com 
oata 
legume hay 
82 
IT .17 com grain 
wheat 
legume hay 
82. 83, 84 
LC .20 
.20 
.60 
com silage 
«heat 
legume hay 
82, 83. 84 
MZ 1.0 legume hay 83, 84 
NC 1.0 nonlegume ha 82, 83 
PC .20 
.80 
oats 
legume hay 
83 
TK .17 
.83 
nonlegume ha 
legume hay 
82, 83 
SI 1.0 wheat 83 
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groups. It is a single figure for each FA. Included in application 
costs are fuel costs for water pumping (mostly diesel fuel in these FAs), 
labor costs, and other maintenance and operation costs. These were 
derived from several sources, including the Firm Enterprise Data System 
(FEDS), the National Resources Inventory (NRI), and the Soil Conservation 
Services Special Projects publication (USDA,SCS, 1976). Water 
acquisition costs in the Upper Colorado Basin can be interpreted as the 
assessment a water-right holder might pay their mutual irrigation company 
to access water. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as a cost to 
acquire an acre foot in an area with water banking provisions or other 
water marketing activities. Its source is the 1979 Farm and Ranch 
Irrigation Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1982). 
Adjusting for irrigation inefficiencies is accomplished by dividing 
the variable cost by the on-farm water use efficiencies. Typically in 
this area, on-farm efficiency is near .50; meaning it takes about 2 acre 
feet of water to get 1 acre foot into the plant root zone. The effective 
cost to an irrigator of getting an acre foot for consumptive use, then, 
would be twice the variable cost. 
Included in the on-farm efficiency, however, is an incidental, or 
irrecoverable, loss. Of the excess water applied to a field, part of it 
returns to the water system as return flow, and another portion is lost 
to evaporation and deep percolation. These latter, irrecoverable losses 
are accounted for elsewhere in the model—in the water purchase 
activities. Therefore, they are "backed-out" of the efficiency figure by 
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multiplying the incidental efficiency times the application cost. 
Incidental efficiency is treated separately because at a future date it 
may be desirable to examine conservation strategies that reduce 
irrecoverable losses. The sources for the irrigation efficiencies are 
the same as those for the variable water cost. 
Fixed irrigation costs are somewhat inappropriately named. In the 
present context they are per acre costs incurred when the decision to 
irrigate is made. Examples of this type of cost are ditching and ditch 
maintenance, drainage, and depreciable ownership costs of the irrigation 
system. The more traditional fixed costs, aptly entitled "sunk costs" in 
the CARD/RCA framework, include the well (for pumped water) and power 
power supply costs. These are on a per acre basis but are not included 
in the analysis since they are fixed and should not enter the production 
decision. 
F. Land Availability Constraints 
The 1982 National Resources Inventory (NRI) provides estimates of 
dryland and irrigated acres available for crop production on the eight 
land groups at a county level (USDA,SCS, 1984). Counties comprising each 
PA are then summed to create a land availability constraint by land group 
and FA. Specifically, the constraint is the sum of the acres devoted to 
production of individual endogenous crops by land group and PA in 1982. 
A consistency problem surfaced when comparing NRI endogenous crop 
acres to Statistical Reporting Service (SRS) estimates. The latter tends 
to show fewer acres of nearly every crop considered compared to NRI 
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estimates. SRS data are published annually, show consistency across 
years, and are considered more reliable than the once every four years 
NRI surveys (USDA,SRS, 1986). As a result, the difference between the 
two sources was subtracted from the NRI data, in proportion to the land 
in each land group. Replicating base year acreages for endogenous crops, 
then, exhausted the land base. 
G. Water Availability Constraints 
Surface water availability is constrained to levels experienced in 
the past. Specifically, for a given year and PA, it is a crop's per acre 
consumptive use requirement times the number of acres historically 
devoted to the crop, summed across all endogenous crops. This results in 
single value for each PA which is then divided by the incidental 
irrigation efficiency for use as an upper limit to surface water use. 
For the CARD/RCA model, the number of acres of a crop was obtained from 
the 1982 NRI (USDA, 1984) and its consumptive use requirement from the 
Soil Conservation Services Special Project bulletin (USDA,SCS, 1976). 
Therefore, calibrating the model to the 1982 NRI acres should completely 
exhaust the surface water supply. Accordingly, the Upper Basin models' 
water constraints incorporate 1984 SRS acreage data, rather than the NRI, 
to determine historical crop acres. 
Although alternative sources for water constraints were available 
for this area, it was felt the above "bottom-up" method most adequately 
suited the particular models. Estimates of consumptive water use from 
the Bureau of Reclamation (USER, 1985b) and the SNWA (Water Resources 
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Council, 1978) imply significant amounts of excess water in the 
calibrated models. This extra water would have a dual value of zero, 
since it is not needed within the model. Obviously, this is not 
realistic. Additionally, the USSR and SNWA estimates do not distinguish 
between crops—making the chore of separating endogenous and exogenous 
crops difficult. 
H. Nonconstraining Rows 
Rows accounting for soil loss, labor use, and machinery and 
fertilizer expenditures are included to crudely assess secondary impacts 
of water transfers. Although constraints for these rows may be developed 
in the future, for now they are nonconstraining. 
Soil losses per rotation, from both water and wind sources, are 
obtained from the CARD/RCA analysis. The soil loss from water is 
measured by the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) (Wischmeier and 
Smith, 1978). It is initially derived per crop and PA from the NRI. 
Adjustments due to crop rotation and land groups are then made with 
indices developed from the EPIC soil loss simulation. Wind erosion 
coefficients are derived similarly, but incorporate a wind erosion 
equation developed by Woodruff and Siddoway (1965). 
Soil loss in the Upper Basin does not threaten the lands' 
productivity, like, for example, in the Midwest, but accelerates off-site 
damages such as sedimentation of dams and waterways, and contributes to 
salinity loading of the rivers. 
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Labor use per acre is on a crop basis, as estimated by the Firm 
Enterprise Data System (FEDS) enterprise budget generator. The labor 
userepresented in the model is on crop rotation basis and is the weighted 
sum of labor use in the rotation's individual crops. Labor use is that 
required for the crop production activity. Irrigation labor is not 
included in this figure because it is incorporated in the variable 
irrigation cost. 
Machinery and fertilizer expenditures are calculated in almost 
exactly the same way as labor use. The difference is that their per 
unit levels of usage, as calculated by the Firm Enterprise Data System 
(FEDS) system, are multiplied by their per unit costs. 
I. Development of a Base Solution for the Programming Models 
A base run assuming 1984 equilibrium conditions was used to compare 
future water transfer strategies. Ideally, running the 3 basin linear 
programs as described in previous section, using 1984 costs and prices, 
would result in acreage and production levels near their 1984 values. 
Unfortunately, but as expected, this was not the case. Like other 
normative models, the initial base run shows a significant divergence 
between the observed acreage and production and the figures estimated 
within the models. 
Table 4.4 documents the actual 1984 acreage, production, and yield 
figures, and those estimated by the LP models. The models suggests PA 82 
would produce much more barley than the historical level. PA 82 produces 
more hay, but it is all nonlegume. Also, no corn is produced. 
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Similarly, FA 83 produces more nonlegume hay and no corn. FA 84 
allocates all corn acres to silage. If models were judged solely on 
their ability to replicate base year acreage and production levels, these 
would be unacceptable. Table 4.5 highlights the objective function 
values and the dual values for the limiting resources. Note the rather 
low returns to land and water. With the exception of irrigated acres in 
PA 83, farming appears to have been a marginal proposition in the Upper 
Basin in 1984. Table 4.4 can be referred to again after subsequent model 
calibration runs to compare the changes in the shadow prices of the 
constraining resources. 
It is evident that crop rotations and land group delineations alone 
are insufficient for ensuring that the model results approximate reality. 
Hazell and Norton (1986) cite three areas for investigation when this 
situation arises. One is checking for errors in reported quantities 
produced and sold. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be the case—SRS 
data show consistency in the study area over time. Additionally, the 
extreme specialization of production estimated by the model, especially 
PA 82, discounts this possibility. The second area for investigation is 
more plausible. It involves checking for errors in reported prices. 
Although it is certain the regional price variations here are bounded by 
transportation costs, the exact shape of crop demand curves, especially 
for corn silage, are unknown within this range. If they could be 
approximated with a degree of certainty, output prices could be 
endogenized—greatly increasing the models' integrity. 
Table 4.4. AmUmmry xaaults ficon linar pmgi^ iming mmfaia of As Uper Basin veixig a 1964 base year 
icceages (1,000 aoces) ftoducdm (1,000 units) ISelds (uiita/aae) 
PA Crop 1984 ast. 1984 actual 1984 est. 1984 actual 1984 ast. 1964 actual 
82 com grain 0.0 2.0 186.5 93.25 
82 com silagB 0.0 6.4 98.3 15.36 
82 allitaat 67.6 71.4 1,817.5 1,822.0 26.88 25.52 
82 harlay 141.0 34.2 14,019.8 1,685.6 
82 lagamhay 0.0 181.1 496.0 2.74 
82 mn1wgi»ff hy 352.7 291.0 580.7 404.7 1.65 1.39 
83 com grain 0.0 24.4 3,330.0 134.27 
83 com ailaga 0.0 16.1* 
83 allWmst 53.3 40.2 1,355.0 1,179.2 25.42 28.83 
83 barley 
lagnshqr 
43.4 18.2 434.9 1,513.0 100.2 83.13 
83 139.7 404.0 2.89 
83 isnlflBW lay 238.2 117.1 383.7 173.5 1.61 1.47 
84 com grain 
com silage 
0.0 12.3 1,665.6 135.41 
84 29.58 1.6 438.3 » 14.82 
84 all iteat 89.89 74.7 3,005.2 2,121.8 33.76 28.4 
84 barlay 
lepnelay 
0.0 7.2 574.3 
2.46 
79.76 
84 99.86 100.4 245.9 259.3 2.98 
84 nonilflgMBhey 0.0 16.0 25.3 1.5 
^Gocn irilmr aoces in Eà*s 83 and 84 are derived by subtracting a%n acres hanmsted fir grain foa 
tte total com actes planted. 
o^t reported. 
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Table 4.5. Objective and dual values of preliminary runs of Upper Basin 
linear programming models 
FA 82 PA 83 PA 84 
Objective value 
(X $1,000) 
$38,427.0 $29,567.0 $27.0 
Dual value of 
dryland cropland, 
weighted by land 
groups 
$4.29/acre $2.50 $.77 
Dual value of 
irrigated cropland, 
weighted by land 
groups 
$76.63/acre $37.38 $10.45 
Dual value of 
water 
(281,000 AF of 
slack water) 
31.31/AF (5,160 AF 
of slack 
water) 
Other points 24,650 acres 
of slack dryland 
in land group 8 
400 acres of 
slack dry­
land in land 
group 4 
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The third area cited by Hazell and Norton is checking for errors in 
marginal costs of production. These are likely the most severe errors in 
the Upper Basin model. A characteristic of the production technology 
embodied in linear programs, linear Leontif, is that average cost always 
equal to marginal costs. Regional programming models typically use 
regional averages for crop yields and variable costs. This is obviously 
acceptable when the model estimates approximate actual figures. But 
when estimated acreages greatly differ from historical levels, one would 
strongly suspect there are marginal costs not being reflected. 
Qualitative differences in land not getting picked up by rotations and 
land groups may not be adequately treated in the model. Risk attitudes 
of producers, machinery capacity limitations, and other more implicit 
types of costs would weigh heavily at the margin, but may not be 
accounted for in the LP objective function. There is, then, a strong 
possibility of errors in the average/marginal cost parameters in the 
model. 
Flexibility constraints on crop acreage or production have 
traditionally been used to calibrate programming model to a base year. 
They are also used to form upper or lower limits on changes in these 
variables in subsequent policy analysis. An unfortunate by-product of 
using flexibility constraints is a tendency for them to "drive" the 
model. That is, the solution obtained in an experimental run is based on 
the constraints exogenously supplied to the model. This may not be a 
severe problem when the constraints imposed are based on sound reasoning, 
96 
but often they are set at a rather arbitrary range deemed "reasonable" by 
the model user. 
Day (1961) and Miller (1972) discuss alternative systematic methods 
of setting flexibility constraints. For the most part, these are 
extrapolative or other methods based on historic variability in crop 
acreage or production. Miller (1972, p.70) also cites "informed 
judgement whereby people who are familiar with the situation estimate the 
maximum changes that may be expected." 
The traditional methods of adding constraints could possibly be used 
in this application. Data are available on year to year variation in 
cropping patterns. Also, there was at least one drought year, 1977, in 
which producer adjustment to water scarcity might be observable. 
Unfortunately, a consistent set of data for hay crops is not available 
for years prior to 1980. Hay is generally the lowest returning crop 
whose levels would probably be reduced in water short years. Compounding 
the data problem is a lack of acreage response during the 1976-77 drought 
period for the remaining crops. Although data may be available to use 
the traditional constraint setting methods, they may not be well suited 
for examining a situation, such as water market opportunities, 
historically not experienced. Informed judgement may be preferable, but 
is difficult to obtain in a defendable context. 
This analysis will incorporate an alternative approach to base year 
calibration and the setting of boundaries on year to year adjustments. 
Positive quadratic programming (FQP) can be used to eliminate flexibility 
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constraints for crop allocations in the base and subsequent policy runs. 
This technique requires the attractive assumption of a quadratic Leontif 
production technology, a more flexible form than the linear Leontif. FQP 
uses the dual value associated with the calibrating flexibility 
constraints to derive a quadratic cost term. This term accounts for the 
previously discussed divergence between average and marginal costs. 
Miller and Millar (1976) were among the first to suggest this method in 
agricultural economic research. FQP has since been put into operation by 
Fajardo et al. (1981) in a model of Nicaraguan agriculture. Horner 
et al. (1985) cite several more applications, including models of the 
California agriculture economy and Turkish agriculture. 
J. Implementation of the Positive Quadratic 
Programming Approach 
For continuity, only the steps used to implement PQP are discussed 
in this section. The theoretical aspects of the method are presented in 
Appendix B. Implementing PQP requires two assumptions regarding the 
underlying crop production functions in the Upper Basin. One, there 
exist independent crop production functions made joint by common factors, 
particularly land. Second, these underlying functions are 
linear-quadratic Leontif in nature, rather than simply linear Leontif, 
the specification assumed in most linear programs. Land is the input 
represented by this quadratic portion. The reasoning behind using land 
is not complex. As more and more acres are developed to a single crop, 
external diseconomies can surface. Marginal productivity of the 
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additional acres will likely decrease. As previously mentioned, 
machinery capacity and seasonal labor availability may become, 
constraining. Additionally, risk preferences of producers may dictate 
crop diversification similar to historical levels. 
A separable quadratic production function in land is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the addition of a quadratic cost component to a 
linear program based on average costs and yields (Howitt and Mean, 1985, 
pp. 9-10). This result comes from the principles of duality (Blackorby 
et al., 1978). The assumed quadratic Leontif production function implies 
a profit function concave in land. If the exact shape of the production 
function is unknown and the revenue is linear in output, the concavity of 
the profit function in land must be reflected in the cost function of the 
crop. Thus, the problem becomes one of estimating the quadratic cost 
function for land. 
Estimating the cost function for a base year using PQP is, 
fortunately, a straightforward process. However, since there are no land 
acquisition activities in the existing models, a set of activities to 
3 
acquire land for use by endogenous crops must be created. The 
development of explicit land acquisition activities can best be described 
by an illustration. Consider an acre devoted to the crop rotation DK, 
where .17 acre is devoted to corn, .17 acre is in barley, and the 
remaining .66 acre is in hay. To produce on acre of rotation DK, then, 
.17 acres of land for corn, .17 acres of land for barley, and .66 acres 
of land for hay must be acquired. In the initial LP specification, the 
cost for land for each crop is assumed uniform at an arbitrary $1 per 
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acre. Land availability by crop is not initially constrained as before. 
At this point, the only change in the original LPs are 18 additional 
activities—a land acquisition activity for each endogenous crop for each 
PA. Since the objective value of each activity is $1 per acre, little 
distortion has been introduced to the models. 
With the land activities in place, the first step in implementing 
PQP is setting upper limits on acres devoted to endogenous crops. Table 
3 gives actual acreages for the 1984 base year. Therefore the accounting 
rows associated with the land acquisition activities will be of the "less 
than" type with an upper limit of the respective crops 1984 acres. 
Mathematically these rows would resemble 
LAND, . < (1.001) ACTACRE, . (4.13) 
IfJ 1;J 
where 
LAND. . are actual acres of land the model devotes to crop j; 
 ^» J 
ACTACRE. . are historical acreages in PA; of crop j. Here, 1984 is 
^ » J 
the base year. 
ACTACRE is multiplied by the scaler 1.001 to ensure the original 
resource constraints, namely total available cropland and available 
irrigation water, remain binding. Howitt and Mean show that this 
perturbation, 1.001, will decouple the resource constraints from the 
calibration constraints and should not effect the former's original 
values. 
Rerunning the LP model with the calibration constraints described 
above should result in a nearly exact replication of 1984 acreages. In 
100 
I* 
addition, these constraints should have positive dual values associated 
with them. Dividing the duals by their respective 1984 acres results in 
an "average" marginal cost of calibrating the models to the base year. 
This figure becomes the coefficient of the quadratic cost term, it 
represents the divergence between the average cost of production, used in 
the LP specification, and the actual marginal cost of production implied 
by the observed 1984 crop allocations. Mathematically, this process is 
as follows. 
In the LP specification, the total cost of cropland acquisition for 
a single crop in a given PA (omitting subscripts) is: 
TC is the total cost for an acre of land in a PA for producing a 
particular crop, 
X represents acres of cropland 
a represents the per acre cost assigned to the specific cropland, 
here initially assumed to be $1. 
The marginal cost of specific cropland, then, is initially: 
However, assuming an as-of-yet unknown quadratic cost function for land, 
the actual marginal cost of land, MCA, producers face equals: 
TC = a(x) (4.14) 
where 
MC = a (4.15) 
MCA = a + f(x ) (4.16) 
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ic 
where f(x ) is related to the negative of the dual value of the base year 
* 
acreage constraint. The value of f(x ) also represents the unmeasured or 
overestimated marginal cost of producing that crop in the original 
normative LP model. 
* 
Assuming the unknown marginal cost function f(x ) takes a linear 
form, then: 
f(x) = e + gx (4.17) 
where e is an intercept term 
* 
When X is set equal to the base year, acreage level, x : 
e + gx* = -X (4.18) 
where X is the dual value associated with the cropland constraint. 
As long as the dual value derived in the model, X, is positive: 
e = 0, and (4.19) 
g = -(\/x*) 
Forming the total cost function yields the quadratic objective function 
for the land acquisition activities: 
TC = (a + e + 1/2 gx)x (4.20) 
and e and g are defined by equation (4.19). 
This technique works well when the dual value of the cropland 
constraint, X, is, indeed, positive. However, this is not always the 
102 
case. In some instances crops which show negative profitability in the 
model may have significant acreage of actual production. In this 
situation, a lower limit must be imposed to replicate a base year acreage 
level. Obviously, the "greater than" constraint will have a negative 
dual value since each additional acre of the crop forced in will decrease 
net revenue. Using the same process as before is not plausible since the 
result would imply decreasing marginal costs for land. In this case the 
coefficients e and g are derived slightly differently than in equations 
(4.16) through (A.19). 
Recall the marginal condition stated in equation (4.18): 
e + gx = -(X) (4.21) 
* 
where, when A > 0, e = 0 and g = -(X/x ). Equivalently, by setting: 
e = -2X (4.22) 
and 
, * g = X/x 
The condition will hold as well and increasing marginal costs would 
result. Therefore, for cropland with negative dual values associated 
with the calibration constraint, the latter cost representation is used. 
Derivation of the quadratic cost terms can now be illustrated for 
the three PAs. The actual acreages of each crop in a PA (Table 4.4) were 
multiplied by 1.001 and imposed as upper limit constraints. For the 
profitable crops, under an average cost specification, the dual for these 
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constraints were positive. Some of the less profitable crops, again, 
under the initial average cost specification, were found to have negative 
duals. Appropriately using equations (4.19) and (4.22), resulted in the 
cost functions for land acquisition in Table 4.6. These functions should 
not be interpreted as cost functions for cropland in a strict sense, but 
are terms to account for the previously discussed external diseconomies 
of deviating too far from recent historical patterns. 
Table 4.7 gives objective function values for the LPs constrained to 
1984 acreage levels and the values for when the models are converted to 
FQF. It also contains the dual values for constraining resources. 
Three rather disturbing observations can be made from Table 4.7, and 
comparisons between it and Table 4.5. One is the dramatic increase in 
the objective value when the models are converted to a FQF framework. 
The differences are entirely due to unobserved variables, such as risk, 
qualitative land differences, and other implicit costs. If one puts a 
great deal of faith in FQF, the differences could be defended as valid, 
unmeasured costs and benefits which are lost under an "average" 
specification inherent in regional LFs. For this analysis, objective 
values derived using FQF will be treated with caution. 
A second issue is the change in land's dual cost—often interpreted 
as its rental value. As expected, the duals usually decreased as 
flexibility constraints were added to the model. However, dryland duals 
for FAs 83 and 84 actually increased—and rather dramatically for FA 84. 
This is not a phenomena of FQF. Often, the CARD/RCA LF will show the 
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Table 4.6. Derivation of FQP coefficients and resulting cost functions 
for cropland 
Crop 
Calibration 
constraint 
dual value 
Constrained 
acreage 
level 
Specific 
function 
cropland 
cost 
for 
types 
(dollars) (1,000 acres) 
82 corn grain -58.78 2.00 -116.56X + 29.390x2 
82 corn silage 88.46 6.41 IX + 13.820x2 
82 all wheat 105.59 71.47 IX + 1.1477x2 
82 barley 65.88 34.23 IX + 1.925x2 
82 legume hay -28.03 181.28 -55.06X + . 155X2 
82 nonlegume hay -39.19 291.29 -77.38X + . 137x2 
83 corn grain -264.446 24.42 -527.9X + 10.829x2 
83 corn silage 0.0 15.92 IX 
83 all wheat 86.051 40.94 IX + 2.102x2 
83 barley 474.035 18.21 IX + 26.03x2 
83 legume hay 44.91 139.14 IX + .323X 
83 nonlegume hay -27.583 117.12 -54.16X + .235x2 
84 corn grain 78.083 12.31 IX + 6.348x2 
84 corn silage 267.634 1.60 IX + 167.270x2 
84 all wheat -214.929 74.77 -428.86X + 2.877x2 
84 barley -212.126 7.21 -423.24X + 29.460x2 
84 legume hay -2.720 100.50 -4.44X + .027X2 
84 nonlegume hay -64.674 16.02 -128.34 + 4.040x2 
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Table 4.7. Objective and dual values of the acreage constrained LPs and 
the corresponding FQF models 
PA 82 FA 83 FA 84 
Constrained LF 
Objective value (X 1,000) 
FQF objective value 
(X 1,000) 
Weighted dual value of 
dryland cropland 
Weighted dual value of 
irrigated cropland 
Dual value of irrigation 
-3,959.65 
15,669.97 
4.20/acre 
17.23/acre 
0.0  
-(dollars)-
834.58 
13,673.89 
8.74 
3.75 
0 .0  
-541.17 
5,828.50 
92.14 
4.14 
0 . 0  
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same sort of increase. If one interprets the dual as a rental value of 
land, it seems counter-intuitive that rental rates for dryland should 
increase when the objective value associated with the constrained LP 
decreases. Possibly, this could be interpreted as a rental rate for a 
particular sort of cropland, such as dryland wheat in this case. 
Henderson (1959) alluded to this problem, stating that "...there are no 
general rules which allow an interpretation of its (dual) variables. 
However, in economic applications the dual of an allocation problem...is 
generally a valuation problem with price or rent variables" (p. 246). 
Like with the CARD/RCA model, the dual values tend to increase when a 
"greater than" constraint is imposed on land allocation in a given area. 
A final observation from Table 4.7 is a lack of a dual value for 
water. This is as expected due to the way the water constraints were 
derived. As previously discussed, they were the per acre water 
requirements of a crop multiplied by its 1984 acreage. If there were a 
significant dual value of water, or a great deal of slack water, one 
would then be suspicious. 
K. Baseline Model Solutions and Sensitivity Analysis 
Tables 4.8 through 4.10 present baseline solutions for the three PA 
FQP models of the Upper Basin. The top halves of the tables give 
acreage, production, and yield levels. Although acreages nearly exactly 
replicate the 1984 levels, production and resulting yields do not. 
Barley, in particular shows a higher yield than the historical data 
107 
Table 4.8. Baseline solution and resource use levels for PA 82 
Acreage Production Yield 
Crop (1,000 acres) (1,000 units) (units/acre) 
Corn grain 2.00 164.19 bu. 82.09 
Corn silage 6.40 94.69 T 14.79 
All wheat 71.49 2,068.84 bu. 28.94 
Barley 34.22 3,259.65 bu. 95.26 
Legume hay 180.86 430.86 T 2.38 
Nonlegume 291.04 463.40 T 1.59 
Objective value $15,669.97 
Resource Units (X 1,000) Usage Imputed value 
Dryland cropland acres 146.6 4.20 
Irrigated cropland acres 501.94 17.23 
Water AF 1,004.96 0.0 
Machinery expend. $ 13,885.74 N® 
Labor usage hours 1,462.81 N 
Pesticide expend. $ 1,378.25 N 
Fertilizer expend. $ 6,908.43 N 
Other expend. $ 26,237.16 N 
is nonconstraining. 
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Table 4.9. Baseline solution and resource use levels for FA 83 
Acreage Production Yield 
Crop (1,000 acres) (1,000 units) (units/acre) 
Corn grain 24.42 3,258.40 bu. 133.43 
Corn silage 16.10 235.44 T 14.62 
All wheat 40.93 1,724.87 bu. 42.14 
Barley 18.21 1,811.23 bu. 99.46 
Legume hay 139.04 407.24 T 2.93 
Nonlegurae hay 117.35 130.99 T 1.12 
Objective value $13,673.89 
Resource Units (X 1,000) Usage Imputed value 
Dryland cropland acres 102.0 8.74 
Irrigated cropland acres 283.45 3.75 
Water AF 581.53 0.0 
Machinery expend. $ 9,267.67 N® 
Labor usage hours 1,106.74 N 
Other expend. $ 18,676.10 N 
Pesticide expend. $ 2,168.10 N 
Fertilizer expend. $ 6,385.76 N 
% is nonconstraining. 
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Table 4,10. Baseline solution and resource use levels for PA 84 
Acreage Production Yield 
Crop (1,000 acres) (1,000 units) (units/acre) 
Corn grain 12.31 1,075.27 87.35 
Corn silage 1.60 23.73 14.83 
All wheat 74.77 1,959.16 26.20 
Barley 7.21 442.71 61.40 
Legume hay 100.50 288.17 2.87 
Nonlegume hay 16.01 26.05 1.63 
Objective value 5,828.50 
Resource Units (X 1,000) Usage Imputed value 
Dryland cropland acres 124.59 92.14 
Irrigated cropland acres 150.05 4.14 
Water AF 290.36 0.0 
Machinery expend. $ 6,173.70 N 
Labor usage hours 716.40 N 
Pesticide expend. $ 2,013.56 N 
Fertilizer expend. $ 4,629.40 N 
Other expend. $ 12,096.12 N 
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Table 4.11. Average acreage response elasticities, with respect to 
output price changes of + and - 10 percent, PA 82 
Acreage adjustment in: 
Corn Corn All Legume Nonlegume 
grain silage wheat Barley hay hay 
Price change in: 
Corn grain 3.65 -.03 .016 0 0 0 
Corn silage -.23 3.52 .10 0 -.03 0 
All wheat 1.16 .67 .95 0 0 0 
Barley -1.31 -.91 .54 3.75 -.06 -.07 
Legume hay -2.31 -1.48 -.651 -1.11 4.01 -1.51 
Nonlegume hay -.34 -.24 .387 -.74 -1.65 .63 
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Table 4.12. Average acreage response elasticities, with respect to 
output price changes + and - 10 percent, PA 83 
Acreage adjustment in: 
Corn Corn All Legume Nonlegume 
grain silage wheat Barley hay hay 
Price change in: 
Corn grain 1.4 -1.79 -.31 0 .12 -.13 
Corn silage -.79 4.37 1.29 -.12 .97 -.59 
All wheat -.51 2.5 1.41 -.04 .586 -.42 
Barley -.09 .36 -.25 .53 .14 -.05 
Legume hay 1.07 3.09 .956 .09 2.15 -2.00 
Nonlegume hay -.33 -1.33 -.34 -.07 -.58 2.6 
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Table 4.13. Average acreage response elasticities, with respect to 
output price changes + and - 10 percent, PA 84 
Acreage adjustment in: 
Corn Corn All Legume Nonlegume 
grain silage wheat Barley hay hay 
Price change in: 
Corn grain 3.04 .19 -.32 .22 -.22 0 
Corn silage 0 1.19 0 0 0 0 
All wheat .65 .26 .62 -.25 1.01 0 
Barley 0 0 -.15 .74 0 0 
Legume hay .26 -.38 .88 1.59 .41 -1.93 
Nonlegume hay 0 0 0 0 0 1.65 
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indicate. Other yields are nearer historical averages. It should be 
noted that the 1984 actual yields are for a single year and should not be 
interpreted as long term averages. Yields used in the crop production 
activities are three year averages (1980-1982) that have been adjusted 
for technological advances between then and 1990. Generally, however, 
actual 1984 yields and model yields are comparable. 
The bottom halves of the tables contain resource use information. 
The level and dual values of the constraining resources, land and water, 
are duplicated from Table 4.6. The levels of nonconstraining resources 
are presented also. Tables 4.8 through 4.10 will be referenced in 
Chapter VI for comparison of model results incorporating water transfer 
activities. 
The sensitivity of acreage allocation in relation to price changes 
is presented in Tables 4.11 through 4.13. The responses are measured as 
elasticities; a 1 percent change in a crop's output price will result in 
a percentage increase or decrease in acreage devoted to it and the other 
crops. The procedure used to derive these elasticities consisted of 
shocking the models with a -10, -5, 5, and 10 percent price change. The 
responses given in Tables 4.10 through 4.12 are average responses over 
this range. 
Sensitivity analysis may not be necessary for this exercise since 
price variability is not a focus. However, confidence in the models may 
be increased if they are "well behaved"; that is, if variations from 
their base level prices do not cause implausible adjustments. Linear 
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programming models do not make continuous adjustments to price shocks, 
but tend to jump in steps from one level to another. For example, price 
variation for a crop may have no impact over a narrow range. But 
increase the range and large, sudden shifts can occur. Conversion to FQP 
appears to have make the adjustment process somewhat smoother. 
Overall, the acreage response elasticities meet a priori 
expectations for relative magnitude and sign. Crops such as corn and 
corn silage were expected to have substantial own elasticities. Since 
their relative acreages are few, even minor changes in their absolute 
values are large in percentage terms. Corn for grain and irrigated 
wheat, and corn silage and irrigated wheat were expected to be somewhat 
complementary because they appear in the same rotations. Increases in 
wheat acres would be in the irrigated category, because dryland wheat 
uses nearly all of the dryland acres already. Therefore, wheat price 
increases may result in additional acres of corn. 
L. Summary 
This chapter documented the development of programming models for 
the FAs in the Colorado River Upper Basin. A mathematical description of 
the initial programming models was presented and the data sources for 
each component were described. Preliminary runs of the models indicated 
they were susceptible to over-specialization of certain crops—barley, 
for instance—and needed to be calibrated to the 1984 base year. 
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Positive quadratic programming (FQF) was used rather than the 
traditional flexibility constraints to replicate base year land use 
allocations. FQF uses the dual values associated with calibration 
constraints to derive quadratic cost terms in land. These terms account 
for implicit costs associated with deviating from historical acreage 
patterns, such as qualitative differences in land, seasonal resource 
availability, and producer risk. Development of FA models using this 
technique resulted in replication of base year acreages and estimates of 
other resource uses. The models are fairly insensitive to output price 
changes in major crops. The overall responses, with some exceptions, are 
of the magnitudes and sign expected. 
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Endnotes 
T^he eight land groups correspond to land capability classes and 
subclasses as defined by the Soil Conservation Service. Land group 
1 corresponds to LCCs and SCs I, Ilwa, and Illva; land group 2 to 
lie; 3 to Ille; 4 to IVe; 5 to lie, IIIc, IVc; 6 to lis. Ills, IVs, 
7 to IIw, IIIw, IVw; and 8 to V, VI, VII, VIII. 
2 
"Other" costs include seed, interest on operating costs, and 
ownership costs of machinery. The latter item can be substantial 
in some rotations, often comprising the single most expensive 
input. 
3 
Historically, land costs have not been considered in the CARD/RCA 
framework. Land has had an implied value observed in the shadow 
price of the land constraint. 
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V. MODELING THE HYDROLOGIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATER TRANSFERS 
From the standpoint of balancing the overall demand and supply of 
the Colorado River and its tributaries, this analysis so far has 
concentrated on the users of the system and their future demands upon it. 
This aspect, the demand characteristics, may in fact be the easiest to 
model since it changes in a more or less predictable fashion over time. 
Of equal challenge, then, is to model the variability of the supply of 
water offered by the basin. This variability will obviously depend on 
weather patterns of the current and previous periods, but will also be 
related to the legal systems underlying the basins water allocation. 
Developing a model to simulate such a complex system is certainly out of 
the scope of this research. However, the Bureau of Reclamation has 
recently refined their Colorado River Simulation System (CRSS) to such a 
degree that, with their assistance, nonspecialized individuals can 
implement it. 
With the aid of the University of Minnesota, as well as the Bureau, 
the CRSS model was obtained and installed on Minnesota's CYBER 170 
computer system. Initial baseline runs of the model were verified with 
the Bureau's in-house version and manipulations of it for transfer 
scenarios were discussed with the Bureau as well. Acquisition of the 
CRSS allows the hydrologie and institutional aspects of the Colorado 
basin to be integrated with the economic model described in previous 
chapters. 
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This chapter will review the model system, discuss its application 
to the present study, and present a baseline scenario from which to 
compare transfer strategies. The model is necessarily large and complex 
enough to comprehensively simulate the river's operation. But the basic 
framework is less complex. There are an intimidating number of variables 
in the model. However, only variables relevant to this particular study 
will be discussed in depth, and the output supplied will be limited to 
these variables only. 
A. CRSS 
The CRSS is a set of computer programs and data files used to model 
the quantity and quality of flows in the Colorado River and its 
tributaries. The main program, CRSM, is essentially a water accounting 
system. Water is brought into the basin at several inflow points, routed 
through the system, and deliveries are made. It was developed by the 
Bureau of Reclamation and is the most comprehensive and detailed model of 
the River. CRSS serves as the Bureau's primary tool in studying the 
operation of the Colorado River System (USER, 1985a). 
CRSS consists of 4 separate computer programs with their own data 
bases. Two programs, HYHDRO and SMDID, account for the hydrologie and 
demand inputs, respectively, and generate input for the main program 
CRSM. A fourth program, TAPEDIT, is a report writer. Manipulation of 
the.control decks for the program can yield detailed reports on specific 
variables regarding consumptive use, water quality, flows, hydroelectric 
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generation, and a host of other variables. Figure 5.1 is a flow diagram 
of the CRSS framework. 
There are eight basic characteristics of the overall model described 
in detail in the documentation. 
A brief summary of the modeling system is as follows: 
(1) The model simulates flows, deliveries, salinity concentration, 
power production, and reservoir operation on a monthly time 
frame. 
(2) The basin is divided into 25 sub-basins, or "reaches." Each 
reach can contain up to 10 inflow and 10 diversion points. An 
inflow point can either be on inflow, return flow, reservoir, or 
salinity checkpoint. 
(3) Up to 10 demands can be specified for each diversion point. 
Data available from the demand data base include a schedule of 
withdrawals and depeletions, monthly distributions, return 
flows, allowable shortages, salt pickup, and water use 
information. 
(4) The hydrology data base contains monthly values of flow and 
salt load beginning with water year 1906 and continuing through 
year 1983. The current data base uses 29 inflow stations along 
the river. 
(5) Eight major parameters are modeled: flow, salinity, reservoir 
operation, power production, diversions, consumptive use, return 
flows, and shortages. 
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Figure 5.1. Block Diagram of CRSS 
(Source: Colorado River Simulation Syatem (USBR, 1985b)). 
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(6) The model simulates irrigation requirements, forecasting 
procedures, surplus and shortage strategies, and the "laws of 
the river," described in Chapter II. 
(7) The rivers modeled are: Colorado, Gunnison, Dolores, Green, 
Yampa, White, Duchesne, San Rafael, and the San Juan. 
(8) The major reservoirs modeled are: Blue Mesa, Flaming Gorge, 
Powell, Mead, Mojave, and Havasu. Five other reservoirs are 
modeled as well. 
Simulations can be as short as 1 month in duration or as long as 99 
years. Within each of the model's reaches' 10 diversion points there can 
be a maximum of 10 demand points which are summed and input to the model. 
CRSS does not model individual state water rights. The model objective 
is only to simulate river flow with respect to the "law of the river". 
Therefore, if a shortage occurs at a demand point, the model will not go 
upstream and take a junior rightholder's water - it will simply print a 
shortage message and continue processing the reach. 
1. The simulation model's demand input data. SMDID 
Four sections highlight the four component programs of CRSS. The 
program SMDID uses the demand data base to generate input for CRSM. The 
data base was developed by the Bureau of Reclamation and could be 
considered the baseline data set through 1986. For the Upper Basin, 
demands are categorized by type, such as irrigation, thermal energy, etc. 
For the Lower Basin, demands are categorized by individual users, such as 
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Imperial Irrigation District, MWD and the like.^  MWD and CAP are handled 
uniquely. Both have the normal scheduled diversions with one demand 
point each. However, two extra demand points account for surplus Lower 
Basin deliveries (if any), which are split evenly between the two. 
2. The hydrology data base. MYHDRO 
Input data for MYHDRO are monthly flow and salinity concentrations 
measured at 29 stations in the river basin, at monthly intervals over 
years 1906 through 1983. The program's main purpose is converting the 
data into a readable format for CRSM. However, MYHDRO can also provide 
statistical analysis on flow and salinity data, manipulate data by 
multiplying values by user supplied factors, and print summary statistics 
of the hydrology data base. 
The model user can specify what water years should be included in 
a particular study. If, for instance, a 20-year study was to be 
conducted and one wanted to use similar stream flow patterns to those 
observed during the years 1910 to 1929, it could be accomplished by 
simply inputting the initial year, 1910, into the CRSM control deck and 
specifying a 20-year time horizon. If variability of weather patterns 
and subsequent stream flows were to be considered, a "multi-trace" run 
could be specified. This routine runs the model repeatedly using 
different sets of user-specified years to derive a statistical 
distribution around relevant variables. 
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3. The Colorado River System Model. CRSM 
Figure 5.2 is a chart of the Colorado River basin configuration as 
interpreted by CRSM. Each reach is titled and numbered with a 3-digit 
code. The hierarchy of the reaches can be seen from the arrows 
indicating direction of flow. Reach 200, for example, is the Blue Mesa 
area at the headwaters of the Gunnison River. Natural inflow here is 
generated by rain, snow melt and other small, unmodeled tributaries. 
Diversions and consumptive use from SMDID are input on a monthly level 
for within each reach and any return flows are re-entered at points 
downstream. Salt content of the water is calculated and then the 
remaining monthly flow of the river, plus any return flow, is passed on 
to reach 210, Morrow Point. This process is repeated at reaches 220 to 
300. Reach 300 has several inflows in addition to natural sources. 
Besides, reach 220, reaches 100 and 310 feed into 300. This is then 
passed to Lake Powell, reach 700. Additions and subtractions to the 
reaches below Powell are influenced more by institutional than hydrologie 
considerations. Volumes of water contained in reservoirs in these 
reaches, as well as diversions, are tightly constrained, as explained in 
Chapter II. 
Figure 5.2 also illustrates a good reason the CRSS model will 
integrate well with the programming models of Upper Basin agriculture. 
Reaches numbered from 100 through 310 correspond exactly to PA 83. Those 
numbered 401 through 710, excluding 700, correspond to PA 82. PA 84 is 
accounted for by reaches 801 and 802. 
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Figure 5.2. CRSS Basin Configuration 
(Source: The Colorado River Simulation System (USBR, 1985a)). 
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A general flow chart of CRSM operation is given in Figure 5.3. Data 
read during the initialization stage are the demands, the CRSM control 
file containing initial values of reservoirs, maximum hydroelectric 
capacity, beginning and ending year of analysis, and other relevant 
variables. CRSM then initiates modeling of the system. The process 
described previously with the basin configuration is performed in the 
HYDRBAL subroutine, which, as its name implies, hydrologically balances 
the system. Institutional arrangements are accounted for in the SURPLUS 
and MASSBAL routines. SURPLUS divides surplus flows between CAP and MWD, 
and MASSBAL balances the overall system. 
4. The report writing program. TAPEDIT 
CRSS generates two types of output - the normal output from CRSM and 
user generated output from the program TAPEDIT. CRSM output could be 
Figure 5.3. General Flow Chart of the CRSM Component of CRSS considered 
the "raw" output. If desired, it can summarize about every calculation 
the model makes - creating nearly enough output to dam the river itself! 
Normally most of this output is suppressed. Most frequently, data are 
summarized by basin as a whole. Yearly summaries of scheduled and actual 
depletions are included, as well as shortage and other comment messages. 
Manipulation of the TAPEDIT program yields well-organized summary tables 
of user specified variables. For this study, several variables were 
examined. They included yearly summaries of deliveries to MWD and CAP, 
end-of-water-year contents of Lakes Powell and Mead, salinity levels at 
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Figure 5.3. General Plow Chert of the CRSM Component of CRSS 
(Source: The Colorado River Simuletion Syetem (USBR. 1985a)) 
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key reservoirs, and numerous flow checks at points in the river. New 
variables can also be generated by TAFEDIT. Yearly summaries of 
consumptive use by irrigation for PAs 82, 83, and 84 were generated by 
summing the consumptive use levels in the corresponding reaches. 
B. A Base Run of the CRSS Model 
To run a baseline scenario of CRSS is fairly straightforward. The 
Bureau of Reclamation provided all information necessary on initial 
reservoir contents, basin configuration, etc., in their 1986 control deck 
for CRSM. For this study, only the length of time to be simulated and 
the historical streamflows to be imitated for this time period were 
specified. Obviously, to appreciate the variability of supplies of the 
river, a "multi-trace" run should be performed. However, for 
illustration purposes, the first run of the baseline scenario shall be 
presented and discussed. 
A 30-year time span will be analyzed—1986 through 2015. This is 
sufficient time for the principal parties involved in a water transfer 
to depreciate related capital expenditures. The historical water years 
used will be 1922 through 1951. These years contain extremes on both 
sides of the mean. The 1920s were relatively wet years, but the '30s 
contained several drought years. Subsequent runs could be staggered in 
five-year increments after 1922. That is, the second run will use 
historical flows over the years 1927 through 1956, and so on. After the 
year 1983 is encountered, the data base will "wraparound" to the 1906 
origin. 
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A final adjustment to the base model involves adjusting the rate of 
demand growth over time. As discussed in Chapter III, Bureau of 
Reclamation demand estimates are considered by many to be inflated in 
more distant future years. Conversely, near term estimates tend to be 
considered the more accurate, or at least the more defendable, since they 
are publicly reviewed. For this study, demand growth in the basin will 
be assumed to go to zero in the year 2000 and beyond. The Central 
Arizona Project should be fully operational by this time and the current 
controversies surrounding the completion of several dam projects in 
southwestern Colorado should be resolved. The major omissions of future 
developments beyond this time are increasing exports to the Colorado 
Front Range and energy development in the Upper Basin. The increasing 
demand estimates for both these items are not well documented. 
Additionally, recent experience indicates the Colorado Front Range has 
found new sources of water within itself through the liberalization of 
water markets (Miniclier, 1987). 
Tables 5.1 through 5.4 summarize the base run of CRSS in the format 
displayed by the TAPEDIT program. Table 5.1 documents annual releases 
and end-of-water year (EOWY) contents of Lakes Mead and Powell. The EOHY 
contents of these two reservoirs should always be nearly equal as a 
result of equal storage regulation. If, indeed they are nearly equal, 
the model is running correctly. Table 5.2 yields the planned, actual, 
and surplus deliveries for CAP and MHD. Note the decreasing surplus 
delivered to MWD and CAP comes fully operational. 
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%ble 5.1. Annual releaflea and end of water year (BCNÏ) acnbortta of 
Lakas Powell and Haadf 
Lake Powell 
Old of Hater Year Contonta—Ldoa Powell (Acre-Fset) 
Year 
1966 24423 24381 22842 22716 23260 24214 23700 24129 23932 21100 
1996 23077 22037 17904 16583 17453 17486 19039 17853 15152 17548 
2006 19354 18836 18779 18501 17036 17772 18070 18984 18603 17902 
lake Powell 
Anial Releases Eton Lake Powell (Acre-Baet) 
Year 
1986 12341 14607 10158 9880 10679 14403 12411 16115 10115 6299 
1996 10152 8269 8230 8230 8230 8270 10681 8645 8230 9338 
2006 11720 9252 9847 9202 8331 9557 9987 10018 8901 8570 
Lake Mmad 
Ehd of Water Year Ccntants—Lake Maad CAcre-Eaet) 
Yaar 
1986 24227 24184 22522 21796 24715 23203 24723 23418 21887 
1996 22578 21593 20299 19087 17526 17027 18157 17455 16209 16931 
2006 18886 18252 18376 17994 16746 16997 17678 18548 18193 17406 
Lake Maad 
Annual Releasee Eton Uke Maad (AcrerFaet) 
Year 
1986 13070 14533 11977 9558 9489 13193 11766 16965 9539 8928 
1996 8744 9662 9042 9324 9545 9240 9318 8992 9325 9212 
2006 9267 9528 9361 9314 9190 9048 8926 8845 8826 8861 
'Souroe: Iha Golocado Rivvr Sinilation Sjystm (USER. 1985m). 
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Table 5.2. Plamad, actual, and suplus dsUveries to CAP and hWf 
Lake Hivasu 
Cap Sdwdulad 
Sdttduled Amual Diversions to Cap (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1986 372 851 1388 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
1996 1515 1515 1515 1515 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 
2006 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 
UIm Hannsu 
Central Arizona Project (Actual) 
Actual Amial Diversions to Cep (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1986 372 851 1388 1515 1515 1515 1749 2063 1562 1515 
1996 1515 1517 1515 1515 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 
2006 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 1488 
Annual Surplus Diversions to Cap (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 234 548 47 0 
1996 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lake Hswsu 
MOSdaàiled 
Scheduled Annual Divaoraione to IN) (Acre-Fset) 
Year 
1986 586 569 552 535 518 518 518 518 518 518 
1996 518 518 518 518 497 497 497 497 497 497 
2006 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 
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Table 5.2. (Gcntinuad) Planned, actual, and sutplua daliveriaa to CAP 
anlMI) 
Laka Itavaau 
Mette Water District of California (Actual) 
Actual Annual Divaraiona to MD (Acrr-Bwt) 
Year 
1986 1155 1110 771 594 638 787 832 1105 660 518 
1996 518 578 518 518 497 497 497 497 497 497 
2006 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 
Amual Sutplua Oiwraiona to IN) (Aere-Feet) 
Year 
1986 569 541 219 59 120 269 314 587 142 0 
1996 0 60 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"Soutoe; Iha Colorado River Simulation Sjyatn (USER, 1985a). 
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Table 5.3. Deliveries to Haxloo and flov weighted quality at Inperial Danf 
Users Below Imperial Dam 
Mesdcan Treaty Deliver)' 
Sdttdoled Annual Deliveries to Headco (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1986 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
1996 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
2006 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 
Users Below Imperial Dam 
Flew Check, Blow Asndlable to Heodoo 
Actual Annual Deliveries to Maodoo (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1966 6292 7286 4410 2078 1995 5798 3706 8324 1845 1515 
1996 1515 2073 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1517 
2006 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1515 1516 1515 
Annual Surplus Diversions to Msdoo (Acre-Feet) 
Year 
1986 4777 5771 2895 563 480 4283 2193 6809 330 0 
1996 0 558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Imperial Dam 
Elcw Chedc, Flow at Imperial Dam 
B&y Flow-Hei^ ited Quality at Imperial (MEL) 
Year 
1966 0 586 573 597 662 706 685 721 684 744 
1996 772 804 838 890 946 1036 1035 1070 1024 1039 
2006 1110 1169 960 946 962 968 1008 994 1020 955 
S^ource; The Colorado River Simulation System (USER, 
iy85a) . 
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Table 5.4. Plamad and actual deliveries to EAs 82, 83, and 84  ^
Flamed Consumptive Use in PA 82 
Year 
1986 844 844 844 844 879 879 879 879 879 879 
1996 879 879 879 879 928 928 928 928 928 928 
2006 928 928 928 928 928 928 928 928 928 928 
Actual Consuiptiva Use in PA 82 
Year 
1986 844 844 838 763 819 849 878 878 838 685 
1996 838 757 611 743 881 897 876 798 712 895 
2006 886 848 925 852 803 913 799 926 922 843 
Planned Consuiptive Um by PA 83 
Year 
1986 971 971 971 971 988 988 988 988 988 988 
1996 988 988 988 988 992 992 992 992 992 992 
2006 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 
Actual Consuiptive Use by PA 83 
Year 
1986 971 971 971 971 987 988 988 988 988 982 
1996 988 988 877 988 992 992 992 989 984 992 
2006 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 991 
Planned Consuiptive Uee by PA 84 
Year 
1986 318 318 318 318 325 325 325 325 325 325 
1996 325 325 325 325 424 424 424 424 424 424 
2006 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 
Actual Consuiptive Use by PA 84 
Year 
1986 318 318 318 318 325 325 325 325 325 325 
1996 325 325 308 325 424 424 424 424 424 424 
2006 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 
^Source: Ihe Colorado River Simulative Syston (USER, 1985m) . 
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Table 5.3 contains Mexican deliveries and water quality at Imperial 
Dam in milligrams of salt per liter of water (MG/L). The quality of the 
river is deteriorating up to approximately the year 2000 at which time it 
appears to level. The final Table, 5.4, gives planned and actual 
consumptive use for each of the 3 FAs. FA 82 has substantial variability 
in its available water in addition to planned demand growth. FAs 83 and 
84 have very little variability around their consumptive use schedules. 
The simulation year 1998 appears to be a very water short year in 
relation to the others. It corresponds to the flow pattern of 1934—a 
severe drought period in the Upper Basin. 
It is worth noting that the consumptive uses levels are not equal to 
the ones used in the baseline solutions of the FA programming models. 
This is probably for several reasons, but two likely explanations are: 
(1) CRSS includes crops not endogenous to the FQP models, and (2) CRSS 
uses an average figure over many years, whereas the PQF models use the 
1984 base year only. 
C. Model Modification for Analyzing Transfer Strategies 
For the transfer strategies involving an outright sale of irrigation 
water to a Lower Basin user, two or three changes must be made to the 
model depending on how surplus deliveries to the Lower Basin are handled. 
If the water bought out of agriculture is simply "turned loose" to the 
Lower Basin and subjected to their current policies regarding surpluses, 
the modifications are: 
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(1) Decrease agricultural consumptive use schedule in the desired 
reach in SMDID by the targeted amount. Add this volume to the 
return flow and reduce salinity loading proportionately. 
(2) Increase annual delivery volume from Upper Basin to Lower Basin 
at Lee's Ferry by the targeted amount. However, this must be 
distributed on a monthly basis. This was done proportionately 
to the historical monthly distribution. 
Modifications (1) and (2) simply get more water to the Lower Basin. They 
suggest little about who might pay for such transfers. Currently any 
increased delivery will be split evenly between MWD and CAP and it is 
unlikely either one would tolerate such a transfer arrangement. A more 
reasonable strategy would be to reserve this extra annual delivery for 
the purchaser or leasor of the water right. For example, if some 
party using MWD's distribution system acquired several hundred thousand 
feet of Upper Basin water, MWD's minimum entitlement would be increased 
by that amount. Assuming a high efficiency of water delivery, this 
should leave CAP as well off as before the transfer. The extra step in 
modifying the model, then, is: 
(3) Increase Lower Basin user's minimum entitlement by targeted 
amount. 
Completion of steps (1) through (3) should yield estimates of intervening 
environmental variables as well as quantity variables. Changes in 
hydroelectric production should also be measurable. 
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Consideration of an option-lease water transfer strategy is much 
simpler, but not nearly as informative in terms of the environmental 
impacts. It merely involves observing the baseline output for MWD or 
CAP, depending on who desires the water, and how many times and by how 
much, water deliveries fall below a threshold level. For instance, say 
MWD wants to increase their assured future annual deliveries by 100,000 
acre feet, from 497,000 acre feet to 597,000 acre feet. One would 
observe from Table 5.2 how many times normal deliveries fell below this 
amount and by how much. This information would then be used with the 
programming models to compute where the cheapest supplemental water could 
be found and how much MWD might have to bid to draw it out of 
agriculture. This ex post method is the alternative for incorporating 
the option lease strategy because the scheduled deliveries at Lee's Ferry 
are not allowed to vary form year-to-year within the model. If research 
resources allowed, however, the CRSS framework could be more fully 
integrated with the PA programming models. This would involve 
interrupting CRSS at yearly intervals, when the hydrologie situation is 
assessed, and increasing MWD deliveries if necessary. 
D. Summary 
The Colorado River Simulation System (CRSS) model of the Bureau of 
Reclamation's was reviewed in this chapter. It was used in conjunction 
with the Upper Basin PA programming models to assess the impacts of water 
transfers within the Colorado River basin. Specifically, it can measure 
the water flow and environmental impacts resulting from transfers out of 
agriculture to supplement Lower Basin supplies. The baseline run of the 
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model was reported with key variables summarized in Tables 5.1 through 
5.4. Finally, adaptations to the model needed to carry out the outright 
transfer strategy were detailed. The lease-option strategy, as well as 
this study, did not require model modification. 
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Endnotes 
C^hapter III presents estimates of future demands for each Upper Basin 
use category and Lower Basin user. 
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VI. THE VALUE OF IRRIGATION WATER IN THE UPPER BASIN 
AND TRANSFER RELATED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
The models described in the previous two chapters are used to 
determine the economic value of irrigation water and measure the impacts, 
both economic and environmental, of transfers from the Upper to Lower 
basins. The chapter begins by simply analyzing water value in a static 
framework using the PQP FA programming models. It then moves on to 
analyze two specific transfer strategies, described in the first two 
chapters in a somewhat dynamic framework, using the CRSS model to account 
for the random nature of water flows from year-to-year. Each stage of 
the analyses will be preceded by a section on the procedures used to 
conduct it. 
A. The Economic Value of Irrigation Water 
1. Procedure used in determining value 
Determining the value of irrigation water with the PQP models was 
accomplished by creating water selling activities and parameterizing the 
selling price. When the income from marketing water exceeds its value in 
irrigated crop production water will be sold.^  Obviously, this measures 
the value of water as an input to production, at a regional level, and 
says little regarding the individual's decisions on whether to sell or 
not. 
Irrigation water may have two different values depending on the 
transfer strategy considered. When irrigators sell or lease a certain 
amount of water on an annual basis, they likely will convert at least 
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part of their land to dryland production. As long as there is a 
positive net return to dryland production, some income will be generated. 
However, if the irrigator engaged in a lease-option strategy, would they 
still be able to convert some land to dryland production? This analysis 
assumes they cannot. 
The predominant dryland crops in the area, wheat and nonlegume hay, 
2 
are generally planted in the fall. It is unlikely the decision by the 
Lower Basin leasee, whether to take water or not, could be made before 
their planting time. Winter snowpack, both in the Upper Basin and 
in the far reaches of California, would be influential to this decision. 
Therefore, its assumed in a lease-option strategy that the leasee will 
notify the irrigator of intentions after feasible fall planting dates, 
but soon enough before spring planting for the farmer to adequately plan 
the year's operation. 
Accordingly, when analyzing the outright transfer, activities are 
included to convert irrigated land to dryland production. When dealing 
with the lease-option approach, land conversion will not be considered. 
A priori, one would expect the outright transfer to imply a lower 
marginal value of water since there is an extra substitution possibility 
in converting land. 
A possibly important consideration not incorporated in the FQP PA 
models is the impact of government crop programs. Regional adjustments 
in land use and production are certainly be affected by them. However, 
only two of the crops considered, wheat and corn, have strong 
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participation in the study area. Overall, they make up 15 to 20 percent 
of the total acreage. Between this fact, and a strong possibility of 
less future government intervention in agriculture, it is not felt this 
omission will discount the analyses. 
2. Results showing irrigation water's marginal value 
Tables 6.1 through 6.3 summarize the results from parameterizing the 
selling price for water with respect to water sold, the objective value, 
and land use for each of the PAs. The first section of the table shows 
the impacts when land conversion activities were not considered and the 
second section includes them. Although simple, the parameterizing of 
water price generates several very interesting results which have 
important policy implications. 
The most obvious observation from Tables 6.1 through 6.3 is the 
extremely low value of water in Upper Basin irrigation derived by these 
models. For less than $55 per acre foot, FA 82 could get out of 
irrigated agriculture and realize many fold the net revenue. If land 
conversion possibilities are included the per acre foot value decreases. 
For PA 83, the water price would have to be slightly higher, but the 
effect on net income is nearly the same. PA 84's results are not as 
dramatic as the others, but for $70 per acre foot, a large dent would be 
put into their irrigation industry. 
These results are similar to those from the past studies by Howe 
(1985) and Gisser et al. (1979) discussed in Chapter III. However, given 
the low output prices used here, the values are slightly lower. Still, 
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Table 6.1. Water sold or leased, objective value and land use for 
PA 82 resulting from parameterizing the selling price 
of water (In 1,000 units) 
Ijnd uw 
Hilar HiUr Objtetlv» Own Gbcn All Upm Nanlmguim tm/m 
prin lold Aretion gndn iHigi Wwt Barlqr hqr hv Alio# Ibtal 
$ AT $ (mow) 
WthDut Imd caiwcikn aetivltlMi 
0.00 0.00 15669.97 2.00 6.40 71.50 34.22 160.00 266.00 67.60 646.52 
9.00 12.94 15729.26 2.10 6.60 74.00 36.30 162.30 206.00 67.60 694.90 
7.50 27.34 19761.06 2.16 6.72 74.97 37.06 161.91 282.29 67.60 693.73 
10.00 17I.M 16007.30 2.00 6.90 72.40 39.20 195.96 241.60 67.60 961.26 
12.50 290.73 16967.56 2.03 6.46 70.36 33.74 136.69 206.49 67.60 923.37 
15.00 436.31 17476.62 1.90 6.20 66.30 31.90 109.80 169.80 67.60 451,90 
17.90 504.77 19753.98 1.82 6.06 67.60 30.09 00.33 125.20 67.60 378.64 
20.00 727.32 20396.67 1.70 5.90 67.60 28.30 50.00 86.60 67.60 308.50 
25.00 M.IO 24586.78 1.10 4.20 67.60 24.60 20.20 45.10 67.60 230.40 
30.00 914.00 29080.39 0.30 1.80 67.60 20.90 7.85 45.14 67.60 211.09 
39.00 974.09 33739.0 0.00 0.00 67.60 17.20 0.00 26.00 67.60 180.40 
55.00 1010.00 93723.66 0.00 0.00 67.60 2.33 0.00 21.40 67.60 156.93 
1
 
1
 aenMnlc 
1 E 
0.00 0.00 15669.97 2.00 6.40 71.90 34.22 160.60 266.00 67.60 646.92 
2.50 11.13 19699.12 2.06 6.52 72.60 39.30 162.94 206.04 67.60 692.66 
5.00 130.79 15946.16 2.10 6.60 74.00 36.30 182.20 266.04 67.60 654.64 
7.50 347.61 16566.99 1.91 6.20 73.11 35.68 157.18 286.04 67.60 627.72 
10.00 651.00 18092.63 1.90 6.20 70.70 33.90 136.00 289.30 67.60 601.60 
15.00 762.27 21622.21 1.70 5.70 67.60 30.23 60.87 285.31 67.60 539.01 
20.00 919.6S 25866.17 1.40 5.20 67.60 26.50 26.98 286.00 67.60 481.28 
25.00 953.60 30555 84 0.60 2.80 67.60 22.80 13.00 286.00 67.60 460.40 
30.00 960.21 35396.23 0.00 0.70 67.60 19.10 2.00 292.87 67.60 490.67 
40.00 996.60 49304 69 0.00 0.00 67.60 11.66 0.00 294.43 67.60 *41.39 
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Table 6.2. Water sold or leased, objective value and land use for 
PA 83 resulting from parmaterlzlng the selling price of 
water (In 1,000 units) 
Hiur Nktmr ObjKtlM Com Gocn All UpM NbnUfM flW 
prie# fold ftnetion praln mill## Mmt ky Cillav Usui 
$ a $ ( !aerai) 
Ulthaut Imd eonvwtian aetivltlMt 
000 0.00 13673.89 24.42 15.90 40.94 18.20 139.05 117.35 29.50 379.36 
2.50 90.26 13791.52 23.45 12.23 38.09 17.98 124.90 94.88 21.50 334.97 
5.00 141.80 14065.70 22.68 10.40 38.20 17.70 116.80 82.20 23.50 309.48 
10.00 276.58 15174.85 20.50 3.90 29.68 17.20 90.40 55.00 23.50 240.18 
15.00 331.60 16725.64 18.20 0.00 25.80 16.70 71.40 55.00 23.50 210.60 
20.00 359.79 18458.17 15.80 0.00 25.80 15.80 61.00 55.00 23.50 198.90 
25.00 382.96 20315.00 14.10 0.00 25.80 14.10 56.40 55.00 23.30 188.90 
30.00 409.42 22298.47 12.46 0.00 23.50 12.46 49.77 55.00 23.50 176.69 
40.00 455.77 26624.43 9.10 0.00 23.50 9.10 36.50 55.00 23.50 156.70 
50.00 497.31 31399.15 6.20 0.00 23.50 6.20 24.60 55.00 23.50 199.00 
70.00 577.90 42257.00 0.38 0.00 23.50 0.38 1.53 55.00 23.50 104.29 
Md) Und eon Mraiai ictivitiMt 
0.00 0.00 13673.89 24.42 15.90 40.94 18.20 199.06 117.95 23.50 379.36 
1.25 179.02 14435.86 23.61 11.99 97.79 18.10 124.79 140.82 23.50 380.60 
2.50 187.64 14665.03 23.28 11.37 97.17 17.97 121.82 145.69 29.50 380.80 
5.00 207.86 15156.09 22.50 9.90 35.70 17.70 114.80 159.70 a.50 377.80 
10.00 282.58 16382.21 20.40 3.30 29.10 17.20 88.20 159.70 29.50 335.40 
15.00 336.44 17947.48 17.80 0.00 25.80 16.70 70.00 154.10 23.50 307.90 
20.00 361.87 19696.18 15.60 0.00 25.80 15.60 62.40 154.10 23.50 297.00 
25.00 385.12 21563.08 14.00 0.00 25.40 14.00 55.93 155.04 23.50 287.87 
30.00 410.95 23558.57 12.35 0.00 23.50 12.35 49.33 155.99 23.50 276.36 
35.00 433.53 25666.97 10.74 0.00 21.50 10.74 42.87 156.60 23.50 267.95 
40.00 456.70 27892.52 9.07 0.00 23.50 9.07 36.24 156.60 23.50 257.98 
50.00 498.25 12675.73 6.10 0.00 21.50 6.10 24.10 156.60 21.50 240.10 
70.00 577.90 41540.47 0.40 0.00 23.50 0.40 1.50 156.60 23.50 205.90 
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Table 6.3. Water sold or leased, objective value and land use for 
PA 84 resulting from parameterizing the selling price 
of water (in 1,000 units) 
Wmt#r Ulttf Objmctiw Com Com All UpM NanUguM ft—r 
priM mold ftnetion grain lilap 1 Bmrlv hV fallev Tbtâl 
$ AF S (i tarn) 
8
 
1 Î iMC*icn 1 aetivitlMi 
0.00 0.00 3828.50 12.30 1.60 74.77 7.20 100.90 16.00 62.30 274.67 
25.00 0.00 5828.50 12.30 1.60 74.77 7.20 100.50 16.00 62.30 274.67 
40.00 0.00 5828.50 12.30 1.60 74.77 7.20 100.50 16.00 62.30 274.67 
*5.00 0.00 5828.50 12.30 1.60 74.77 7.20 100.90 16.00 62.30 274.67 
47.50 90.89 5846.07 11.80 1.60 70.94 6.69 62.78 19.40 62.30 231.51 
48.2! 92.31 5857.43 11.78 1.60 70.88 6.63 62.29 15.27 62.30 230.75 
50.00 119.65 5887.96 10.79 1.60 68.40 6.26 19.27 14.41 62.30 179.03 
«0.00 207.46 6169.94 3.85 1.20 63.90 3.84 22.01 1.90 62.30 169.99 
70.00 206.34 6565.30 0.89 0.74 63.04 0.89 9.60 3.63 62.30 137.01 
75.00 279.43 6788.28 0.00 0.51 62.81 0.00 1.93 3.10 62.30 130.25 
100.00 290.37 7965.46 0.00 0.00 62.30 0.00 0.C0 0.00 62.30 124.60 
Hlth Und eemmlcn oetlvitiMt 
0.00 0.00 5828.50 12.30 1.60 74.77 7.20 100.90 16.00 62.30 274.67 
2.50 41.36 5837.19 12.21 1.55 79.81 7.22 98.79 16.22 62.90 274.70 
5.00 46.98 5845.27 12.30 1.95 76.74 7.27 96.67 16.42 63.66 274.61 
10.00 56.17 5864.26 11.90 1.44 78.40 7.24 93.03 16.70 69.84 274.54 
15.00 66.57 5886.66 12.00 1.40 80.18 7.30 89.00 17.17 67.64 274.69 
20.00 76.37 S9U.73 11.82 1.30 81.90 7.30 89.20 17.90 69.63 274.65 
25.00 87.21 5942.69 12.00 1.27 13.72 7.40 81.06 17.97 71.26 274.68 
30.00 95.72 9976.22 11.33 1.13 89.30 7.30 77.62 18.31 73.70 274.69 
35.00 104.21 6012.78 10.6S 0.98 86.88 7.29 74.17 18.69 76.11 274.69 
45.00 121.12 6095.33 9.30 0.69 90.04 7.10 67.32 19.33 80.91 274.69 
55.00 138.09 6190.28 7.93 0.40 93.22 6.96 60.44 19.99 85.70 274.64 
65.00 155.08 6297.65 6.97 0.11 96.40 6.80 53.50 20.70 90.56 274.64 
75.00 171.80 6417.39 5.10 0.00 99.90 6.67 46.67 21.35 95.30 274.59 
85.00 188.70 6549.44 4.10 0.00 108.00 6.60 39.20 22.00 100.13 274.03 
115.00 226.00 7009.76 1.95 0.00 110.22 4.86 24.60 23.70 109.72 274.65 
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they meet a priori expectation that water will have a lower value when 
land conversion opportunities exist. By denying the irrigator a chance 
for a dryland crop, he obviously receives less net agricultural income. 
For most PAs and conversion options, there appear to be threshold 
points where a little water sold turns into a lot of water sold. For 
example, in PA 82 without the conversion option, at a price between $7.50 
and $12.50 per acre foot, a marginally large amount of water is released. 
With a conversion option, this threshold level is between $2.50 and 
$7.50. For PA 83, these ranges are 0 to $5 without conversion and 0 to 
$1.25 with it. The range is not as clear in PA 84. Without conversion, 
it takes over $45 per acre foot to draw water out of irrigation. With 
conversion, there does not appear to be a threshold level, but a more or 
less steady increase in water releases with a higher price. Potential 
recipients of Upper Basin water would obviously want to be aware of these 
critical price ranges before negotiating an agreement. 
By summing the water sold at a common price for each PA, a normative 
supply curve for Upper Basin water can be constructed for both land 
conversion options. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are the results of this process. 
As is illustrated in the results of Tables 6.1 through 6.3, the transfer 
price for the alternatives is markedly different. 
So far, little has been said about the changes in land use resulting 
from selling or leasing water. From a state perspective, they can be as 
important as an increase in the objective function, since many secondary 
impacts will be tied to the changes in farming patterns. 
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Figure 6.1. A nornative eupply curve for Upper Basin water aatuning no 
land conversion from irrigation to dryland 
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Figure 6.2. A normative aupply curve for Upper Basin water asauming land 
conversion 
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Very significant impacts result from taking water from Upper Basin 
agriculture—ones important to states considering prohibiting private 
sector initiated water right transfers by their constituents. Table 6.1 
shows that for PA 82, up to a 27,000 acre foot transfer (without land 
conversion) and between a 137,000 to 347,000 transfer (with land 
conversion) will not significantly reduce total planted crop acreage.^  
Unfortunately, Table 6.1 does not adequately document the entire 
substitution process involved. In both cases, nonlegume hay is switched 
from irrigated to dryland production and the water released is partially 
used to maintain irrigated acreages of the other crops. The remainder is 
sold. In the no conversion scenario, this continues until about 290,000 
acre feet are sold. At this point, the dryland acres available for 
nonlegume hay are exhausted and acreages are reduced. 
With the other crops, except the dryland portion of wheat, acreage 
steadily decreases as water prices get higher. Recall that corn, wheat, 
and legume hay often appear together in irrigated rotations, so one would 
expect they continue to move in this proportion. With land conversion 
possibilities, a great deal of acres are converted to dryland production 
as evidenced by the slower decline in total crop acreage. Dryland 
wheat acreage does not increase, however. All of the acres converted to 
dryland production are in nonlegume hay. 
FA 83 experiences slightly different land use adjustments. In the 
no conversion case, total acres in production are always decreasing. 
Irrigated nonlegume hay leads the way. And, at $10 per acre foot, there 
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are only dryland acres in nonlegume hay. Irrigated wheat and corn silage 
are eliminated at water prices exceeding $5 and $10, respectively. Corn 
grain, barley, and legume hay are more slowly withdrawn from production. 
With land conversion, the results are qualitatively similar except much 
of the retired irrigation land is converted to dryland nonlegume hay. 
Until the water price exceeds $5, there is, like PA 82, little change in 
3 land use, even a slight increase in total cropped acres. Five dollars 
corresponds to approximately 270,000 acre feet. 
Results for FA 84 fall between the other two FAs. With no land 
conversion total cropped acreage steadily falls with water prices over 
$45 per acre foot. Proportionately more acres are taken out of legume 
hay production than the other crops as the price increases. With 
conversion alternatives, cropland acres remain about the same—near 
274,000—but land is mostly converted to dryland wheat production rather 
than nonlegume hay. Up to about $20 per acre foot, the land use 
allocation among the crops remains about the same. 
Changes in crop production, soil erosion, and input levels resulting 
from water exiting agriculture are presented in Tables 6.4 through 6.6. 
For the most part, they mirror the land use responses. Most importantly, 
similar to land use, small decreases in water available for irrigation 
have relatively smaller impacts on these variables. 
Table 6.4. Production, soil erosion, and input response for PA 82 resulting from 
parameterizing the selling price of water (in 1,000 units) 
ftoacxiat 
Soil Soil 
Witar Gbm Gam m 1 
BarLqr 
tCB« NsilcnB» «wim «onoi Madiineiy Unr Oter Batinik Bstilizer 
prim pan siUgt ky hy (wcer) (md) «fund. usag» egad. ofend. ofond. 
S bu. bu. bo. bo. T. T. T. T. $ hues S $ S 1 1 xiMxsiai k activities: 
0 16% 93 2068 3259 430 463 447 496» 13885 1463 26237 1378 69C8 
S 173 98 2232 3547 43% 455 434 4966 140B0 1481 2662% 1400 7206 
8 177 IflO 229% 365% 43% 444 428 4805 14062 1478 26607 1400 7278 
10 167 96 2133 3390 373 378 44% 4117 12321 1293 23414 1232 6338 
U 167 96 1997 3UB 327 320 441 3561 10946 1145 20895 1103 5571 
IS 155 92 1863 2920 264 253 420 2986 9188 958 17663 935 4602 
IB ISO 90 IBIB 2719 193 186 40% 2^ 2 7378 764 14330 765 3751 
as 143 87 IBIB 2558 121 122 387 1936 5625 576 11103 602 3011 
25 « 61 IBlB 2268 48 55 352 1334 3674 36% 7474 393 2149 
30 IB 27 IBIB 2DI7 19 55 309 118» 3022 2» 6199 295 1797 
3S 0 0 1818 1719 0 20 281 1092 230% 213 4820 199 1381 
55 0 0 IBIB 233 0 233 281 1092 1790 154 3619 151 977 
l&th laid oome rsian accivitics: 
0 16» 95 2068 325» 430 463 447 4969 13885 1463 26Z37 1378 6908 
3 1» 97 215% 3%05 «15 458 442 4975 14021 1475 26502 1393 7072 
S 172 98 a%02 
2358 
3547 434 380 3G9 5258 14067 14% 26642 1400 7048 
8 157 92 3461 376 290 257 5769 13074 1370 24857 1315 6448 
10 157 92 2199 3202 326 132 316 4798 12140 12» 23205 1243 5349 
IS 13B 85 2001 2748 19% 138 34% 4407 9917 IMl 19045 1058 4242 
2D 119 77 2001 240% 6% 102 387 4113 7833 82% 15153 888 
786 
3381 
25 47 42 2001 2151 31 104 388 3896 7128 748 13781 3095 
30 0 10 2002 
2002 
1B7B 7 107 387 3743 6685 700 12992 718 2771 
40 0 0 116% 0 108 387 3664 6387 666 12208 684 252S 
Table 6.5. Production, soil erosion, and input response for PA 83 resulting from 
parameterizing the selling price of water (in 1,000 units) 
-ftoAiccicn 
Sail Sail 
Htcer Cam Cm Ml UmmlbnWmmwmicn «orâ Mmdimgy Ufaor Other Besticide ESertilias pnct gr«3n tiligt ifacc hrlv nv fiatcr) fidid) 
bi. btt. bu. T. T. T. T. $ hues $ $ $ 
IfiAouc lad oomcnxen activities: 
0 3258 235 1725 1811 407 131 16» 422» 9267 U06 18676 2168 6385 
3 3126 101 1S6S 178» 371 9» 176 3739 8136 982 1652» 1909 5502 
S 302* 153 144S 1760 349 73 00 3506 7481 908 15252 1748 4999 
10 2744 57 1023 1715 281 29 122 3062 5571 698 11525 1260 3499 
IS 2M3 0 765 1663 228 29 109 2864 4509 579 9909 880 2552 
20 2112 0 765 1574 201 29 108 2756 4035 521 8206 61B 2298 
25 1892 0 m 1407 180 S 107 2B2» 3741 482 7614 568 2140 
30 IfiBl 0 539 1270 160 29 UB 2*73 3380 437 6865 513 1871 
40 1240 0 539 938 118 2» 102 2220 2BD1 361 568» 414 1556 
SO 8tt 0 539 641 80 29 98 1990 2273 292 4625 324 1267 
70 «1 0 539 66 6 9 81 1553 12» 159 2571 151 m 
-
WWi land a ncrsia It activities : 
0 3258 215 1550 1797 372 75 164 422» 9267 1106 18676 2168 6385 
1 3147 178 1725 1811 407 • 131 201 4405 8556 1068 17561 1996 5703 
3 310» m 1510 1785 364 78 196 440» 8453 1040 17354 1954 559» 
5 3005 
2728 
146 1410 1761 345 82 186 439» 8165 1020 16771 1847 S3U 
10 48 983 1715 275 83 129 41X3 6682 858 13808 1410 3985 
IS 2380 0 765 1661 223 83 117 3849 5650 742 11614 998 3139 
20 2092 0 767 1559 199 83 118 3797 52«8 692 10689 799 2920 
25 1877 0 732 1400 178 8» 118 3699 4963 655 10108 750 2757 
30 1667 0 541 1259 159 8» 118 3634 4625 611 9395 697 2519 
35 1452 0 541 1097 138 85 119 3543 4354 576 8852 651 2376 
40 1231 0 541 932 117 85 119 3423 4060 538 8261 601 2220 
SO 833 0 541 «35 79 85 118 3» 3532 46» 7202 512 1933 
70 61 0 541 66 6 86 107 2798 2529 338 5172 341 1355 
Table 6.6. Production, soil erosion, and input response for PA 84 resulting from 
parameterizing the selling price of water (in 1,000 units) 
hter 
Kim 
S 
Qxn 
pain 
bu. 
Com 
bu. bu. 
Bvliy ' 
bu. 
"ET 
T. 
Nanlegw 
T. 
Sdl 
T. 
Sedl 
(SSf 
T. t 
Lite 
ham S 
tatiode fertilizer 
oçend. eçend. 
S S 
t&thout Imd 00 nwrsian accxAxiat 
0 1077 24 1955 4«2 2B8 26 771 2776 6167 716 12085 2012 4622 
25 van 24 1955 442 2B8 26 771 2776 6167 716 12085 2012 4622 
40 1077 24 1955 442 288 26 771 2776 6167 716 12085 2012 4622 
4S 1077 24 1955 442 2B8 26 771 2776 6167 716 12085 2012 4622 
48 llfiO 24 1714 411 181 25 768 2179 4799 548 9499 1801 3882 
48 1160 24 1710 407 180 25 768 2171 4774 5tf 9452 1789 3866 
SO 1134 23 1549 384 151 24 747 1972 4214 48S 8419 1670 3436 
60 471 18 1230 235 73 15 710 1555 2566 302 5263 1050 2012 
70 112 11 1200 53 17 7 700 1398 1674 187 3438 tfl 1377 
75 0 8 IU5 0 4 6 698 1361 1444 158 2964 282 1193 
ICO 0 0 US2 0 0 0 694 1345 1310 144 2720 262 ion 
1
 
1
 SIMTSk n activities : 
0 1077 24 1955 442 2B8 26 771 2776 6167 716 12085 2012 4622 
3 10*4 23 1999 444 281 18 750 2612 6099 711 12023 2445 4664 
S 10G9 23 2024 447 274 18 765 2621 6080 707 11983 2461 4693 
10 1025 21 2092 445 264 18 776 2619 5974 695 11794 2456 4614 
IS 1028 21 2065 
2086 
4W 252 19 784 3525 5907 685 11669 2471 4615 
20 1013 19 4*9 240 19 795 2509 5820 673 11512 2476 4577 
25 1029 19 2128 454 227 20 810 2596 5766 663 11409 2500 4607 
30 973 17 2121 450 218 20 820 2585 5637 €51 11183 2462 4483 
35 917 15 2113 445 210 20 830 2574 5508 638 10958 2465 4358 
806 10 2097 436 196 21 866 2554 5251 612 10510 2429 4110 
55 694 6 2077 428 177 22 931 2536 4994 586 10060 2193 3856 3602 tf 582 1 2056 418 159 23 997 2520 4735 560 9609 2358 
75 468 0 2099 409 143 23 1062 2504 4479 534 9162 2323 3357 
85 412 0 2011 40 125 24 1131 2473 4219 508 8715 2303 3132 
lis 179 0 2066 295 84 26 1182 2539 3899 446 7713 2024 2723 
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B. Impacts of a Sale or Lease of 
Water on an Annual Basis 
1. Procedure followed for the annual lease analysis 
This and the following section integrate the economic and hydrologie 
models to analyze the transfer strategies. This section examines an 
initial long term lease (30-year) of 311,000 acre feet annually beginning 
in 1986 and escalating to a 400,000 acre foot annual exchange after the 
year 2000. This plan insures the MWD system at least 897,000 acre feet 
of water, allowing it to maintain its approximate historical deliveries 
from the Colorado River and keeping the Colorado River Aqueduct at over 
75 percent of capacity. 
The economic model incorporates information generated from the 
previous section to identify areas where the water involved could be 
obtained at least cost by the urban interest. The hydrologie modeling 
system, CRSS, is used to calculate offsite effects of the transfer 
strategy, including salinity changes in the River and increases in energy 
production through intervening dams. These two attributes will likely 
have the most visible offsite benefits of such a plan. Other changes, 
such as flow increases and reservoir levels, can be quantified but it is 
more difficult to determine whether they have positive or negative 
impacts. 
It is not the purpose of this study to explicitly suggest or derive 
the terms of exchange. In reality, the irrigators would certainly 
consider the value of marginal product of their water i but would also be 
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aware of potential purchaser's next cheapest alternative. As irrigators 
in Utah's Great Basin demonstrated in Chapter III, there will 
likely be an attempt to extract as much economic rent from the buyer as 
possible. But, this section can demonstrate that there may be some 
significant benefits accruing to society from allowing transfers to take 
place—in excess of the benefits to the principals involved in the 
trade. 
Several assumptions about the long term 400,000 acre foot transfer 
are needed to make the analysis tractable. They are behavorial 
assumptions about the irrigators and the urban leasee(s): 
(1) Irrigators would be willing to lease their water when its price 
equals or exceeds its marginal value. 
(2) Increasing future irrigation water supplies resulting from the 
completion of several dam projects will further lower water's 
marginal value. However, transferors will demand at least the 
present marginal value now and in the future. 
(3) Although the strategy begins by transferring less than 400,000 
acre feet before increasing to that amount in the year 2,000, 
transferors will insist on a marginal value equal to that 
associated with a 400,000 acre foot withdrawal. 
(4) Regional distribution of the transferred water between PAs will 
remain constant in all years, and be based on a 400,000 acre 
foot transfer. 
(5) Irrigators are risk neutral in the aggregate. 
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Identifying where the transferred water originates, in terras of PA 
distribution, will be accomplished with the aid of Figure 6.2. By 
finding the water price corresponding to 400,000 acre feet, and using 
this price in the FA models, the normatively determined distribution 
is easily obtained. Either re-solving the models with this price of 
water, or interpolating from Tables 6.1 through 6.3, will yield the land 
use, production, and other economic impacts of the transfer. 
The location of the areas where water will be transferred is, of 
course, dictated by the economic model. These amounts are subtracted 
proportionately from the irrigated basins of the model reaches associated 
with each PA. 
2. Results assuming constant water deliveries 
Figure 6.2 indicates that 400,000 acre feet corresponds to a water 
price of slightly over $5.00 per acre foot. At exactly $5.00, 390,000 
acre feet would be forthcoming. Subsequent experiments suggested the 
price should lie between $5.00 and $5.05. The latter price is assumed to 
be valid and is used in the remainder of the analysis. 
At $5.05, PAs 82, 83, and 84 contribute 153,000, 208,000, and 47,000 
thousand acre feet, respectively, totaling 408,000 acre feet. PA 82 
contributes 37.5 percent of the total, PA 83 about 51 percent, and PA 
84—11.5 percent. Table 6.7 summarizes the economic impacts of giving up 
this amount of water. Note that, in total, a 22 percent reduction in 
irrigation consumptive use generally result in much smaller changes in 
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the listed variables describing agricultural cropping. This may be of 
interest for the policy making sector. 
Of passing interest in Table 6.7 is the final entry, the reduction 
in agriculturally generated profits, that is, the reduction in the PQF 
models' objective function when 400,000 acre feet are subtracted from the 
water supply and there are no water selling opportunities. This change 
amounts to $618,430—the area under the normative supply curve, 
represented in Figure 6.2, between the values 0 and 400,000. The total 
long run annual benefit (after the year 2000) accruing to the Upper Basin 
from this water transfer is the proceeds from the water lease, $2,020,000 
($5.05 X 400,000), minus the $618,430. This sum equals $1,401,570 
annually. 
3. Results with variation in water deliveries 
The above discussion assumes certainty in full water deliveries. 
Table 5.4 shows that deliveries to PAs 83 and 84 are, in fact, very 
reliable over the years 1986 through 2015 (incorporating flow patterns 
similar to 1922-1951). The exception is year 1998, corresponding to 
conditions similar to the severe drought year of 1934. Uncertainty may 
not be as relevant here. However, consider FA 82. From Table 5.4 its 
apparent there are deficient deliveries fairly frequently, although often 
they are not severe. 
For irrigators in PA 82, the frequent shortages could be of major 
importance. In a pre-transfer situation, these shortages may not have 
been of major consequence. At this time, the marginal value of water 
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Table 6.7. Results of reducing Upper Basin agricultural use by 400,000 
acre feet (in 1000 units), assuming land conversion to 
dryland production 
Producing area: 
Total/overall 
82 83 84 average 
Reduction in consumptive 
use from base (AF): 153 208 47 408 
Percent reduction in 
consumptive water 
use with the PA: -15 -36 -16 -22 
Percentage change in 
land use: 
Corn grain 5 -8 1 -2 
Corn silage 3 -38 -3 -19 
All wheat 5 -13 1 -5 
Barley . 6 -3 1 1 
Legume hay 1 -18 -4 -9 
Nonlegume hay 0 31 3 16 
Percentage change in 
production: 
Corn grain 5 -8 -2 -2 
Corn silage 3 -38 -3 -19 
All wheat 16 -18 4 -3 
Barley 9 -3 1 2 
Legume hay 1 -3 -5 -2 
Nonlegume hay -6 -38 -31 -25 
Other percentage changes: 
Soil erosion (water) -20 13 -1 -1 
Soil erosion (wind) 7 4 -6 5 
Machinery expenditures 1 -12 -1 -6 
Pesticide expenditures 2 -15 22 -7 
Fertilizer expenditures 2 -17 2 -8 
Labor usage 1 -8 -1 -4 
Reduction in agricul­
turally generated 
profits ($1,000) 489.49 101.39 27.55 618.4 
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associated with the shortages would have been low. However, include a 
transfer strategy that takes near 153,000 acre feet year after year, and 
a shortage may be of much greater consequence. In fact, by including the 
possibility of shorted future deliveries, especially in FA 82, the 
marginal value of water will likely be in excess of $5.05 annually, for a 
400,000 acre feet transfer. 
No attempt will be made to suggest how the transfer plan should be 
modified to incorporate these uncertainties. The purchaser might 
possibly change the regional distribution of the water forthcoming -
taking relatively more from the more reliable delivery schedules of FAs 
83 and 84. For illustration, say the purchaser retains the regional 
distribution derived previously but annually pays the FAs their marginal 
value product of water, incorporating the value of the shortage in the 
water price. The long run (30 year) average of the annual value of water 
might resemble the averages presented at the bottom of Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8 was constructed form Tables 5.2, 5.4, and 6.1 through 6.3. 
Table 5.2 provides estimates of the amount needed to keep the MWD system 
conveying 897,000 acre feet annually. That is, 897,000 minus the 
regularly scheduled scheduled deliveries to MWD determined the total acre 
feet needed. Using the proportional distribution from each FA previously 
determined, the amount forthcoming from each to fulfill MWDs requirement 
was computed. Next to each FA figure is the marginal value of water 
T associated with that amount of transfer plus any shortage amount. This 
latter shortage amount was determined by subtracting actual FA deliveries 
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Table 6.8. À possible 30-year transfer schedule, with the transfer price 
incorporating shortages 
PA 82 FA 83 FA 84 Total 
AF Dollars/AF AF Dollars/AF AF Dollars/AF Average Annual 
Year (X 1,000) (x 1,000) (X 1,000) AF Price Payment 
1986 117 5.05 159 5.05 35 5.05 311 5.05 1570.55 
1987 123 5.05 167 5.05 38 5.05 328 5.05 1656.40 
1988 129 5.05 176 5.05 40 5.05 345 5.05 1742.25 
1989 135 5.96 185 5.05 41 5.05 362 5.39 1951.63 
1990 142 5.78 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.32 2017.70 
1991 142 5.66 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.28 2000.65 
1992 142 5.05 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.05 1913.95 
1993 142 5.05 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.05 1913.95 
1994 142 5.56 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.24 1986.43 
1995 142 7.37 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.92 2243.68 
1996 142 5.56 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.24 1986.43 
1997 142 6.52 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.60 2122.87 
1998 142 8.02 193 12.50 44 10.06 379 10.54 3994.43 
1999 142 6.68 193 5.05 44 5.05 379 5.66 2145.61 
2000 153 5.76 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.32 2169.03 
2001 153 5.57 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.25 2139.96 
2002 153 5.82 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.34 2178.21 
2003 153 6.74 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.68 2318.97 
2004 153 7.68 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 6.04 2462.79 
2005 153 5.59 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.25 2143.02 
2006 153 5.70 208 • 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.29 2159.85 
2007 153 6.15 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.46 2228.70 
2008 153 5.05 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.05 2060.40 
2009 153 6.11 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.45 2222.58 
2010 153 6.68 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.66 2309.79 
2011 153 5.38 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.17 2110.89 
2012 153 6.73 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.68 2317.44 
2013 153 5.05 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.05 2060.40 
2014 153 5.27 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.13 2094.06 
2015 153 6.21 208 5.05 47 5.05 408 5.49 2237.88 
30-yBar-average: 
5.93 5.30 5.22 5.53 2148.68 
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from their planned deliveries (Table 5.4). It assumes the endogenous 
crops bear the full burden of the deficits. 
Table 6.8 shows that if irrigators considered the impacts of 
possible future water shortages, they may demand a higher price before 
giving up some of their reliable water supplies. Using Table 6.8, it 
would appear FA 82 requires an increase of $.88 per acre feet, or 
17.5 percent, before they should give up a maximum of 153,000 acre foot 
annually. For FAs 83 and 84, the dollar amounts are $.25 and $.17, 
respectively. In the final measure, the irrigators will probably demand 
more than $5.00 to $6.00 per acre foot for their water, but delivery 
reliability and the impacts of its shortage should be a consideration in 
the pricing process. 
3. Offsite impacts of the transfer strategy 
Quality differences in the River resulting form this transfer may 
actually be worth much more than the agricultural value of the water. 
Decreased irrigation in the Upper Basin has the effect of reducing salt 
loading and increasing return flows. The increasing return flows dilute 
the River's remaining salinity. Table 6.9 documents the salinity 
reduction in the river resulting from the transfer at Lake Havasu—the 
intake point for MWDs system, and Imperial Dam—the intake for the 
Imperial Valley irrigators. Due to lags in the system, it takes 
approximately 15 years before the benefits of the increased flow are 
fully felt, but they are definitely significant. 
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Table 6.9. Salinity reduction in the Colorado River due to 
the transfer plan* 
Year 
Salinity Reduction (MG/L) 
Lake Havasu Imperial Dam 
1986 0 0 
1987 1 4 
1988 6 7 
1989 10 12 
1990 13 15 
1991 19 23 
1992 22 28 
1993 25 29 
1994 28 31 
1995 29 35 
1996 29 32 
1997 30 33 
1998 33 37 
1999 35 41 
2000 42 48 
2001 46 56 
2002 50 59 
2003 53 62 
2004 51 60 
2005 55 64 
2006 56 66 
2007 56 65 
2008 51 61 
2009 51 59 
2010 50 59 
2011 51 60 
2012 53 60 
2013 53 59 
2014 53 60 
2015 52 57 
® Source: Colorado River Simulation System (USSR, 1985a). 
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In an extensive study of salinity control in the Colorado basin, 
Gardner (1983) estimated direct benefits of $46,000 per milligram per 
liter (MG/L) accruing to Imperial Valley irrigators through increased 
yields for each MG/L reduction in salinity. For urban users, he 
estimated a marginal benefit of between $161,000 and $308,000 per MG/L of 
salinity reduction, depending on the assumptions used for salt retention 
time. This estimate was a composite of earlier studies, including one 
for the Bureau of Reclamation by Kleinman and Brown (1980). The high 
values for municipal users are due to lower repair costs and the 
increased useful life of plumbing fixtures. 
Changes in hydroelectric energy production, resulting from the 
increased return flows, are also significant. Four dams—Flaming Gorge, 
Glen Canyon, Hoover, and Davis—show substantial increases in energy 
production. Table 6.10 documents this increase in energy production for 
these and one other dam. The value of this increase is indeterminate in 
aggregate, depending on whether electricity was valued at wholesale or 
retail rates. For Glen Canyon and Hoover, the increased energy 
production might be relatively more valuable because it could be 
considered "firm" energy from year-to-year. 
Table 6.11, in a rather "back of the envelope" fashion, compares the 
value of the transferred water in terms of its: (1) agricultural value 
to the Upper Basin from Table 6.8, (2) value to the Imperial Valley, 
using Gardner's estimate, resulting from decreasing salinity, (3) value 
to the urban users on the mid-range of Gardner's municipal benefits, and 
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Table 6.10. Increased energy production at 5 Colorado River dams 
resulting from the transfer plan (assumed flow patterns 
similar to years 1932-1951) 
Increased hydroelectric energy production (GWH) at: 
Year 
Flaming 
Gorge 
Glen 
Canyon Hoover Davis Imperial Total 
1986 24 152 221 49 32 478 
1987 25 156 228 45 25 479 
1988 7 168 241 51 11 478 
1989 62 233 169 38 0 502 
1990 14 174 336 78 27 629 
1991 49 175 100 24 0 348 
1992 35 204 215 35 7 496 
1993 34 160 248 55 30 527 
1994 36 203 209 49 5 502 
1995 8 238 203 42 0 491 
1996 54 142 201 42 0 439 
1997 9 152 185 39 0 385 
1998 30 190 190 42 0 452 
1999 30 179 186 42 0 437 
2000 55 183 192 44 0 474 
2001 29 148 189 45 0 411 
2002 33 188 189 45 0 455 
2003 33 187 189 45 0 454 
2004 9 186 188 45 0 428 
2005 30 177 187 45 0 439 
2006 53 179 191 45 0 468 
2007 35 210 193 45 0 483 
2008 33 188 192 45 0 458 
2009 35 204 192 44 0 475 
2010 33 194 190 44 0 461 
2011 35 194 193 45 0 467 
2012 33 175 192 44 0 444 
2013 34 198 194 45 0 471 
2014 35 200 194 45 0 474 
2015 36 213 195 45 0 489 
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Table 6.11. Annual and net present values of agricultural, salinity 
reduction, and energy values of the transfer strategy 
(1,000 dollars) 
Imperial Valley Municipal Value Hydroelectric 
Year Agricultural Value of Decreased of Decreased Energy 
Value Salinity Salinity Value 
1986 1571 0 0 7170 
1987 1656 184 235 7185 
1988 1742 322 1407 7170 
1989 1951 552 2345 7530 
1990 2016 690 3049 9435 
1991 2001 1058 4456 5220 
1992 1914 1288 5159 7440 
1993 1914 1334 5863 7905 
1994 1986 1426 6566 7530 
1995 2244 1610 6801 7365 
1996 1986 1472 6801 6585 
1997 2122 1518 7035 5775 
1998 3813 1702 7739 6780 
1999 2145 1886 8208 6555 
2000 2128 2208 9849 7110 
2001 2096 2576 10787 6165 
2002 2136 2714 11725 6825 
2003 2272 2852 12429 6810 
2004 2416 2760 11960 6420 
2005 2100 2944 12898 6585 
2006 2116 3036 13132 7020 
2007 2184 2990 13132 7245 
2008 2120 2806 11960 6870 
2009 2180 2714 11960 7125 
2010 2264 2714 11725 6915 
2011 2064 2760 11960 7005 
2012 2272 2760 12429 6660 
2013 2020 2714 12429 7065 
2014 2052 2760 12429 7110 
2015 2196 2622 12194 7335 
Net present value: 
at 3% 42239 35138 153611 141990 
at 6% 30005 22196 96686 103238 
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(4) the hydroelectric value of the increased energy production assuming a 
wholesale price of $.015 per kilowatt hour is paid. At the base of 
Table 6.8 are net present values of the four categories, using 3 and 6 
5 
percent discount rates. 
The values of salinity reduction and increased energy production 
appear to be substantially greater than those attributed to the 
agricultural value. Although it is not clear who may pay for the 
benefits of these offsite impacts, it is of great significance to note 
value compared to the agricultural benefits and costs. 
C. Impacts of a Lease-Option Strategy 
of Upper Basin Irrigation Rights 
1. Procedure 
A lease-option strategy may be the most feasible alternative for 
urban users to gain access to low valued irrigation water, both from an 
economic and political standpoint. Evidence of this practice is found in 
the MWDs dealings with the Coachella and Arvin-Edison agricultural water 
agencies (Quinn, 1986). MWD is negotiating agreements to take some of 
their water in years of shortage, in return for monetary compensation, 
capital improvements, and some of MWDs present excess supplies which the 
agencies can store. Similarly, the Idaho state government recently 
sponsored a study which favorably assesses letting power companies buy 
lease options from irrigators on the Snake River (Whittlesey et al., 
1986). The purpose of these options is to improve the firm energy yield 
of the River. Neither plan is in operation, but it is very easy to see 
165 
why such a strategy would be desirable for MWD and the power companies. 
They gain a great deal of flexibility in assuring a reliable future 
supply. 
2. Practical consideration of the lease option strategy 
There is no reason to believe a potential water user on the MWD 
system may not try to enter into a lease option agreement with Upper 
Basin irrigators if its economically and politically feasible. Indeed, 
CAP is not yet 100 percent complete, and it appears that between this and 
the current full reservoir situation on the River, MWD may be getting its 
traditional (unplanned) excess deliveries, for a few more years. Why, 
then, would they want to pay for water they have a good chance of getting 
free anyway? It may be more prudent for MWDs member to take a "wait and 
see" attitude at the present, and try to negotiate some sort of lease 
option. 
There are two types of lease option transfer strategies which can be 
examined. The most probable one assumes the Lower Basin transferee has 
more sources of water than just the Colorado River and will only exercise 
the option when their other more economic sources are exhausted. This is 
a fairly short and straightforward analysis which can be accomplished 
with the PQP models, as before. Since there is little information 
regarding the reliability or cost of their other sources, it would be 
difficult to analyze the frequency or volume of any transfer. 
A second approach to examining a lease option strategy is to assume 
the Lower Basin purchaser maintains the 897,000 acre foot annual delivery 
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to MWD and will take only enough water to meet the difference between 
that and the sum of the normal deliveries and the unplanned excesses. 
This is similar to the previous section, but in this case the buyer will 
not purchase water if it is not needed to maintain 897,000 acre feet. 
Whether it is a plausible strategy remains to be seen. 
As usual, some assumptions regarding the strategy need to be made to 
provide tractability. They apply equally to both types of lease options 
considered: 
(1) The per acre foot transfer price will depend on the maximum 
amount of water which may be taken, here assumed to be 400,000 
acre feet. 
(2) The regional distribution of where the water will come from, in 
terms of FAs, will be based on the proportion when the maximum 
transfer amount, 400,000 acre feet, is utilized. 
(3) Possible increases in their total irrigation water supply, 
resulting from future dam completions, will not be considered 
by present irrigators. 
The assumptions are very similar to those of the previous section. 
Identifying the locations in (2) will be accomplished as before, however 
this time using Figure 6.1 as a reference. The economic impacts are 
calculated as before as well. 
CRSS will be used somewhat differently. As discussed in Chapter V, 
it is not plausible to use the model to analyze the varied a release 
schedule from the Upper to Lower Basin that this section would suggest. 
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Therefore, the magnitude of offsite impacts can only be discussed rather 
than estimated. However, CRSS can alternatively examine the impacts of 
different weather patterns, embodied in the flows, on the possible lease 
option transfer schedule. 
3. Results for the lease option strategy 
It was established earlier that for a lease option strategy, when 
the decision to exercise the option is not known until winter or early 
spring, water will be relatively more expensive to draw out of 
agriculture. Figure 6.1 shows just how much more expensive. Assuming 
the maximum transfer volume of 400,000 acre feet, water has a marginal 
value slightly less than $10 per acre foot. 
The price found to move approximately this much (404,000) is $9.40 
per acre foot. It comes from 2 PAs, 82 and 83, contributing 136,000 acre 
feet (34 percent of total) and 268,000 acre feet (66 percent), 
respectively. As before, in net, the Upper Basin in total gives up about 
22 percent of its consumptive use. At $9.40, FA 84 can generate more net 
revenue by retaining water in agriculture. 
Interpolation of the land use, production, and other variables, 
listed in the first halves of Tables 6.1 through 6.3 will yield estimates 
of their impacts for up to the maximum transfer amount. Table 6.12 
illustrates these impacts for this maximum of 400,000 acre feet. As 
expected, without the land conversion option, the strategy has relatively 
greater regional effects than with conversion. A 35 percent drop in 
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Table 6.12. Results of reducing Upper Basin agricultural use by 
400,000 acre feet (in 1,000 units), assuming no land 
conversion to dryland production 
Producing area: 
82 83 Total/overall average 
Reduction in consumptive 
use from base (1000 ÂF): 136 268 404 
Percent reduction in 
consumptive use: -13 -46 -35 
Percentage change in 
land use: 
Corn grain 3 -15 -9 
Corn silage 2 -70 —46 
All wheat 2 -25 -16 
Barley 4 -5 -2 
Legume hay -10 -33 -25 
Nonlegurae hay -12 -53 -39 
Percentage change in 
production: 
Corn grain 3 -15 -9 
Corn silage 2 -71 -46 
All wheat 5 -38 -24 
Barley 6 -5 -1 
Legume hay -10 -29 -23 
Nonlegume hay -15 -78 -57 
Other percentage changes: 
Soil erosion (water) -2 -22 -15 
Soil erosion (wind) -13 -27 -22 
Machinery expenditures -8 -38 -28 
Pesticide expenditures -8 -39 -29 
Fertilizer expenditures -5 -43 -30 
Labor usage -8 -35 -26 
Reduction in agriculturally 
generated profits (1,000 
dollars) 1031 1178 2209 
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water use in PAs 82 and 83 will cause like reductions in the resource use 
and production variables. 
Again, the net benefits to the irrigators stemming from the maximum 
transfer are found by subtracting the lost agricultural income, 
$2,209,000, from the proceeds of the water lease, $3,760,000 ($9.40 x 
400,000). This results in an annual producer surplus of approximately 
$1,551,000. 
Under the lease-option strategy, uncertainty about possible delivery 
shortages has qualitatively similar effects to those for the annual, 
outright lease. There is a strong possibility that the Lower Basin users 
might exercise their option the same year or years the Upper Basin 
suffers shortages—driving the per acre foot marginal value of water much 
higher than $9.40. Although its year-to-year changes will not be 
calculated as in Table 6.8, it may be useful to find the maximum shortage 
experienced by the two PAs and calculate water's marginal value in with 
respect to the maximum shortage plus the maximum transfer amount. 
In the year 1998, as simulated in base run, PAs 82 and 83 suffer 
natural shortages of 268,000 and 111,000 acre feet, respectively. In a 
maximum transfer situation, FA 82 will transfer 127,000 acre 
feet—bringing their total water reduction in PA 82 during 1998 to 
395,000 acre feet. This total corresponds to a marginal value of about 
$14.30 per acre foot. For PA 83, the maximum transfer plus the shortage 
equals 361,000 acre feet, corresponding to a value of $20.00 per acre 
foot. Weighting these values by the proportion coming from each PA 
results in 
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an Upper Basin marginal value of water of $18.06 per acre foot. Like the 
previous section, incorporating the natural shortages in addition to the 
transfer amounts can increase the value of water up to twice its normal 
level. Obviously, irrigators will take this into consideration when 
negotiating for the option lease. 
4. Results incorporating a alternative flow simulation years 
Observation of a distribution of possible transfer schedules, under 
a lease option strategy, may lend some insight into the feasibility of 
such a strategy. For illustration, say (again), the Lower Basin user 
wants to maintain the 897,000 acre foot delivery to MWDs system. The 
base run of the CRSS model can be used to derive one possible schedule by 
subtracting the simulated actual annual deliveries to MWD from 897,000 
(Table 5.4). Four additional runs of the model, or "traces" were run, 
each incorporating a different flow pattern. In all, five traces 
including the base run were available for observation. Table 6.13 
summarizes the results of this analysis. To the right of Table 6.13 is 
an "average" schedule based on the mean of the five runs. 
It is apparent that after a few years under this lease option 
strategy, the amount of water transferred becomes almost as great as that 
with the annual lease approach. In fact, after the year 2,000, with just 
3 exceptions, the transfer schedules become essentially the same. This 
is important because it implies a lease option may only be feasible here 
in the near term—at least under the schedule assumed. 
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Table 6.13. Transfers needed to keep a constant 897,000 acre foot 
delivery to the MWD system, under the lease-option 
strategy (1,000 acre a foot) 
Traces and corresponding simulated flow periods: 
Year Trace 1 Trace 2 
(1922-1951) 
Trace 3 
(1927-1956) 
Trace 4 
(1932-1961) 
Trace 5 
(1942-1971) 
5-year 
Avg. 
1986 0 0 0 157 0 31.4 
1987 0 0 215 0 164 75.8 
1988 126 0 287 126 79 123.6 
1989 303 191 362 362 303 304.2 
1990 259 319 379 379 379 343.0 
1991 110 379 379 0 379 249.4 
1992 65 259 379 149 319 234.2 
1993 0 379 379 319 319 279.2 
1994 237 379 379 379 379 350.6 
1995 379 379 379 379 379 379.0 
1996 379 379 379 379 21 307.4 
1997 319 379 379 379 259 343.0 
1998 . 379 379 319 204 379 332.0 
1999 379 379 379 379 379 379.0 
2000 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2001 400 400 400 122 400 344.4 
2002 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2003 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2004 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2005 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2006 400 400 347 400 400 389.4 
2007 400 400 277 400 400 375.4 
2008 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2009 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2010 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2011 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2012 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2013 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2014 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
2015 400 400 400 400 400 400.0 
 ^Source: Colorado River Simulation System (USER, 1985a). 
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For comparison of the total water payments generated under the 
annual transfer and the lease option plans. Table 6.14 provides the 
transfer schedules, per acre foot marginal values of water assuming no 
shortages in irrigation deliveries, and the total annual payment, defined 
as the product of the previous two columns. From the final column, it is 
observed that after 3 years, the annual transfer strategy becomes the 
least cost alternative for the Lower Basin user to maintain a high level 
of capacity in the MWD system. 
D. A Combination Annual Lease, 
Lease Option Strategy 
As seen from Table 6.14, the lease option is the less expensive 
strategy for about the first three years of the transfer period. For the 
remaining time, the annual transfer is least expensive. This should 
indicate a transfer plan incorporating a combination of the two 
strategies may be the overall minimum cost method of achieving the 
constant 897,000 acre feet delivery to the Colorado River Aqueduct. 
Specifically, the leasee may want to develop a plan to acquire an annual 
lease of an increasing volume of water each year between the current 
period and that point in the future when the maximum of 400,000 acre feet 
is needed consistently. Any deficiency during this time horizon could be 
covered by a least option on enough water to cover the shortage. 
The above is easily illustrated by example. The far right column of 
Table 6.13 yields a five year average needed to keep the MWD system at a 
constant capacity. Figure 6.3 plots this against time. Upon observation 
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Table 6.14. Transfer schedules and annual payments to the Upper 
Basin assuming no shortage in deliveries are experienced, 
for the two transfer strategies (in 1,000 units) 
Annual transfer Lease-option transfer Difference 
strategy strategy in payments 
Year 1000 Dollars Total 1000 Dollars Total (1000) 
ÂF per AF payment AF per AF payment Dollars 
1986 311 5.05 1571 31.4 9.4 295 1275 
1987 328 5.05 1656 75.8 9.4 713 944 
1988 345 5.05 1742 123.6 9.4 1162 580 
1989 362 5.05 1828 304.2 9.4 2859 -1031 
1990 379 5.05 1914 343.0 9.4 3224 -1310 
1991 379 5.05 1914 249.4 9.4 2344 - 430 
1992 379 5.05 1914 234.2 9.4 2201 - 288 
1993 379 5.05 1914 279.2 9.4 2624 - 711 
1994 379 5.05 1914 350.6 9.4 3296 -1382 
1995 379 5.05 1914 379.0 9.4 3562 -1649 
1996 379 5.05 1914 307.4 9.4 2890 - 976 
1997 379 5.05 1914 343.0 9.4 3224 -1310 
1998 379 5.05 1914 332.0 9.4 3121 -1207 
1999 379 5.05 1914 379.0 9.4 3562 -1649 
2000 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2001 400 5.05 2020 344.4 9.4 3237 -1217 
2002 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2003 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2004 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2005 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2006 400 5.05 2020 389.4 9.4 3660 -1640 
2007 400 5.05 2020 375.4 9.4 3529 -1509 
2008 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2009 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2010 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2011 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2012 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2013 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2014 400 5.05 2020 400.0 9.4 3760 -1740 
2015 400 5.05 2020 400.00 9.4 3760 -1740 
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of Figure 6.3, it is easy to imagine an exponential function, asymmtotic 
to 400,000 acre feet, which might alternatively represent this data. A 
least squares estimate of such a function was estimated and used to plan 
additions to annual transfer volume over the transfer horizon.® If the 
difference between needed water (Table 6.13) and planned annual transfers 
derived from this function is positive, the balance is acquired via least 
option. If the difference is negative, the leasee received additional 
water over the 897,000 acre feet. 
Applying this method to analyze the annual payment for the annual 
lease, lease option, and combination strategies indicates the latter is 
significantly less expensive than the two previously considered ones. 
Table 6.15 illustrates this in an annual and present value context. The 
combination plan is especially attractive in the nearer term years. 
F. Alternative Assumptions Regarding 
the Transfer Strategies 
Few actual long term, interstate transfers have been proposed, and 
as a result, there are very few non-theoretical guidelines to follow in 
their analysis. For example, the assumptions regarding the possibilities 
of land conversion under the annual and lease option alternatives would 
be difficult to validate. Most likely there would be cases when the 
urban user holding a lease option contract could notify the irrigator in 
time to convert their land to dryland production. And, alternatively, 
there would be cases when, either due to salinity or aridity, irrigated 
land may not be able to be converted to dryland. 
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Figure 6.3. A five-trace average of lease option transfers 
needed to maintain a 400,000 acre foot 
delivery to the MWD system 
(Source: Table 6.13). 
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Table 6.15. Annual payment schedule for annual lease, 
option lease, and combination strategies, 
and their present values (in $1,000) 
Annual Option Combination 
Year transfer lease 
1986 $ 1,571 $ 295 $ 159 
1987 1,656 713 447 
1988 1,742 1,162 682 
1989 1,828 2,859 2,083 
1990 1,914 3,224 2,127 
1991 1,914 2,344 1,582 
1992 1,914 2,201 1,786 
1993 1,914 2,624 1,902 
1994 1,914 3,296 1,963 
.1995 1,914 3,563 1,992 
1996 1,914 2,890 2,007 
1997 1,914 3,224 2,014 
1998 1,914 3,121 2,017 
1999 1,914 3,563 2,019 
2000 2,020 3,760 2,021 
2001 2,020 3,237 2,020 
2002 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2003 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2004 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2005 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2006 2,020 3,660 2,020 
2007 2,020 3,529 2,020 
2008 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2009 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2010 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2011 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2012 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2013. 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2014 2,020 3,760 2,020 
2015 2,020 3,760 2,020 
Present value ; 
at 3% 38,713 59,635 35,530 
at 6% 27,617 40,213 24,438 
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The above discussion underscores the qualification that the economic 
results generated for the transfer alternatives are highly dependent on 
assumptions made to simplify their analyses. Although this limits the 
results to the specialized conditions of the tailored problem, there are 
still valuable generalizations that can be generated with them. Most 
importantly, the value of water for Upper Basin irrigation should not be 
viewed as $5.05 or $9.40 per acre foot, but as within this range 
depending on the volume of water sought (up to 400,000 acre foot) and the 
possibility of harvesting a dryland crop during the water short years. 
Tables 6.1 through 6.6 provide information needed to incorporate 
alternative assumptions regarding land conversion. Although not analyzed 
here, it would be worthwhile to use this information to look at each 
strategy with and without these opportunities. 
The lease option strategy may be case in an unfairly poor light by 
the previous assumptions. Obviously if there are no land conversion 
opportunities and an option of 400,000 acre feet is fully exercised there 
will be significant impacts on the agricultural economy. There may be 
more income in the area, but expenditure patterns by the irrigators may 
be changed. That is, input suppliers and marketing services could be 
more adversely impacted. However, the important point is that this is 
only when the full option is exercised. In reality, if it happened with 
increasing frequency, as the analysis indicates will happen, the transfer 
contracts may be re-examined. 
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More likely the situation will exist where, as previously discussed, 
the Lower Basin urban use may have other alternatives for acquiring water 
and will utilize the option maybe as frequently, but for smaller volumes. 
This would result in the lease option strategy being the less disruptive 
transfer plan to agriculture and related industries. 
F. Summary 
This chapter has estimated the marginal value of water in Upper 
Basin agriculture by parameterizing its selling price in the PA models. 
For a given level of transfer, water's marginal value and the associated 
production and resource impacts of its transfer were determined. Water 
was found to have two values in relation to the assumed transfer. When 
the irrigator has the possibility of converting land to dryland 
production, less compensation may be required. 
For an outright, annual 30-year lease of up to 400,000 acre feet, 
water in the Upper Basin was found to have a per acre foot value of 
$5.05. This represented a 22 percent drop in irrigation consumptive use 
in the area. Conversely land use, production, and input usage changed 
less than proportionately. This was due to resource allocation decisions 
suggested by the model to convert some of the poorer yielding irrigated 
acres to dryland production. This maintained total acreage of lower 
valued hay crop and also maintained production of higher valued grains. 
The offsite impacts of the transfer, reduced salinity in the River and 
increased hydropower production, appear to have many times the value of 
the water in agriculture. 
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If a lease option strategy is employed, the marginal value of water 
increases to $9.40 per acre foot if there is assumed to be no dryland 
conversion opportunities. However, it may be the more economically 
feasible alternative considering the inevitable intense opposition to a 
proposed long term sacrifice of a resource as political as water. In the 
special case where the transferee wants to maintain the annual delivery 
to MWD at 897,000 acre feet, the combination annual lease, lease option 
strategy was found to be the least expensive. Because CRSS indicated 
that unplanned excess deliveries will be reduced to near zero after the 
year 2,000, the transfer schedule for this special case were thereafter 
nearly identical to that of the less expensive annual transfer option. 
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Endnotes 
1 Alternatively, and equivalently, successively reducing the water 
availability to the models and observing its shadow price could have 
been implemented. 
2 Nonlegume hay is also planted in the spring here but usually is sowed 
into a fall-planted nurse crop (Martin et al., 1976). 
3 The slight increase in FA 82s and FA 83s, total acreage is the 
utilization of the small amount of slack dryland acres in the FQF 
models. 
4 Increasing the crop output prices 50 percent increased the marginal 
value of irrigation water to $23.26 per acre foot in the land 
conversion case, and $42.32 per acre foot without conversion. 
5 These rates are assumed to bracket the long run, real rate which may be 
used in a project evaluation. 
6 The expotential function used for the experiment was of the form 
y = BC/C + (B - C)e"^  
where y is the annual transfer volume in a given year; B is 400, the 
long run asymmtotic value; C is 31.4, the first year value; A is 
estimated by least squares; and X is the year of the transfer in a 
range of 1 to 30. A was estimated to be .001395. It was significant 
at the 99 percent level with an R-square of .90. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
The results generated from the previous chapter, lead to more 
broadly applicable conclusions regarding interstate water transfers. The 
conclusions highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the analysis, 
provide suggestions for further research, and importantly, suggest policy 
direction for water allocation institutions. 
The first section discusses the specific conclusions drawn from 
results in Chapter VI, both particular points and then generalizations. 
It also makes policy recommendations based on these conclusions. 
Following this discussion is a section on the limitations of the study 
and subsequent suggestions for future research. 
A. Conclusions 
Irrigation water has a very low marginal value in the Upper basin. 
It is of little surprise to find that, according to the PQP models, up to 
400,000 acre feet of irrigation water has a marginal value of less than 
$10 per acre foot. Agricultural productivity in the areas is low, and 
coupled with depressed output prices, results in crop production being a 
low profit proposition. In terms of competitive advantage, the Upper 
Basin has a great deal of leased federal grazing, but too few arable 
acres to produce the feed necessary to become a regional center for 
cattle feeding and meatpacking. The region is also hampered by its 
remote location, much more so than beef finishing areas such as Garden 
182 
City, Guymon, or the Colorado Front Range, which, though somewhat remote 
themselves, have the available feedstuffs and economically more 
competitive transportation routes. There will likely always be enough 
irrigated production in the Upper Basin to supplement the grazing but 
never enough to export finished, rather than feeder, cattle. 
From a policy standpoint, there is probably little possibility of 
raising water's marginal value product in agricultural production aside 
from increasing crop price supports. The low agriculture value should 
indicate to the federal and state governments that future structural 
development for the sake of irrigation water may not be a good investment 
by economic standards. And, in fact, this conclusion is being driven 
home by several economists in the western states by intense opposition to 
several dam projects in southwestern Colorado. With so much water 
generating little value in agriculture, it seems almost intuitive that 
increasing irrigation efficiencies, conservation, and promoting water 
transfers could yield an equal amount of water at a cheaper price than 
with structural development. 
Irrigation water will not sell at the estimated marginal productive 
value. This conclusion is not drawn from the models but becomes evident 
when comparing the model results with the values of water in competitive 
uses. Strictly speaking, the conclusion could alternatively be listed as 
a study limitation, but shall be discussed explicitly at this point. 
As mentioned in the early stages of Chapter VI, this research only 
calculates water's value as a productive input and not as a marketable 
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commodity. This is all that is possible in the FQF framework. In 
reality, however, an irrigator will consider many factors before making a 
decision whether to give up a portion of their water or not. These 
include the compensation amount and its packaging in terms of annual 
and/or lump sum payments, the aforementioned next cheapest alternative 
available to the transferee, uncertainty in agricultural and other 
industry variables, and possible government intervention in the form of 
exchange taxes or fees. 
Obviously, for compensation, the marginal value of water is a useful 
starting point. Additionally, it was implicitly assumed in the preceding 
exercises that payment was made on an annual basis. These are safe 
assumptions when little information about the relative market power of 
each party to an exchange is available; and when dealing in a 
heterogeneous region. 
Few irrigators draw their water directly from a main tributary. 
They nearly always belong to an irrigation association and water 
conservancy district which, on assessment, will provide delivery service 
in member-owned canals and laterals. Rarely, then, would one expect to 
observe a single irrigator arranging terms with a potential buyer or 
leasee. The latter would more likely deal with the irrigation 
association that would collectively bargain for interested members. 
Alternatively, the buyer/leasee may try to segment the Upper Basin 
to take advantage of lack of communication among the irrigators to 
extract producer surplus. This is exactly what the city of Thornton, 
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Colorado (a Denver suburb) did in 1986 to irrigators sixty miles 
northeast, near Ault. Thornton used a third party buyer to acquire up 
to 30,000 acre feet of irrigation rights. By using discretion in 
discussing his intentions, or client, publicly, the buyer negotiated 
varied prices (in excess of 300 percent) for irrigation water rights. 
Some sellers even shared the same canals but were unaware of the others' 
transactions (Miniclier, 1987). 
The compensation package, as opposed to a single annual amount could 
effect the sale, as well. Whittlesey et al. (1986, pp. 96-97), suggested 
an annuity combined with a lump sum payment in the years of water supply 
interruption as a compensation scheme for a lease option strategy. They 
hedged by also suggesting research in the area of developing compensation 
strategies which provided maximum flexibility to all parties involved. 
The combination of an annuity and lump sum payments, whether at the 
beginning or at the intervals, could be tailored to sellers with varying 
degrees of risk aversion. It could also provide an immediate cash 
infusion to a financially stressed agricultural area, but at the expense 
of a possible long term loss of a resource. 
The recent study by Wahl and Davis (1986) suggests urban users on 
the MWD system are considering a minimum of $200 to $240 per acre foot to 
deliver reclaimed water from the Imperial and Coachella Valleys. If 
successful in obtaining what they estimate to be up to 400,000 acre feet 
through them, it might represent MWD's next cheapest alternative to Upper 
Basin water. Subtract Wahl and Davis' estimated pumping cost of $72 per 
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acre foot for delivery through the Colorado River Aqueduct and a 
potential purchaser could afford to pay $128 to $168 per acre foot to the 
Upper Basin irrigators for an annual right. These are rather cavalier 
estimates in that they do not consider water quality differences, 
litigation costs in obtaining water, and system capacity. However, they 
highlight the potential for a seller to extract economic rent from a 
buyer (or vice versa). The difference between the irrigation value of 
the water and MWD's next cheapest alternative would likely be the 
bargaining range. 
Uncertainty about future crop prices, other input costs, inflation, 
and technology will also play a large part in the irrigators decisions on 
whether to release water. These variables could potentially be 
incorporated in the current model framework if resources permitted. 
Uncertainty in the energy industry is also an important variable. 
Despite the current slump, energy development has been counted on to use 
a large amount of water in the future. From a 1987 perspective, it 
appear this use will have to obtain water from existing users, of which 
agriculture may be a prime target. Irrigators interested in selling a 
portion of their water may not want to tie themselves to long terra 
agreements with urban users if they think a greater price could be 
obtained for the water in the future. Or, they raay demand a high price 
from a current purchaser in light of the uncertainty. 
The federal and state governments in the Upper Basin have played a 
very large part in water development and allocation. If the recent 
186 
transfer tax imposed by Colorado (Chapter II) is an indication, 
government will likely become involved in the water pricing process, 
also. The Bureau of Reclamation has very generously cost-shared and 
loaned literally billions of dollars to irrigation development. A 
substantial portion of this investment shows little promise of generating 
enough agricultural revenue to repay even the interest of the investment. 
In a real sense, the Bureau of Reclamation "bankrolled" western water 
development and it seems reasonable they share in exchange proceeds. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter II, many feel that few irrigators would 
be willing to give up water unless they could keep the majority of the 
proceeds of its sale. From a regional perspective, it also seems 
reasonable that states would want a piece of the pie, as well, since the 
water, by law, belongs to the public. Since there is no guarantee the 
irrigators will invest the proceeds within the state, the state 
legislatures may demand protection against adverse secondary impacts. 
Water transfers will have negative secondary intacts to agricultural 
regions, but not as severe as anticipated. Under the annual lease 
transfer scenario, with land conversion possibilities, the benefits of 
increased regional net revenue were partially offset by reductions in 
production and input usage. However, the reductions are proportionately 
much less than the reduction in water use. As a result of a 22 percent 
reduction of irrigation water, land under cultivation in the Upper Basin 
remains about the same. Production levels of irrigated crops drop but 
mostly in low valued nonlegume hay, and input usage is reduced much less 
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than 22 percent; labor use dropped only 4 percent, and machinery, 
pesticide, and fertilizer expenditures dropped 6, 7, and 8 percent, 
respectively. These fairly minor changes resulting from the transfer 
indicate the secondary regional impacts may not be as severe as states 
may fear. It implies that states considering blanket prohibitions on 
interstate water transfers should consider such actions on a case-by-case 
basis, instead. 
In addition to possibly standing on shaky ground with the Commerce 
Clause, basin states could be denying their citizens an opportunity to 
increase their incomes, and increase benefits of nonconsumptive water 
uses which depend on instream flows. As Radosevich (1986, p. 288) 
states, its important that states "not cut their throats to spite their 
face" by categorically limiting transfers. 
The magnitude of adverse secondary impacts, whose effects have been 
downplayed, may, in fact, be overstated. Since no activities were 
included in the FA models to increase irrigation efficiency, or reduce 
irrigation levels while maintaining the same amount of irrigated land, 
the model estimates are considered to be biased in a negative direction. 
Incorporating these activities may have resulted in the secondary 
impacts, as measured by decreased production and input usage, being even 
less. 
The offsite impacts of interstate water transfers are very 
significant and have as high a dollar value as the water in agricultural 
uses. Probably the major contribution of the analysis is in estimating 
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river salinity changes and increased hydropower production resulting from 
the Upper Basin releasing irrigation water to the Lower Basin. The 
Bureau of Reclamation's Colorado River model, CRSS, indicated a long term 
reduction in salinity of up to 50 to 60 mg/1 with 400,000 acre feet taken 
from Upper Basin consumptive uses. Over 400 gigawatt hours of 
electricity are produced annually by the increased river flow resulting 
from this release. 
Table 6.11 compares the agricultural value of 400,000 acre feet of 
Upper Basin water, the value of decreased salinity to Lower Basin 
agricultural and municipal users (using Gardner's estimates of salinity 
values) and a conservative estimate of the value of the energy increases. 
From simple observation, there is little question that these offsite 
impacts have a far greater economic value than the waters agricultural 
value. For illustration, consider simulation year 2000. Water's per 
acre foot agricultural value in the Upper Basin is approximately $5.32. 
For salinity reductions, the transfer has a value of $5.52 and $24.63 per 
acre foot, to Imperial Valley irrigators and municipal users, 
respectively. At $.015 per kilowatt hour, the extra electricity produced 
has a value of $17.78 per acre foot. The total offsite benefits from the 
transfer are $47.93 per acre foot ($5.52 + $24.63 + $17.78). This is 
about nine times the marginal value of an acre foot of water to 
agriculture. 
Since the benefactors of the offsite impacts would probably be in a 
different state than the transferor. Upper Basin states may have limited 
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interest in the offsite values. However, from a regional perspective the 
Federal government should assess the possible net social gains stemming 
from a liberalized transfer policy. The recent relaxed attitude of the 
Bureau of Reclamation regarding transfers—again, taking them on a 
case-by-case basis—provides evidence of an increasing awareness of the 
disproportionate values. The policy recommendation implied by this 
conclusion, then, is to an expert already being implemented by the 
Bureau. 
Positive quadratic programming appears to be a useful technique for 
avoiding flexibility constraints when information is limiting. Although 
far from a ringing endorsement of FQF, this analysis demonstrated that it 
can be useful in some situations. Here FQF was used in lieu of 
flexibility constraints to calibrate the base level programming models 
and analyze the agricultural impacts of increasing the selling price of 
irrigation water. 
The traditional methods of setting flexibility constraints were not 
felt to be applicable. As discussed in Chapter VI, FQF had the appeal of 
being easily implemented and having straightforward economic 
interpretation. For this analysis, it did not require more information 
than the base year acreage levels for the six crops in each of the 3 PAs. 
This was fortunate, since data for the Upper Basin and its predominant 
crop, hay, are difficult to obtain in a useful form. 
However, the benefit of FQF, its lack of additional data 
requirements, is also a weakness. When a programming model does not come 
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close to replicating the base year input and output levels, it should be 
an indication that enterprise costs and benefits are not being adequately 
treated. Rather than compensating for these discrepancies in a wholesale 
manner with PQP, it might be more worthwhile to investigate the 
production technology and pricing in the study area further. 
Describing PQP as ad hoc is possibly too harsh, but is the attitude 
of Hazell and Norton (1986, p. 221). They state that manipulating the 
objective function for the sole purpose of calibrating the model (which 
is, to some, exactly what PQP does) is to be strictly avoided. There is 
some economic justification for assuming a Leontif-type production 
function quadratic in land, but the quadratic portion is neither 
estimated empirically or directly observable. 
Despite its arbitrary nature, PQP worked surprisingly well in this 
analysis. It calibrated the models to their base year, met a priori 
expectations regarding sensitivity to output price changes, and generated 
reasonable supply curves for water sales. The acreage and production 
adjustments to water sales were reasonable as well. With the exception 
of the absolute magnitude of the objective value, the model results are 
defendable. In some situations, then, where data are scarce and policy 
or resource scenarios are unique, PQP may have a useful purpose. Until 
better data are acquired regarding the study area, it can be used to 
aggregately account for relevant missing information. 
The Colorado River Simulation System is a powerful tool for 
analyzing economic issues in light of hydrologie and institutional 
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constraints. To the Bureau of Reclamation's knowledge, the CRSS model 
had not been used to support an economic analysis of water transfers. 
The only non-Bureau mention of the CRSS in past economic research 
regarding agricultural and/or salinity abatement has been in 
generalizations about salinity retention time between the Upper and Lower 
Basins (Gardner, 1983). This seems curious when considering the recent 
attention give the economic issues in western water development. In the 
future, it will be used to support USDA research regarding the benefits 
and cost of water quality improvement programs in the Colorado basin. 
Linking the programming models to CRSS was straightforward since the 
FAs correspond closely with sub-basins of the River. CRSS greatly 
enhanced the analysis by providing basin-wide salinity and energy 
production impacts of transferring irrigation water to the Lower Basin. 
It accounted for the institutional restrictions placed on the system and 
the year-to-year variability of streamflows. There was additional, 
relevant information generated by CRSS that was not reported in Chapter V 
or VI, simply because it was so voluminous in nature. Items such as 
monthly stream flow and reservoir levels are very important to 
recreational and fishing uses, but reporting all of them would have been 
distracting relative to the primary intent of the study. 
The Bureau of Reclamation currently maintains and updates the model 
on a regular basis. They were very cooperative in assisting in its 
adaptations for non-Bureau studies. It does require a fairly specialized 
computer operating system, the CYBER-170, however individuals with 
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average computer skills can run it once installed. For the price of 
locating a compatible computer, the Bureau's self-described 
"state-of-the-art in river system simulation" is available to almost 
anyone with the patience to study its operation. 
B. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study, like most others, has many limitations which should be 
identified and briefly discussed as a basis for appropriately qualifying 
the analytical results and policy implications. Future research in each 
area is, of course, recommended. 
The linkage of the economic models and river basin model was rather 
simplistic and could be improved. The PA-PQP models were static and for 
the 1984 based crop production sector. The CRSS model was necessarily 
dynamic in nature. When evaluating water's marginal value over time, 
incorporating possible deficient deliveries, the static models were 
pragmatically applied. They assumed technology and output prices 
remained at their 1984 levels. Building a dynamic component into the 
PA-PQP models is recommended and would involve solving them for every 
simulation year, incorporating a subroutine in the system annually 
accounting for irrigation water availability (from CRSS) and 
technological advances in crop yields. This subroutine would update 
water and other constraints in the PA-PQP models and use technology 
factors to adjust yields. 
Another possible improvement in the PA-PQP models involves breaking 
out input costs. Pesticides, fertilizer, labor, machinery, and other 
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costs were aggregated in the objective function. Separate input 
purchasing activities would more explicitly account for limited 
availability, or changes in costs. The development of constraints on 
input availability may also reduce the need for flexibility constraints 
in the FÂ-PQF models necessary to replicate a base year. 
If the above improvements are made, other model enhancing features 
could be more easily incorporated. For instance, weather patterns 
corresponding to the historical river flows could be examined. If a 
CRSSsimulation run, for example, used the historical flow years of 1922 
through 1951, weather data for several Upper Basin locations could be 
obtained for the same time period. These data could then be used as 
inputs to plant growth simulators such as EPIC, to estimate yield 
variability corresponding to the flow variability. This joint simulation 
could be valuable in setting exchange terms if it was found that in years 
of low flow, yields (particularly dryland) were correspondingly low. 
In addition to yield variability, other uncertainties could be 
examined in a more dynamic economic framework. Different paths of input 
and output prices over time could be introduced. Their explicit 
consideration would permit a better analysis of producer behavior under 
uncertainty. Risk attitudes of producers when faced with long terra 
irrevocable decisions, like selling water rights, would be a useful 
extension. 
Other limitations and future directions for the economic modeling 
system are structural in nature. There are three in particular. First, 
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a livestock sector should be built into the system. As discussed, what 
little agriculture there is in the Upper Basin supports the beef 
industry. The need for FQF may also be reduced by incorporating 
livestock production activities to provide a demand for irrigated crops. 
Tied to this is a second recommendation of endogenizing the output 
prices, especially for hay. Although hard to estimate, a demand function 
for each output would capture the local price response to their changing 
supplies. Additionally, demand functions would permit a more complete 
welfare analysis. 
A third structural improvement to the PA-PQP models is to include 
activities to raise irrigation efficiency. Activities could be developed 
to reduce inefficiencies by making capital improvements in irrigation 
equipment. Implementation of sprinkler systems and the lining of 
irrigation canals are examples. Considering almost 25 percent of 
Colorado River water is irrecoverably lost to the system, there is high 
potential for economic water reclamation, rather than reducing 
agricultural consumptive uses, to "squeeze" more water from the area. 
A final possible improvement to the programming models has been 
previously discussed in the text. It involves developing crop activities 
which have reduced levels of water consumptive use, and correspondingly 
lower yields. From an economic standpoint, it implies moving down the 
production function. However, more complete production function 
estimates are required for this extension. 
195 
Aside from the limitations embodied in the economic and river basin 
models, there are other areas for improvement in the analysis. Only the 
direct economic benefits of interstate water transfers were calculated. 
In terms of the cost of the transfer—the secondary costs of reduced 
regional economic activity and the long term loss of a valuable 
resource—little was mentioned aside from calculating the loss of 
agriculturally generated profits and changes in input expenditures. 
These latter impacts can be significant to the continued viability of 
rural communities depending on irrigated agriculture. Although described 
as minor, they can have multiplier effects throughout the region. In the 
Four Corners area, roughly the area of FA 84, Gisser used a multiplier 
of1.59 for reduced agricultural income and 1.58 with labor usage. That 
is, a $1 loss of farming income will result in a $1.59 loss in regional 
income and a 1 hour loss of farm labor results in a 1.58 hour loss in 
regional labor utilization. 
The secondary impacts, both benefits and costs, were not included in 
the analysis for several reasons: (1) they are hard to estimate, (2) it 
is difficult to determine where the water sales proceeds will be spent. 
If they are reinvested in the originating area, there could be secondary 
benefits balancing the aforementioned costs. Also, (3) from a larger 
regional perspective, calculating the secondary impacts could be a zero 
sum game. The costs to the Upper Basin may be offset by additional 
benefits to the Lower Basin. From a national perspective, these aspects 
may be very hard to identify. 
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A final suggestion for improving the analyses of interstate water 
transfers is a cataloging of acquisition alternatives for potential 
purchases of water. MND, for example, has many alternatives for 
obtaining more water, in addition to tapping the Colorado. Chapter III 
attempted to identify these alternatives, albeit on a limited basis. 
Knowledge in the area and each agencies' strategic planning would assist 
in anticipating future water transfers and their possible terms of 
exchange. 
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IX. APPENDIX A; DERIVATION OF CARD/RCA CROP PRODUCTION COEFFICIENTS 
The CARD/RCA programming models and related data are mentioned 
repeatedly in the course of this study. Since the programming models of 
the Upper Basin are from this modeling system, an overview of the 
development of the CARD/RCA input coefficients is appropriate. This will 
serve the purposes of (1) demonstrating that the CARD LP model(s) may not 
be the "black boxes*' as some outside observers may think, and 
(2) providing an understanding of the model sufficient for constructive 
criticism of the results and suggestions for future improvements. 
The "model" referred to refers to the 105 PA, 8 land group, 17 crop, 
16 conservation tillage and support practices, linear programming model 
of U.S. crop production. This is the base model which other smaller 
models have evolved from. Users of the offspring include the Economic 
Research Service, the Soil Conservation Services, and Environmental 
Protection Agency. The main model was developed under contract with the 
ses for the 1985 Resource Conservation Act (RCA). 
Before proceeding, it may be useful to state what the base model is 
not. It is a model of resource use in the agricultural production 
sector, not a general equilibrium model of the agricultural economy. It 
is not a detailed model of input substitution possibilities. As 
previously discussed, it incorporates a fixed technology in terms of 
input use. Yield increases due to technological advances are 
incorporated in base models for the years 1990, 2000, and 2030. However, 
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input use is, for the most part, assumed to remain at constant absolute 
and relative levels. Finally, the model is not tightly constrained, only 
land and water availability are limited. This is realistic in a long run 
analysis, but may miss some of the very important short run adjustments 
to policy changes. 
Balancing these weaknesses are many strengths. The model has 
detailed information on input use, conservation practices, and 
qualitative yield differentials (between land groups, tillage practices 
and production areas) not found in other models of national agricultural 
production. This makes it very well suited for analyzing contemporary 
resource policies, such as the Conservation Reserve Program, conservation 
cross compliance with commodity programs, and, of course, water resource 
issues in relation to agricultural production. 
The heart of the CARD model is the crop matrix input data set 
(MIDSET). This is a repository for nearly all of the yield and input use 
information collected for the hundreds of crop rotations considered in 
the model. A sample MIDSET entry for a surface water irrigated crop 
rotation, in PA 82, is given in Table 9.1. Its components are briefly 
described and a summary chart of its evolution is presented in the 
following sections. 
Table 9.1. Â. sample MIDSET entry from the CARO/RCA modeling framework 
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A. Components of the CARD Modeling System 
1. Rotation identification and objective function value 
The first two lines identify the rotation, market region, and 
objective function value. •I2LCA082* refers to irrigated crop rotation 
LC (silage, wheat, and legume hay) grown on land group 2, using tillage 
practice A (traditional fall plow) in FA 82. The market region (MR) is 
23 (MRs are not considered in this study) and the objective function has 
an initial value of 0.00. 
2. Field and irrigation energy use, lines 3 and 4 
These give the energy uses of diesel fuel (gal), natural gas (Hcf), 
LP gas (gal), and electricity (kwh) for field operations and irrigation. 
The source is the FEDS budget system and the associated irrigation cost 
program formerly operated at Oklahoma State University (Klettke, 1978). 
3. Irrigation efficiencies and application costs, lines 5 and 6 
Incidental, on-farm and conveyance irrigation efficiencies are 
derived from the SCS Special Projects publication (USDA, 1976), Variable 
application costs are on a per acre foot basis. Fixed and sunk costs are 
also on a per acre basis. These cost were developed using the FED's 
system and the SCS Special Projects sources. Further irrigation 
information is available from Smith et al. (1987) and Oamek (1986). 
4. Soil loss and terracing costs, lines 7 
Soil losses due to water erosion, measured by the Universal Soil 
Loss Equation and AGF technique, are listed as well as wind erosion 
estimated by the Woodruff and Siddoway equation. The figures are 
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obtained from the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) crop 
growth simulation model (Futman and Dyke, 1987). Terracing costs, 
although not considered, are derived from data supplied by the SCS 
National Technical Centers. The last entry on the line is the number of 
crops in the rotation, 5. 
5. Specific crop information, lines 9 through 18 
In this case 5 crops are considered in the rotation. More 
correctly, this could be considered the information by year for a 5-year 
rotation. The first column lists the current crop—3 is corn silage, 16 
is winter wheat, and 5 is legume hay. The second column is the previous 
year's crop. This is important when considering nutrient carryover. The 
third column is the current crop's relative weight in the rotation. The 
next column is base yield. Following this is a series of yield impacts 
due to rotation sequence and fertilizer carryovers. These impacts are 
summed to obtain a factor to multiply times the base yield. Base yields 
for a PA are averages derived from Statistical Reporting Services (SRS) 
statistics for the years 1980 to 1982. Land group adjustments and the 
other above yield adjustments are derived from the EPIC simulator 
(English, 1986). 
Under the heading 'DIESEL' and through 'OTHER' are per acre costs 
for the input categories listed. They are self-explanatory except for 
'OTHER' which includes seed, interest on operating capital and machinery 
ownership costs. For the present purpose, it can be stated that these 
costs were derived from the CARD budget system. The CARD system 
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resembles the FEDS system and uses a great deal of the latter's 
information. However, CARD budgets are hybrids developed form the FEDS 
and information gathered with from individual state SCS offices. A 
sample is given in Table 9.2. It is a corn silage budget in PA 82 and, 
with the exception of yield and fertilizer levels, should look similar to 
MIDSET data for crop 3. 
Under the headings NITRO, PHOS, and POTAS are fertilizer use 
requirements on a pound per unit of output basis. They are derived in a 
backward fashion using a Spillman function methodology. Stoecker (1974) 
documents regional equations that calculate fertilizer use levels given a 
base crop yield. Note that nitrogen use per ton of corn silage is only 
.26. Assuming a 14.8 T yield, this results in only 3.85 lbs of N being 
purchased. From the region's Spillman function, the N level should be 
near 108 lbs per acre, the remaining 104 lbs come from N carryover (in 
addition to the NITROIM) resulting from 2 previous years of legume hay. 
The amount of carryover per year is derived from equations contained in 
Nicol and Heady (1975, pp. 109, 110). 
The final column in lines 9 through 18 is consumptive water use 
requirements on an acre foot per acre basis. These are obtained from the 
SCS, Special Projects document. 
6. Fertilizer prices, line 19 
Prices for N, P, and K are given per lb. The price of lime is per 
ton. 
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Converting the MIDSET data into the standard mathematical 
programming system (MPS) format involves the execution of a matrix 
generating program. A typical MPS output for the rotation listed in 
Table 9.2 might resemble: 
I2LCA082 OBJOOOOl 126, .578 
I2LCA082 ZAWT0082 -13, ,007 
I2LCA082 LAWT0082 0, ,200 
I2LCA082 ZCSL0082 -2, ,963 
I2LCA082 LCSL0082 0. ,200 
I2LCA082 ZHLH0082 -1. 418 
I2LCA082 LHLH0082 0. 600 
I2LCA082 LTOT0082 1. 000 
I2LCA082 SWTR0082 1. 505 
I2LCA082 SWND0082 6. 402 
I2LCA082 WSR00082 1. 190 
I2LCA082 LIRS2082 1. 000 
The objective function value is the sum of the individual crop per 
acre costs plus the per acre fertilizer costs, multiplied by the crop its 
crop weight. Yield is the per crop yield per acre times the crop weight. 
Land use levels for individual crops are listed, as well as the irrigated 
land constraint (LIRS) and total land use (LTOT). Soil loss from water 
and wind are given, and finally, the weighted was use (WSR). 
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Other information needed to develop constraint levels for the model 
has been discussed in the text. For the CARD/RCA model, the NRI provides 
PA and land group right-hand-sides. Surface water constraints are 
developed by multiplying crop per acre water use requirements by 
historical crop levels and summing across crops. 
Figure 9.1 schematically illustrates the CARD/RCA MIDSET evolution 
for the crop sector. The MIDSET framework for dryland and groundwater 
irrigated crops is essentially the same as it is for the illustrated 
surface water irrigated one. Also, in the parent model, there are 
double-crop possibilities for some areas included in separate MIOSETS. 
From Figure 9.1 it is apparent there are also land and irrigation 
MIDSETS. These are of no less importance to the model, but contain much 
less information. Complete descriptions of the contents of the 
irrigation MIDSET can be found in English et al. (1987) and Oamek (1986). 
The land MIDSET consists of the 1982 endogenous cropland base, 
adjustments for future urban growth, amount of potential future 
conversions into/out of cropland from/to forests and pastures, and other 
data pertaining to land usage. This aspect of the CARD/RCA model is 
still in the process of being documented. 
There are other sectors in the CARD/RCA framework that will not be 
discussed since they are not used in the present analysis. They are, 
however, valuable in the overall modeling system. These sectors are for 
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demand, transportation, livestock, and rangeland. Mathematical 
descriptions and further reference for them can be found in English et 
al. (1987). 
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APPENDIX B: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF POSITIVE QUADRATIC PROGRAMMING 
Howitt and Mean (1985) present a comprehensive explanation of PQP's 
theoretical and operational aspects. This appendix shall draw heavily 
upon their work. This is not so much that PQP is a particularly 
difficult method to grasp, but Howitt and Mean present it in a concise, 
easily understood manner. 
First, assume a quadratic and generalized Leontif production 
function closely approximates the crop production technology in the 
region being modeled. In the context of the Upper Basin models, assume a 
quadratic-linear Leontif technology exists; quadratic in land, as 
previously discussed, and linear in the other inputs. 
In the absence of detailed knowledge regarding the actual underlying 
profit or cost functions of a region, linear programming (LP) is often 
used to crudely approximate the technology. Regional average yield and 
cost figures are typically used as inputs in the model. However, its 
assumed a generalized quadratic Leontif production function more closely 
approximates the technology relating crop output, y, and inputs 
(land), x2, and xi, i.e., 
Y = min (a^ X^  - ^  b^ xg, a^ X^  a^ X^ ) (10.1) 
The profit function corresponding to this production function might 
resemble : 
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Max ïï 
ïï = minfa^ X^  - ^  b^ Xg, agXg, .... r^ a^ X^ ) (10.2) 
1^*1 " ^2*2 ~ '^ i*! 
Where p^  is output price for crop i and r are input costs for factor X. 
At expected acreage, X , the marginal contribution of crop i to 
profit, under an LP specifications, is the value of average product (VAF) 
less variable costs (VC ); 
 ^= PiC*! - I bjXj) - VC (10.3) 
axi 
Where the terra in parentheses represents VAF. 
Under a quadratic specification, at Xj^ , the marginal contribution to 
profit is the value of marginal product (VMF) less variable costs; 
— = p. (a. - bXJ - VC (10.4) 
ax,  ^ 1 1 
If the production function is quadratic in land, the divergence between 
marginal conditions for an LP based on average yield and a marginal 
condition linear in land allocation equals 
(4) - (3) = - ^  Pi^ l^ i (10.5) 
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"Clearly, a calibration constraint in the LP formulation-holding the 
land allocation in crop i to X will have a dual value equal to the 
divergence (5) if the production function on which farmers base their 
marginal decisions is quadratic Leontif" (Howitt and Mean, 1985). 
If the dual value of the calibration constraint is X, 
then 
and 
 ^ - 2 Pi^ l^ l 
The PQP specification, then requires that the additional marginal 
cost be linear in land. "Thus, a quadratic production function in land 
is necessary and sufficient condition for the addition of the PQP cost 
component to an LP specification based on average yields." 
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